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SUMMARY 
During the late 1970's, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) and several other government agencies developed a policy intended to 
permit more rapid regulation of cancer-causing substances. The existing method of 
regulating carcinogens one-by-one is inadequate due to the long time spans 
encountered before, during, and after rulemaking. Such delays are caused by 
extensive staff preparation time for each substance, litigation, economic impact 
analysis, and quantitative risk assessments. This thesis examines the social context 
of regulation of carcinogens, an historical analysis of the developments at OSHA 
that led to the policy's formulation in 1980 and the subsequent decision not to 
implement it, and a review of a number of philosophical and methodological 
dilemmas posed by economic and risk analysis of carcinogen regulation. A case 
study of how methylene chloride would have been regulated under the policy (had 
it been fully implemented) is provided to illustrate the differences between generic 
and substance-specific regulation. The number of cancer cases which could have 
been prevented by generic regulation of this one chemical is estimated. Interviews 
with former President Jimmy Carter, the last four OSHA administrators, personnel at 
NIOSH, OSHA, NTP, OMB, and other key individuals were conducted. Historical 
documents at the Jimmy Carter Library in Atlanta, Georgia were also analyzed. 
Conclusions include: 
1. The necessity of a generic policy 
2. , The identities of the stakeholders involved 
3. The inadequacy of the dominant model separating risk management from 
risk assessment 
4. The hegemony of economists and risk assessors in modern occupational 
cancer regulation 
5. The absence of organized labor 
6. How public input into the decisionmaking process can be improved by 
implementation of a generic cancer policy. 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Generic Regulation and the Incremental Norm 
Motivated largely by increasing production, modern society is marked by rapid 
rates of technological innovation previously unimaginable. With these changes has 
come a recognition of the need to plan for various consequences, some well-defined 
and others less clear. One school of thought has argued that such planning is 
comprehensible only in small packages, and that our political system is capable of 
nothing more extensive than a "muddling through" approach.1 Others have noted 
the inadequacies of this approach, calling for a more "comprehensive, rational" 
planning stance, stretching our prescient abilities to the utmost.2 
The massive introduction of synthetic chemicals into commerce after World War 
II is a classic example of rapid technological innovation unaccompanied by a 
comprehensive social policy. However, the recognition of the need for public policy 
planning arrived some years later, and came only after reports of harmful 
environmental and human health effects.3 The fy-st attempts at muddling through 
soon followed. While the magnitude alone of these changes would seem to make the 
need for a comprehensive social policy self-evident, regulation of these substances 
has in fact more closely resembled a slow, one-by-one approach, i.e. the "muddling 
^indblom, CE: "The Science of Muddling Through," Public Administration 
Review, Spring, 1959, p. 79-88 
2Quade ES: Analysis for Public Decisions. North Holland Press, New York, 
1982 
3Many environmentalists cite the publication of Rachel Carson's book, Silent 
Soring. Fawcett Publishers, Greenwich, Conn, 1962 as the first time the issue was 
raised publicly. 
through approach." At the same time, there have been a few occasions when 
abrupt, large-scale changes in policy have been effected. The Occupational Health 
and Safety Act (OSHA) 4 of 1970 was such a change. It has been described as a 
new right added to the Bill of Rights, although it is really a legal right, not (yet) a 
constitutional right. In the words of a former Assistant Secretary of Labor for 
OSHA, it is "the right to a safe and healthful workplace."5 In short, the formation 
of OSHA was an attempt by Congress to implement a comprehensive policy; 
unfortunately, the agency has remained mired in the norm of incrementalism for most 
of its brief history. 
Various attempts have been made to speed up the process of regulation to 
meet the needs of a complex technological society. The clash between a widely-
perceived need to act more quickly and the struggle actually to do so is vividly 
illustrated by OSHA's attempt to regulate cancer-causing substances (carcinogens) in 
the nation's workplaces. The cancer policy, officially known as the "Regulation 
Covering the Identification, Classification, and Regulation of Potential Occupational 
Carcinogens,"6 is designed to regulate certain chemicals as a group. The generic 
approach is broad in scope, covering a number of individual substances which 
produce similar health hazards, and addressing issues "at the frontiers of science" 
where scientific knowledge is incomplete and uncertain. The cancer policy 
contained principles defining how OSHA would use such knowledge to protect 
4"OSHA" refers to both the Occupational Safety and Health Act and the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration in this thesis. 
5Morton Corn, quoted in "Policies, Objectives and Plans of OSHA," ABA 
National Institute on Occupational Safety and Health Law, 1976, p. 229, cited in 
Women's Occupational Health Resource Center (WOHRC) News, September 1987, p. 7 
6 45 Federal Register (FR) 5002, Jan. 2, 1980 
worker's health, thus avoiding duplication of efforts for each newly-identified 
carcinogen facing regulation. 
The Enforcement Approach vs. The Guideline Approach 
While other federal agencies have acted to address cancer hazards, the OSHA 
policy has been the center of a storm of controversy throughout its history. 
Partly, this is due to the fact that, in its 1980 formulation, the policy is one of the 
few that are legally-enforceable. It is a formal rule which forces OSHA to take 
certain actions based on certain information. For example, it could ban the 
production of a carcinogen if substitutes were available. The Food and Drug 
Administration's tight regulation prohibiting addition of carcinogens into food under 
the Delaney clause is the only other truly legally-enforceable cancer policy. Other 
agencies have for the most part opted for a "guideline" approach which delineates 
internal agency methods, but does not immediately affect commerce. The 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Office of Science and Technology 
Policy (OSTP) have developed such guidelines recently, 7 , 8 and are likely to define 
government policy in this area in the immediate future. Supporters of the 
guideline approach argue that it can keep pace best with changes in scientific 
understanding. Critics charge that guidelines are ineffective in actually leading to 
control of hazards and the "teeth" of legal enforcement are a necessity. 
Risk Management and Risk Assessment 
Enforcement policies and guidelines share a common denominator: they both 
explain the assumptions the agency will make in areas where uncertainties are 
7EPA: "Environmental Protection Agency Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk 
Assessment," 51 (FR) 33993, September 24, 1986 
8OSTP: "Office of Science and Technology Policy Guidelines on Assessing 
Chemical Carcinogens," 50 FR 10372, March 14, 1985 
plentiful. Typically, risk assessment and risk management have been depicted as 
"scientific " and "political" endeavors, respectively. However, the history of the 
OSHA cancer policy shows that there is much overlap between the two. The 
political values of the various actors are as important as the scientific 
understanding of the problem. As we shall see, history is replete with instances of 
how the two combine to produce policy. 
The Use of Scientific Information by Industry and Labor 
More fundamentally, the turbulence surrounding the cancer policy is a 
reflection of the history of OSHA itself and the history of labor relations in this 
country. The decision to put the agency in the Department of Labor instead of in 
the Public Health Service or some other scientific agency was a recognition of the 
political nature of occupational health and safety regulation. The respective 
responsibilities and needs of private employers and workers often have been the 
scene of sometimes violent upheaval and conflict. Both organized labor and industry 
have used scientific information to serve their own needs. 
For example, the first documented evidence of occupational cancer was made 
by Sir Percival Pott in 1775, who identified coal soot as the cause of skin and 
scrotal cancer in chimney sweeps. Two years later, the Danish Chimney Sweepers 
Guild demanded better protective clothing and a daily bath as part of their 
organizing efforts, based on Pott's findings.9 
Since then, the 19th century notion that workers had "freely contracted" to 
bear occupational risks when taking on a j o b 1 0 has given way to government-
Williams, LR: "Work and Health Around the World," American Industrial 
Hygiene Journal, December, 1987, p. A-784 
1 0Horowitz, MJ: The Transformation of American Law. 1780-1860. Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, 1977 
regulated worker's compensation laws, which place some responsibility for 
occupational risks on the employer. 1 1 
When the policy was first adopted in 1980, then-Assistant Secretary of Labor 
for OSHA Eula Bingham, a supporter of organized labor, declared it to be "...a 
course that will profoundly affect the quality of life for hundreds of thousands, if 
not millions, of American workers."12 Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall 
characterized previous attempts at regulating individual carcinogenic substances as 
"...trying to put out a forest fire one tree at a time."13 
On the other hand, some regard the OSHA cancer policy as the epitome of 
what is wrong with attempts to use scientific research to set social policy. For 
instance, Edith Efron has nothing good to say about the preamble to the policy: "It 
has no identified author. It is long; it is extremely technical; it is chaotically 
organized; it is printed in agonizingly small type; it is badly written; it is pedantic, 
pompous, and repetitious. It even succeeds, somehow, in being simultaneously 
polemical and boring. It is a wretched piece of literature." 1 4 Yet even she states 
that the views contained in this policy are "particularly worthy of inspection." The 
American Industrial Health Council, an industry organization, believes that the 
policy must be firmly grounded in "sound science," although critics charge that is a 
euphemism for delay. The policy is intended to address issues that are currently 
beyond firm scientific understanding. Although scientific knowledge plays an 
important role in setting the boundaries, differences in social and economic views, 
1 1Berman, DM: Death on the Job. Monthly Review Press, New York, 1978 
1 2 Eula Bingham's Remarks on the OSHA Carcinogen Policy, in Kitty Bernick's 
Papers at the Jimmy Carter Library, Box 10, OSHA Carcinogen File 
13Quoted in Bingham E: "Nothing to Lose But Your Lives," The Sciences, 
July/August 1979, p. 30 
1 4 Efron E: The Apocalvptics. Simon and Schuster, New York, 1984, p. 220 
values, and political philosophy are key in understanding how a generic cancer 
policy can be implemented at OSHA. 
The Public Fear of Cancer as the Motivation for a Generic Cancer Policy 
While some dilution of concern has occurred as a result of the epidemic of 
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, cancer still remains one of the most feared 
and pervasive of all modern diseases. Cancer mortality has increased approximately 
250 percent over the last 50 years. 1 5 Those who suffer include not only the 
victim, but also the survivors, for example, family members who must struggle to 
maintain some quality of life while a loved one slowly succumbs. The specific 
causes and mechanisms of cancer induction are still murky (despite substantial 
progress) and are probably numerous, making it difficult to conclusively prove 
causation by individual substances. In addition, there remains substantial 
uncertainty regarding cancer incidence trends. Are there more cancers appearing 
in all age groups, or is cancer merely a natural reflection of an aging population? 
Fear generated by the unknown and the uncertainties thus plays an important role. 
In addition, few would deny the role of the media in keeping the question of cancer 
fresh in the public mind. 
Modern and Traditional Risk 
Is the fear justified? The risks posed by exposure to carcinogens and other 
products of modern technology are different from older, more traditional risks. Of 
course, both risk and cancer have always been present, and as industry is quick to 
1 5Devessa SS, Schneiderman MA: "Increase in the Number of Cancer Deaths in 
the U.S." American Journal of Epidemiology Vol. 106, 1977, p. 1-5 
point out, obtaining a risk-free world is neither possible nor desirable. 1 6 But risks 
in technologically advanced societies are fundamentally different from those in more 
traditional, less developed societies. For much of the developing world, the risk of 
starvation, infectious disease, exposure to the elements, etc. are still of paramount 
concern, as they have been throughout human history. However, modernized nations 
have been able to eliminate many of these types of risks, at least for the majority 
of their populations. 
Instead, more long-term risks have taken their place. While the chances (i.e., 
probability) of an adverse consequence may have been reduced, the extent of those 
consequences, should they actually occur, has greatly increased. In short, there has 
been a shift from limited, short-term risks to catastrophic long-term ones. For 
example, increased food production has been made possible, at least in part, from 
the increased use of agricultural chemicals, such as pesticides, fertilizers, etc. At 
the same time, some of these chemicals are known to be capable of causing 
mutations and cancer in test animals. If one accepts the central tenant of the 
theory of evolution, which holds that new forms emerge through mutation, then it 
is not inconceivable that the ubiquitous introduction of synthetic chemical 
substances may have already affected the very course of evolution in ways that will 
be difficult, if not impossible, to detect (i.e., what is a "normal" course of 
evolution?). Thus, the potential risks associated with cancer reside not only with the 
immediate victims, but with the shape of our collective future. This means that 
quantitative risk assessments, which estimate the number of cancers produced by 
1 6 Cox GV: "Risk is Normal to Life Itself," Paper delivered at American 
Industrial Hygiene Conference, 1987. The author is vice president of the Chemical 
Manufacturers Association. "We live in a society that expects technology to provide 
a risk-free Utopia. As we all know, Utopias do not exist, and energies spent trying 
to reach an unrealistic goal are spent in vain...We should strive to reduce risks to a 
level that reaches toward zero, but any attempt to actually try to reach absolute 
zero will mean misspent resources." 
exposure to a particular chemical, may underestimate its true impact, even if the 
normal conservative assumptions and safety factors are used. 
The context of petrochemical introduction into our society has been described 
by Barry Commoner, a leading biologist, this way: 
During the course of evolution, organic chemistry has been restricted to a 
narrow range of possible compounds. What the petrochemical industry did was 
to break out of those limits. In the natural world, organic chemistry is the 
outcome of a very long evolution...incompatible compounds have been 
eliminated. In my opinion, an organic compound that does not now occur in 
living things has to be regarded as an evolutionary reject. Simply put, 
somewhere down the line a few billion years ago, perhaps some cell got it into 
its head to synthesize dioxin [a highly toxic substance] and has never been 
heard from since...We keep being surprised that chemicals that were perfectly 
nice and simple to make turn out to have very serious biological consequences.17 
In short, the stakes have become much higher. The dimensions of the failure 
to plan comprehensively for such scenarios are still unfolding. Carcinogens, in this 
view, are merely one of several types of substances that are active through DNA-
related mechanisms, substances that in theory are capable of posing extensive, but 
not highly probable, adverse outcomes. 
Of course, the alternative view (that the fear is not justified) is just as 
plausible. In this argument, the risks posed by synthetic chemicals pale in 
significance when compared to "natural" carcinogens found in the diet, smoking, and 
other more voluntary lifestyle habits. 1 8 In fact, a major conference held at the Jimmy 
Carter Center of Emory University in 1984 concluded that tobacco is the leading 
single cause of premature death in the U.S. population. 1 9 Furthermore, a former 
1 7Commoner B: "High-risk High Tech: Who Decides How It Is Used?" Science 
for the People, March/April 1987 
1 8 Ames BN, Magaw, R, Gold, LS: "Ranking Possible Carcinogenic Hazards," 
Science, Vol. 236, April 17, 1987, p. 271-280. "...carcinogenic hazards from current 
levels of pesticide residues or water pollution are likely to be of minimal concern 
relative to the background levels of natural substances..." 
1 9Closing the Gap: The Burden of Unnecessary Illness. Edited by Robert W. 
Amler and H. Bruce Dull, Oxford University Press, New York, 1987, p. 188 
official of the Centers for Disease Control has said that tobacco will cause more deaths 
worldwide than all other causes by the turn of the century, although not all of 
these will be due to cancer alone. 2 0 The effect of this view may be that in order 
to get the "biggest bang" for the regulatory buck, priority needs to be given to 
those risks that are, relatively speaking, the most easily detected and for which 
certainty is highest. 
While this study focuses on carcinogens in occupational settings, it should be 
clear that the potential risk posed by toxic substances goes well beyond either 
cancer or the workplace. Reproductive problems, mutations, immunological 
sensitization caused by environmental as well as occupational exposures are also 
important parts of the risk equation. In fact, some have argued that cancer has 
occupied the center stage to the detriment of research into these other areas. 2 1 
One economist has suggested that regulation of toxic chemicals has resulted in less 
attention to safety hazards, which may in fact pose higher risks. 2 2 While the data 
for many safety hazards are much less uncertain than those for health hazards, this 
should not necessarily mean that regulation should proceed only in those areas 
where a high level of certainty exists. How much do we need to know before 
regulating? And how should society use uncertain knowledge when lives are at 
stake? 
2 0Personal Interview with Jimmy Carter, Emory University, Nov. 12, 1987. "Dr. 
Foege believes that by the year 2000, the number one cause of premature death in 
the entire world will be from cigarettes." 
2 1Silbergeld, E: "Risk Assessment," letter in Science. September 18, 1987. 
"Discussion of risk assessment-continues to confine our national debate to one end 
point—cancer risk. While evaluating the potential risks of chemicals as carcinogens 
is important, the human disease and dysfunction that can reasonably be associated 
with impacts of chemical exposure and environmental modifications are likely to be 
expressed in many other outcomes." 
2 2Morall, John F. Ill: "A Review of the Record," Regulation, November/ 
December, 1986, p. 25-34 
10 
The assessment of whether exposures to carcinogens, mutagens, teratogens, and 
other substances is truly of catastrophic dimensions is not likely to be resolved 
soon. Irving Selikoff, a leading cancer researcher, has pointed out that this controversy 
has been around since at least 1895, when 
...Rehn reported the first three cases of cancer of the bladder among aniline 
workers. When additional cases of this association were identified in the next 
15 years in Germany and Switzerland, it was projected that the developing chemical 
industry, with its increasing number of synthetic chemicals new to the human 
environment, would bring with it a host of problems and an unhappy harvest 
of cancer. This prediction, in the next few decades, seemed far from 
unreasonable when our laboratory colleagues demonstrated carcinogenicity of 
literally hundreds of chemicals in animal test programs. Yet, by and large, the 
prophecy was not seen to be fulfilled in the first half of the 20th 
century...Thus, until recent years we were faced with something of a paradox; 
Rehn and his contemporaries had shown that human cancer could result from 
chemical industry exposure, laboratory studies indicated that the agents could 
be varied and numerous, yet human experience had not demonstrated this to be 
a major problem...Do experiences with vinyl chloride, bischloromethyl ether, 
chromates, etc., demonstrate that the prophecies were really correct, or merely 
premature? 2 3 
Eighteen years later, gaps in the scientific knowledge are still likely to be 
with us for the foreseeable future, in spite of some very promising advances. The 
methylene chloride case study examined here shows that even with a better 
understanding of pharmacokinetic data (how chemicals are absorbed, transported, 
distributed, transformed, and excreted from the body) and the extrapolation of 
animal testing data to humans, assumptions are still necessary, and in some respects, 
even more uncertain. 
To Act Or Not To Act: That Is The Question 
How can a regulatory agency like OSHA confront the issue of scientific 
uncertainty and still fulfill its mandate? Congress defined that mandate to "...assure 
2 3Selikoff, Irving: "Perspectives in the Investigation of Health Hazards in the 
Chemical Industry," Proceedings of the Meeting of the Scientific Committee, Carlo 
Erba Foundation, Occupational and Environmental Health Section, Milan, December 
12, 1975 
11 
so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful 
working conditions."24 Furthermore, OSHA is required to ensure that an employer 
"...furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of employment free 
from recognized hazards."25 
The relationships that develop among the actors in the OSHA cancer policy­
making process—scientists, decisionmakers, policy analysts, economists and lawyers-
are key to understanding how scientific uncertainty is treated. At this date, few 
would be surprised to learn that values and policy judgments play a key role, not 
only in the political considerations present in every policy formulation, but also in 
the scientific assessment of carcinogens.2 6 In fact, the conflict among various 
social groups is increasingly played out in the scientific realm, not the political 
arena. It is often easier to argue that a particular animal study is deficient in 
some technical respect, than it is to argue that one ought to be more tolerant of or 
more averse to imposing risks on moral grounds. 2 7 Sadly, such moral investigation 
appears to be regarded as a deadend, not amenable to "rational" examination, even though 
ethical decisions by government are the foundation of democracy. Whether or not 
inferences are explicitly delineated during the phase of scientific assessment does 
not change the fact that public involvement and our democratic ideals are 
proscribed by the very technical nature of the debate. Thus, science is, on one 
level, a political tool wielded by various players for political ends. We shall see 
that the substance of the OSHA carcinogen policy is shaped in large measure by 
how science, or more precisely, the gaps in scientific knowledge, are used to make 
2 4 O S H A Act, Public Law 91-596, Section 2(b) 
2 5 Ibid. Section 5(a)(1) 
2 6Personal Interview with Morton Corn, February 8, 1988 
2 7Personal Interview with Anson Keller, December 16, 1987 
12 
assumptions which either favor or place at additional risk employers and workers, 
respectively. 
Yet there is something profoundly disquieting about this seemingly 
opportunistic and selective use of science by various advocacy groups. The 
positivist desire to know things with certainty, to find the truth, plays an important 
role in the ultimate decision to classify a particular substance as carcinogenic. 
Unfortunately, this certainty is, practically speaking, possible only in human 
epidemiological studies, which measure the damage after it has occurred. This is 
clearly an unacceptable basis to formulate public policy, since action is taken only 
after it is too late. Nevertheless, most OSHA health standards have in fact been 
developed in response to human data, not animal testing.2 8 The failure to act on 
animal data poses a significant moral dilemma for modern society. 
Plausibility and the Changing State of Knowledge 
What standard of scientific proof should be used to act? One former OSHA 
administrator commented that "good science is needed to make good regulations."29 
In other words, the state of scientific knowledge places bounds on the terms of the 
debate. Whether one wishes to make risk-tolerant or risk-averse assumptions in the 
scientific assessment, they must be plausible and consistent with the scientific 
knowledge as it exists at a given moment in time. Of course, since scientific 
knowledge is continually changing, the bounds of the public debate also change. 
This mix of plausibility, political values, and scientific information forms the 
cornerstone of cancer policy from one administration to the next. 
^Identifying and Regulating Carcinogens: Background Paper. Office of 
Technology Assessment, Congress of the United States, US Government printing 
Office, Washington, DC, 1987, p. 77-85 
2 9Interview with Eula Bingham, September 9, 1987 
13 
For some, such unambiguous scientific evidence is the only useful evidence for 
regulatory purposes. For others, certain preliminary indications of carcinogenicity 
are enough to act, since lives may be at stake. In their guidelines for risk 
assessment of carcinogens, the Office of Management and Budget argues that the 
compounding of conservative assumptions typically used by environmental regulators 
leads to wholly unrealistic estimates of human cancer incidence which are simply 
not believable. 3 0 On the other hand, the 1980 OSHA cancer policy required only two 
positive animal studies to permit a determination of potential carcinogenicity. 
Of course, history is full of failures to act quickly enough. Arsenic was once 
widely thought not to be a carcinogen, since there are no animal studies to support 
such a finding. Human evidence has shown that the substance is in fact capable of 
producing tumors. Thalidomide caused deformities in 20,000 children, 3 1 even though 
it had been tested in several different animal species prior to release. Beta-
naphthylamine caused bladder cancer in a large percentage of exposed workers, far 
more than would have been predicted by animal studies.3 2 Even the now well-
known association regarding cigarette smoking, asbestos and cancer was unproven 
for many years. 
How Tension Among Scientists. Decisionmakers. Lawyers, and Policy 
Analysts Can Lead To Action 
Some have argued that when regulation has been left solely to scientists, there 
has been a general failure to regulate, since scientists are trained to act only on 
the basis of nearly absolute proof. The scientific agencies in the old Health, 
30"Regulatory Program of the United States Government", April 1, 1986-March 
31, 1987, Office of Management and Budget, 1987, p. xix-xxvi 
3 1 D r . Peter G. Gerone, quoted in Feder BJ: "Beyond White Rats and Rabbits," 
New York Times, February 28, 1988, p. F8 
3 2Personal Interview with Eula Bingham, Ibid. 
14 
3 3 Noble C: The Rise and Fall of OSHA. Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 
1986, p. 19 
8 4Interview with Jimmy Carter, Ibid. 
Education and Welfare department failed to regulate toxic substances until Congress 
forced the issue in the early seventies. Since science is disputatious, scientists do 
not tend to act on uncertain data. Rather, they formulate further experiments to 
reduce the uncertainty. Thus, tension between scientists seeking additional data and 
those wishing to take more immediate action develops. However, the tension 
created between scientists and decisionmakers is not necessarily competitive, but 
can be creative. The OSHA cancer policy as it was originally formulated in 1980 
was the result of close cooperation between cancer scientists, lawyers (and other 
policy analysts), and public decisionmakers (Morton Corn and Eula Bingham), and 
should serve as proof that the "comprehensive rational" approach is indeed within grasp. 
How Economic and Quantitative Risk Analysis Can Lead To 
Paralysis and a Retreat from Democracy 
How has economic analysis, such as cost-benefit analysis, shaped our concept 
of what is feasible in attacking occupational cancer? Of course, the economic 
impact of the cancer policy is potentially quite large. During the Carter 
administration, the Council on Wage and Price Stability estimated that moderately 
strict standards for all 2415 known or suspected carcinogens would eventually cost 
$526 billion. 8 3 Former President Carter has stated that he thought it was important 
to force his regulators to work with his economic advisors, 8 4 even though this 
often led to bitter conflict. Whether this tension is productive or not is more 
problematic than the relationship among scientists, policy analysts, and 
decisionmakers. As we shall see, there are fundamental ethical difficulties and 
15 
3 5Morton Corn, Eula Bingham, Thorne Auchter, and Patrick Tyson, all former 
head administrators (Tyson was acting administrator for a short time), expressed 
disappointment with the slow pace of health standard development during individual 
interviews. The issue is also expected to receive attention in Congressional 
Oversight hearings this year (see "OSHA Faces Rigorous Congressional Oversight," 
by Stephen G. Minter in Occupational Hazards, September 1987, p. 95-99 
other shortcomings in modern economic theory which may tend to stifle creative 
solutions to the cancer regulatory problem. These dilemmas include: 
1. The pricelessness of human life vs. the knowledge that regulatory 
expenditures do in effect place a price on our heads. 
2. Whether individual decisionmaking (the foundation of modern 
microeconomics) can be used as a basis for social decisionmaking. 
3. Equity 
Similarly, the use of quantitative risk assessments, now widely acknowledged to 
be a necessary ingredient in policy decisions, may at the same time tend to obscure 
more important concerns among the citizenry, namely, fairness, control, and trust of 
experts. 
Lessons From The History Of The OSHA Cancer Policy 
How Carter's OSHA Used "Regulatory Reform" to Develop the Cancer Policy 
Former OSHA Administrators, Congress, and other investigators have viewed 
the paucity of health standard development at OSHA with increasing concern. 3 5 
From 1972-86, OSHA issued health standards covering only 22 carcinogens. 
Fourteen of these were adopted in one rule in the early seventies when OSHA was 
still quite young. Two others, benzene and formaldehyde, have recently been 
finalized. The benzene standard development process is especially noteworthy. With 
numerous court challenges, it has taken more than a decade to be finalized. The 
recent OSHA formaldehyde standard has taken nine years from the time when the 
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first animal studies showing carcinogenicity appeared in 1978, and final promulgation 
in December, 1987. Further court action is likely for the formaldehyde standard. 
Why the concern over such a slow pace? Isn't informed, deliberate rulemaking 
with judicial review a good thing in a democracy? Shouldn't we take the time to 
consider all viewpoints? In hearings before the Senate in 1977, it was reported 
that 21,000 chemicals were in common use and were known to be toxic. Of these, 
2,400 were suspected of causing cancer. It was estimated that there were more 
than 100,000 deaths from occupational diseases, and another 390,000 new cases of 
occupational disease annually, although not all of these were due to cancer. 3 6 More 
recently, the National Research Council looked at testing needs for toxic substances. 
Taking a randomized subset of all chemicals in use, the study concluded that, in 
order to form a complete health hazard assessment, virtually all chemicals in 
commerce needed additional toxicological testing. Only 27% of the chemicals in the 
subset had any chronic testing data available at all, and much of that was 
inadequate. 3 7 Chronic testing refers to the long-term animal testing needed to 
assess carcinogenicity of particular substances. 
All this suggests that a slow pace of regulation is costly, not only in terms of 
ethical dilemmas and public trust, but also in lives lost. During the Carter years, 
OSHA was able to build a broad consensus on the need for a generic cancer policy 
by first addressing more minor issues. Hundreds of mostly irrelevant safety 
consensus standards were dropped from the books. Enforcement also became better 
focused. OSHA's reputation in the business and scientific communities improved 
considerably. Without these preliminary steps, it is unlikely the cancer policy and 
36"Occupational Diseases, 1977" Hearings before the Subcommittee on Labor of 
the Committee of Human Resources, US Senate, June 28, 29, 20, 1977, p. 1 and p. 53 
3 7Toxicitv Testing: Strategies to Determine Needs and Priorities. National 
Research Council, National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 1984 
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How Reagan's OSHA Used "Regulatory Reform" to Prevent 
Implementation of the Cancer Policy 
The official OSHA position today is that the cancer policy remains in effect. 3 8 
Yet the agency no longer publishes lists of carcinogenic substances, and the courts 
have imposed additional requirements before the agency can adopt standards. Most 
notably, courts now require formal findings of significant risk, and additional 
economic analysis. Standards development for carcinogens continues to proceed 
slowly. Some argue that this is due to an unnecessarily strict interpretation by 
OSHA of various court rulings, 3 9 or by the reluctance of the Reagan Administration 
to regulate the business community. Reagan's view of regulatory reform meant a 
wholesale reduction in regulation, not the better focus championed by Carter's 
OSHA. Others have indicated that the agency's agenda is set by outsiders and the 
courts. 4 0 Still others, including members of Congress, have suggested that the 
limited staff resources of OSHA are a key factor. 4 1 Whatever the reason, most 
observers, including staffers at the National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
3 8Interview with anonymous national OSHA Staffer, February 1, 1988 
3 9Dannon, B: "Perspectives on the Law and OSHA Standards Setting," Women's 
Occupational Health Resource Center News, September, 1987, p. 6-8 
4 0Interview with Thorne Auchter, Ibid. 
4 1 "OSHA Head Questioned on Budget Needs, Agency Policies in Biting House 
Oversight," Occupational Health and Safety Reporter, Bureau of National Affairs, 
February 3, 1988, p. 1373. "'If I were you, to be very candid with you, I'd either 
scream or quit, and I don't understand why you're not screaming.' Rep. James M Jeffords 
(R-Vermont) told OSHA Head John A. Pendergrass....Jeffords contrasted Pendergrass' 
stated opposition to asking for more OSHA funding...with his statements that the 
agency struggles to hire and retain qualified inspectors because of low government starting 
salaries." This problem is even more acute at senior staff levels, where salary 
concerns combine with career concerns to produce a shortage of qualified 
professionals (see Chapter 2). 
other broad initiatives (e.g., the right-to-know and employee access to medical 
records standards) would have ever seen the light of day. 
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Health (NIOSH), which, in addition to other duties, serves as "research arm of 
OSHA," agree that in practice, the OSHA cancer policy is, for all practical purposes, 
ignored. 4 2 The policy is scheduled for an update in 1988, although the first 
deadline of January 1988 has already passed without action. John Pendergrass, the 
current administrator of OSHA, recently stated that the issue has "low priority."43 
The Key Questions 
This thesis will address the following questions: 
1. Is a generic cancer policy needed? 
2. Is the dominant model of a strict separation of risk management and risk 
assessment an accurate description of carcinogen rulemaking? 
3. Is it possible to regulate entire families of chemicals more quickly 
without sacrificing due process and democratic norms? Or does 
scientific uncertainty doom us to a plodding substance-specific course of 
regulatory activity? 
4. Are economic analysis of feasibility and quantitative assessment of 
socially acceptable risk levels compatible with our nation's democratic 
norms? That is, who decides what risks are acceptable? 
5. Perhaps most importantly, how do generic and substance-specific 
rulemaking each affect employees at risk of exposure to carcinogens? 
The answer to these questions will ultimately determine our success or failure 
in controlling, and ultimately eliminating, the workplace health hazards posed by a 
technologically-based society. The virtual elimination of infectious disease has added 
approximately 30 years to the average lifespan in this century, and perhaps more 
4 2Interview with anonymous NIOSH staffer 
4 3Interview with John Pendergrass at the American Industrial Hygiene 
Conference, San Fransisco, California, May 16, 1988 
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importantly, improved the quality of life and expanded the opportunities for 
productive contributions. Elimination of cancer, if we can achieve it, will also 
revolutionize our nation's productivity and our quality of life. Due to higher 
exposures and relatively well-defined populations at risk, occupational hazards are 
often more easily detected than are environmental ones. The resources we choose 
to commit to this effort will in large part define the horizons for society's fight 
against cancer as a whole, even if it is true that occupational exposures account for 
only a small part of the total cancer incidence rate. 
This thesis will begin by examining the history of the OSHA cancer policy, and 
how it followed other political developments both inside the agency and in society 
generally. The current state of the art of quantitative risk assessment, together 
with the utility of economic analytical tools (such as cost-benefit and cost-
effectiveness analysis) are then reviewed briefly and contrasted with certain ethical 
dilemmas. A case study of methylene chloride is provided to assess how the 1980 
version of the policy would have shaped regulation of this substance had it 
remained fully in place. Special attention is given to the use of pharmacokinetic 
data in the risk assessment of methylene chloride and in its ultimate classification. 
While some parts of the case study are speculative, it does show the potential value 
of the generic approach in reducing the number of lives lost to regulatory delay. 
I conclude by posing the two alternatives we face under the constraints of 
scientific uncertainty, an ever-present feature of the cancer problem. If we demand 
firm proof before acting, industries may be less likely to suffer unnecessary 
regulation, but lives may be lost. If instead we adopt a prudent posture by acting 
on suggestive evidence, industry may suffer (and with it our rate of growth), but 
lives can be saved, and the moral dilemmas may be eased somewhat. In an era of 
abundant production, prudence may be more highly valued than continued growth. 
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A number of interviews with key players in the development of the policy have 
been completed for this study. These include four former OSHA Administrators, 
representatives of the National Toxicology Program, the . National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health, the principal author of the 1980 policy, a high-
ranking economist during the Carter Administration, representatives of industry and 
labor, a staffer from the Office of Management and Budget, and former President 
Jimmy Carter. 
CHAPTER II 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE OSHA CANCER POLICY 
The Early Cancer Principles 
The roots of the OSHA cancer policy lie in proceedings regarding pesticide 
regulation conducted by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) during the early 
1970's. There is evidence of an earlier attempt to define cancer principles, brought 
about by disagreements among government scientists concerning addition of 
carcinogens to food. The Food Protection Committee of the National Research 
Council reported in 1970 that regulators could permit carcinogens to be added to 
food at "toxicologically insignificant levels," and further, that some substances could 
be considered safe without undergoing testing, based on past experience.4 4 
Umberto Saffiotti, a scientist at the National Cancer Institute, responded by 
organizing a group of fellow scientists which eventually produced a report to the 
Surgeon General. The report indicated that a "safe level for man" cannot be 
defined by current scientific knowledge and that therefore no level of exposure to a 
chemical carcinogen is "toxicologically insignificant." It was suggested that a more 
realistic approach would involve a concept of "socially acceptable risk." Eventually, 
this concept formed the basis of the historic Supreme Court decision on benzene a 
decade later. Saffiotti's group also defined a number of other operational 
principles, including animal dose testing requirements, the supremacy of positive 
findings over negative findings, how to view benign and malignant tumors in animal 
4 4McGarity, TO: "OSHA's Generic Carcinogen Policy: Rule Making under 
Scientific and Legal Uncertainty, Law and Science in Collaboration. JD Nyhart and 
MM Carrow (eds), Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1983. Also see Office of 
Technology Assessment: Identifying and Regulating Carcinogens. US Congress, November 
1987, p. 32-33 
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testing, prevention of synthetic carcinogen entry into the environment, extrapolation 
of animal testing results to humans, and a unified federal legislative approach to 
the problem. 4 5 
The Tension Between Scientists and Lawyers 
Saffiotti later introduced these principles into EPA hearings on whether to 
cancel the registration for the pesticide DDT. The Report was also used by OSHA 
when it passed its "14 Carcinogens" rule in the early seventies. However, during 
hearings on the insecticides chlordane and heptachlor, and again during hearings on 
aldrin and dieldrin, industry and individual scientists indicated that the "substantive 
content" of the principles was wanting. In addition, EPA staff scientists reportedly 
felt that the scientific principles had in fact been drafted by lawyers, and were 
technically deficient. These concerns reached a crescendo during the hearings on 
the pesticide Mirex, when EPA lawyers attempted to have the principles adopted as 
"officially noticed facts." Saffiotti's principles, which had grown to 17, were 
subsequently reduced to three: 
1. There is no scientific basis for defining a safe threshold for carcinogens, 
2. Animal data can be used to assess risk to humans, 
3. All tumorigens (substances capable of causing both benign and malignant 
tumors) be considered potential human cancer-causing agents. 4 6 
Anson Keller, one of the EPA lawyers involved in the DDT and other pesticide 
hearings, and others observed that many of the issues in each of these hearings had 
4 5 U S Department of Health and Human Services, National Cancer Institute, Ad 
Hoc Committee on the Evaluation of Low Levels of Environmental Chemical 
Carcinogens, "Evaluation of Environmental Carcinogens," Report to the Surgeon 
General, April 22, 1970, cited in OTA: Identifying and Regulating Carcinogens. Ibid. 
p.32 
4 6 O T A Ibid., p. 33 
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4 7Burnham D: "Agency Assailed by Ford Defers New Safety Rules Till After 
Election," New York Times, March 4, 1976, p. 15 
4 8Burnham, Ibid. 
*been settled previously, but still had to be relitigated, and that this represented a 
substantial duplication of effort. Gradually, Keller took on more legal work at 
OSHA, and in fact was the only lawyer working directly with OSHA. Lawyers with 
the Department of Labor Solicitor General's Office had more indirect contacts with 
OSHA staff personnel. 
The OSHA Administrator during the last part of the Ford Administration was 
an industrial hygiene scientist named Morton Corn, who had strong views about the 
need for more health standards. However, he felt that scientists should play the leading 
role in writing them, although Keller was put in charge of developing the 
carcinogen policy. Relying primarily on scientists meant more detailed, complete 
standards, but also further delays. This question of a slow time frame for standards 
development became public when an internal proposed calendar of regulatory 
actions was leaked to the New York Times. 4 7 Critics charged that the process was 
too slow to be effective. 4 8 
Nevertheless, most of the proposed carcinogen policy was completed under the 
Corn administration, drawing in large part on the work that had been done on the 
earlier coke oven emissions standard. Strong consensus had been developed between 
OSHA policy personnel and government scientists. However, due to the election 
year bureaucratic logjam, the policy was not proposed until early in the Carter 
administration, when it clearly carried the mark of Corn's successor, Eula Bingham, 
another scientist. 
The Carter Administration: Activism at OSHA 
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OSHA As Ogre 
Although Corn began the process of increased attention to health standard 
development, it was not until the Carter administration that the effort began to 
gather steam. To understand why, it is important to grasp the nation's consensus 
regarding OSHA at the beginning of the Carter Administration. 
Former President Carter explained it this way: 
When I went to the White House I had had a long experience with OSHA as a 
businessman. I ran Carter's Warehouse, I had a peanut shelling plant, I ran a 
cotton gin...And my reaction to OSHA then was very negative. I didn't think 
they were rational. They were intrusive on occasion. A lot of times they 
would demand that we spend enormous sums of money with almost non-existent 
benefits to employees. OSHA was condemned roundly...Before I went into 
office, OSHA was looked upon as an ogre and one of the most despised federal 
agencies.4 9 
The popular wisdom holds that the Jimmy Carter Presidency was plagued by an 
inability to act decisively. Instead of a chief executive leading a nation along a 
planned path, external events appeared to dictate policy decisions. The Iran 
hostage crisis, the energy crisis, inflation, welfare reform—all seemed to be beyond 
control. The President was widely perceived to be paying excessive attention to details. 
A president who would lead his administration, the Congress, and the country 
must...figure out what he wants and be able to communicate his vision and a 
sense of urgency to others...Above all, the president must be an effective political 
leader...and employ a strategic sense to gauge how much to propose and how 
much to settle for. Carter appears to have done few of these things....50 
In short, he was accused of merely managing the government, not leading it. 
However, the moves to reform OSHA during the Carter years seem to have 
been especially far-reaching. The agency adopted a labor-oriented activist posture 
4 9Personal interview with Jimmy Carter, November 12, 1987, Emory University, 
Atlanta, GA 
5 0 Lynn LE and Whitman DF: The President as Policymaker. Temple University 
Press, Philadelphia, p. 279-280 
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for the first time in its history; Many of the fundamental issues, such as how to 
deal with complex problems at the frontiers of science, how regulators can address 
uncertainties in modern science and technology, economic and political aspects of 
acceptable risk and the utility of cost-benefit analysis, and how to involve 
employees in plant health and safety matters, became the topics of formal 
rulemaking activities. 
In spite of the President's apparent lack of direct involvement, the OSHA 
carcinogen policy (and the 250,000-page record generated to support it) carries his 
mark of attention to detail. Nearly all the objections and comments regarding the 
policy were answered by OSHA in a lengthy preamble covering nearly 300 single-
spaced, small-typed pages in the Federal Register. To trace both the development 
of the rationale for the policy and how such a comprehensive policy became 
politically possible in an agency which, in earlier years, had been widely regarded as 
ineffective and a nuisance, it is necessary to examine the conflicts among the OSHA 
bureaucracy, other regulatory agencies, the President's Council of Economic Advisors 
(CEA), the White House domestic policy staff, industry, environmentalists, the scientific 
research community, and the labor movement. Internal documents recently opened 
for public inspection at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library in Atlanta, Georgia 
are especially helpful in understanding these often complex relationships. 
Efforts to Focus OSHA On More Serious Hazards 
While it had its precursors,51 the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970 
was the first serious attempt to comprehensively enforce minimum standards in the 
nation's factories, mines, construction sites, and other workplaces. The previous 
system of state worker's compensation laws was widely perceived to be a failure, 
5 1See the Walsh-Healey Act, the Construction Safety Act, the Service Contract 
Act, and the Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act 
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p. 1A 
since they did not provide sufficient incentives for employers to maintain safe and 
healthful working conditions. 5 2 
When Congress enacted the law, it established timetables for development of 
those minimum standards. In order to meet the legislatively-mandated deadlines, 
consensus standards established by various professional groups and testing 
laboratories, such as the American National Standards Institute, the American 
Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, the National Safety Council and 
various manufacturers of safety equipment, were included en masse, without regard 
to whether such standards were appropriate as enforceable laws by OSHA inspectors 
(compliance officers). The intent was to use such standards only until more 
permanent ones could be developed and recommended by NIOSH. 5 3 
Many of these standards were really recommendations that were not intended 
to become law. For example, inclusion of these standards meant that firms could be 
cited by OSHA if their fire extinguishers were not located exactly 38 inches above 
the floor. Toilet seats were required to be of a certain design, and dimensions of 
restroom facilities were specified. There were over 14 pages of detailed regulations 
on the construction of portable or temporary ladders, as well as specifications on 
sizes of knots, etc. Some of the earlier efforts were, if not sinister, certainly 
comical. At one point, OSHA issued a pamphlet on hazards in the barnyard, warning 
farmers of slippery conditions around livestock. 
There is some question as to whether initial enforcement of these "nitpicking" 
laws was done on purpose to arouse opposition to OSHA. Speaking before a United 
5 2See "OSHA-A Four Letter Word," Washington Post, February 12, 1977, p 
1A. Also see Berman, DM: Death on the Job: Occupational Health and Safety 
Struggles in the United States. Monthly Review Press, New York, 1978, for a 
history of worker's compensation laws 
5 3Milius P: "OSHA--An Impossible Task," Washington Post, February 13, 1977, 
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Automobile Workers Conference, Carter's Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall said, "We 
believe in these [OSHA] laws and we are going to try to make them work. There 
have been people in the past who did not believe in them and therefore did not try 
to make them work."5 4 
The results of the "nitpicking" focus were predictable. By 1977, OSHA was 
perceived to be a failure by both businessmen and labor groups. A Washington Post 
reporter wrote, "To business groups and conservatives, it [OSHA] has become the 
leading symbol of what's wrong with the Federal regulatory process."55 Ronald 
Reagan said, "OSHA is a 4-letter word that is giving businessmen fits and is helping 
drive up consumer costs."56 Labor and environmental activists also denounced 
OSHA for failing to provide adequate protection for workers, especially against 
occupational diseases. They noted that in its first six years of existence, only 
four health standards were established to protect workers from exposure to the 
growing number of toxic chemicals used in industry. Sidney Wolfe, a spokesman for 
a Ralph Nader organization, said, "Nothing is going to happen until we have a well-
informed group of victims."57 This theme of providing information to workers is 
one that finds expression in later OSHA activities, and is a key element in the 
effort to develop a carcinogen policy. 
OSHA also had its problems in Congress, as conservatives sponsored bills to 
"get the government out of the health and safety field" during the mid-seventies. 
5 4Dewars H: "Marshall Assures UAW of Action on Job Safety," Washington 
Post, March 3, 1977, p. CI 
5 5Dewars, H, Ibid. 
5 6 Ibid. 
5 7 O p . Cit. "OSHA- A Four Letter Word" 
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5 8Carter Library, White House Central File, Box HE-7, File HE 4-2 
5 9Evans R and Novak R: "Reassuring Businessmen," February 19, 1977, 
Washington Post, p. A13 
6 0 Ibid. 
Examples include attempts to exempt over 90% of all businesses from OSHA 
inspections, use of independent inspectors, voluntary compliance schemes, etc. 
As shown, there is evidence that Carter shared some of the complaints of 
businessmen regarding harassment by OSHA compliance officers. In a 1977 meeting 
with Charles Whitley, a member of Congress, the President said OSHA would more 
strongly enforce the health standards, and called OSHA safety inspectors 
"nitpicking."58 
Carter attached great importance to the choice of who would head OSHA under 
his administration, finally settling on Eula Bingham, a biology professor from the 
University of Cincinnati. 
After impressing on [Bingham] his desire to stop OSHA's harassment of small 
businessmen and believing that she understood,...the President decided to name 
her...After lecturing Bingham, Carter conceded a need for OSHA.... But some 
businessmen don't seem to understand [the need for OSHA], and, he told 
Bingham, they include a peanut warehouse operator in Plains, Georgia named 
Billy Carter. 5 9 
The concession that there is indeed an important role for OSHA seems to 
suggest that the President knew that OSHA had to address truly serious hazards if 
it was to survive and perform its needed function. In short, his concern appears to 
have been for more than relieving businessmen of regulatory burdens. Bingham 
was far from a "safe" choice. 
...Bingham scarcely seems the answer to a businessman's prayers. A crusader 
for more healthful conditions in factories, she has been called a health 
extremist. That is one description, Bingham has said privately, she is proud to 
accept. 6 0 
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In fact, Bingham herself was surprised at the appointment, which had been 
suggested by officials of the United Automobile Workers (UAW). She provides the 
following account of her initial meeting with Carter: 
I was one of two subcabinet people interviewed by Jimmy Carter. I know that 
once Ray Marshall decided that I was his choice, (and I had not said I would 
take the job, and actually thought I wouldn't take the job), I got a call saying 
the President wanted to meet me, so Ray Marshall and I went over. He 
interviewed me and told me it was a very important job and asked me what I 
thought. I told him it was a very serious problem in the US and that I wasn't 
interested in some of the little things that didn't make any difference. You 
know, compliance officers dealing with whether a rail was 38 or 40 inches 
[high]. I was interested in health and safety features that made the difference 
between life and death and harm and so forth. Then he proceeded to tell me 
two stories. One story was about a facility in the Midwest, maybe Kansas, I 
don't recall, about how a company had made a place for people to eat outside 
on the patio, and they had a rail around the little fountain, you know it was 
one or two feet and the dropoff was minimal. The OSHA compliance officer 
came in and inspected the facility and had given them a citation because it 
was an inch off. Well it's a horrible story, really, when there's so much out 
there--that they would spend time doing that. 
Q: Was that a widespread problem? 
A: No I don't think it was a widespread problem, but once there was a 
story, everybody told it, and they wrote it up. I think the compliance 
officers were sometimes ruled by the attorneys, who read the letter of 
the law. I sent the word out very quickly that they should use 
judgement. One of the [compliance officers] told me that if you have to 
use a ruler, then you've got a problem. But if you look at it...experience 
[should tell] you what the appropriate height is to prevent you from 
falling to your death.... 
Q: Some people say that in the early years... 
A: ...that it was done on purpose. I think there was some of that. But I 
think that... Mort Corn had been there for a year, [and he was] very 
good, and by the time I got there, there wasn't that much of that. But 
there was some. 
The other story Jimmy Carter told me was that he was up in a plant in New 
Hampshire. This was a place where they did some work with asbestos. And 
he said, "I walked in there and started coughing and oh it was terrible and I 
said to one of the fellows, 'Boy!' And [one of them] said, 'Oh you think this 
is bad, you should have seen it before we cleaned it up.'" And Carter rolled 
his eyes at me, and we talked about how important the agency was... 6 1 
Interview with Eula Bingham, May 18, 1987 
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6 2 Memo to the President from Stu Eizenstat, August 5, 1977, Domestic Policy 
Staff Papers, Jimmy Carter Library, White House Central File, Subject File, Health 
4-2, Box HE-7 
6 3 Memo to the President from Stu Eizenstat, Domestic Policy Staff, Jimmy 
Carter Library, Eizenstat Papers, Box 204, 3/30/77 CF, O / A 46 
6 4 The President's Papers. Carter. 1977. p. 970 
Within the first six months of his administration, Carter ordered the creation 
of an interagency task force chaired by Ray Marshall and Bert Lance to look at 
ways of strengthening the federal role in the regulation of health and safety in the 
nation's workplaces. On May 19, 1977, the Labor Department announced a program 
to "redirect the resources of OSHA away from trivial problems."62 
Carter's Environmental Message of 1977: Linking Unimportant 
Safety Regulations with Slow Action on Health Problems 
To what extent did Carter regard environmental protection and occupational 
health and safety as important national priorities? In a memo to the president, 
Stuart Eizenstat, his chief domestic policy advisor, noted that the absence of an 
environmental speech during the campaign was interpreted by many as a sign that 
Carter thought the issue was of low priority. The memo also noted that his 
appointments for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ) had been late. Eizenstat concluded by stating that the 
President should establish environmental priority before addressing his energy 
policy. 6 3 The implication was that the energy policy was ultimately more important, 
but that it was important to allay fears from labor and environmentalists first. 
In his environmental message to Congress on May 23, 1977, Carter said: 
In the past, implementation of the OSHA Act of 1970 has emphasized safety 
and too often resulted in unnecessary and burdensome regulations. Yet at the 
same time, federal response to health problems has been unconscionably slow. 6 4 
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6 5 Memo from Charles Schultze to Stu Eizenstat, May 23, 1977, Eizenstat 
Papers, Box 204, File CF, O/A 29 [2] 
6 6Interview with Jimmy Carter, Ibid. 
This is the first linkage between safety and health standards, one that would 
eventually play an important role in creating the political conditions necessary for 
the development of OSHA's cancer policy. 
The initial draft of the environmental message was written by the CEQ, and 
provoked a great deal of debate. A memo from Eizenstat to the President noted 
that the draft had "emotional language," which had been deleted. The draft in the 
Eizenstat file had the following phrases crossed out: "...the dark side of our 
industrial civilization...the environmentalists who warned us of this are resented by 
some people, perhaps because so many of their predictions have come true..." Some 
of the members of the CEQ, such as Gus Speth, a former lawyer for the 
Environmental Defense Fund who would eventually chair the Council, were regarded 
as environmental activists. 
Another objection came from Charles Schultze, the President's economic 
advisor, who wrote: 
The opportunity is missed in this draft to move in new directions to harness 
the market in the fight against environmental degradation instead of continuing 
a system that rewards those that resist pollution curbs."65 
This friction between the "economists" and the "environmental regulators" is a 
recurring theme throughout the Carter administration. In fact, Carter seems to 
have desired this interaction: 
I instructed both my director of OSHA and also the EPA people and the CEQ 
people to work together, strangely enough, with my Council of Economic 
Advisors...who were trusted by Wall Street and by manufacturers, to try to have 
some cost-benefit elements installed, and to see what OSHA could do to 
minimize paperwork and to maximize benefit to employees and employers, both 
in modification of existing plants and the design of newly constructed 
plants...In most cases they ironed out their differences between them. 6 6 
32 
Later in this chapter, we shall see that the relationship between the economists and 
the regulators was not as amiable as the former President suggests, especially with 
regard to cost-benefit analysis. 
A memo to the President from a White House staffer on the Environmental 
Message stated: "If we are actually asking for an expansion of OSHA's efforts in 
the health area (where it has been wanting), we should put in some general 
language to show our sensitivity to the "over regulation" problem involving OSHA in 
the safety area."67 This emphasis on regulatory reform was included in the 
message, which also called for a coordinated strategy against toxic chemicals. The 
message noted that there were more than 12 federal statutes implemented by 7 
agencies, and that a more coordinated effort was needed. With the passage of the 
Toxic Substances Control Act, the message said, there was no need for further 
legislation, only better implementation.6 8 
Who Should Coordinate? 
With so many agencies involved, both economic and environmental, it became 
clear that some means of coordinating activity was essential. A meeting called by 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 1977 was apparently the first 
attempt at such coordination. The meeting was 
dominated by CEQ, which...interprets the President's Environmental Message to 
give it the lead...The reception of the participants [to this idea]...was friendly 
but skeptical, due to the large scope of the project...The four major toxic 
regulatory agencies—EPA, CPSC (Consumer Product Safety Commission), FDA 
(Food and Drug Administration), and OSHA have created a working group to 
coordinate their regulatory activities...My impression is this group 
appears...promising. 
6 7 Memo to the President from Rick Hutcheson, May 10, 1977, Eizenstat Papers, 
Jimmy Carter Library, Box 204, File CF, O / A 29 [2] 
68President's Environmental Fact Sheet, May 23, 1977, Eizenstat Papers, Box 
203, Environmental Issues File CF, O / A 29 [1] 
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This memo from Si Lazarus to Stuart Eizenstat concludes by saying that this 
Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group (IRLG) is being kept relatively quiet, due to 
resistance from within their respective bureaucracies.69 
It was the IRLG and later the Regulatory Council which played key roles in 
the development of a unified government carcinogen policy. While there were 
important differences between the carcinogen policies finally adopted by the EPA 
and OSHA, this type of cooperation among federal bureaucracies is noteworthy. It 
should serve to underscore the complexity of many environmental issues, which may 
not fit neatly into the legislative mandate of a single agency. Eula Bingham 
describes how the IRLG came into being: 
The first couple of months we [the administrators of EPA, FDA, CPSC, and 
OSHA] met each other and we decided that the things we had to do were 
similar. We decided we wouldn't reinvent the wheel and [that we would] get 
together and talk about what we were going to do. We would meet once a 
month, sometimes [more] often, in each other's office and cook breakfast for 
each other. We didn't have any staff people there, it was just the four of us 
(and then it got to be five when we brought in [a representative of the Meat 
Inspection Service from the Agriculture Department] and we would talk about 
what we were going to regulate, who in the White House was after us, or 
[who] from among the economists was causing a problem, what industries were 
giving us a problem. We used to call it circling the wagons. 7 0 
Such cooperation was reinforced by the perception of a common enemy, as indicated 
in the following account: 
In a hasty, last minute decision just before his October 24 anti-inflation 
speech, Carter agreed to appoint a new Regulatory Council, consisting of 
representatives of the executive branch regulatory agencies and excluding the 
Administration's inflation fighters. He thus resolved a bitter dispute between 
his top economic advisors...and his top appointees in...the EPA...OSHA...and 
FDA, who sought to exclude the inflation fighters...Schultze wanted to extend 
[the economists'] power to review, and possibly delay or alter costly agency 
6 9 Memo from Si Lazarus to Stu Eizenstat Box 291, Jimmy Carter Library, 
Eizenstat Papers, Toxic Substances [O/A 6244] 6/29/77 
7 0Interview with Eula Bingham, May 18, 1987 
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rules. But their plan provoked strong opposition from the agencies, which 
quickly developed the Council idea and convinced Carter of its merits. 7 1 
Thus, the MBig Four" regulatory agencies played the leading role in the 
development of the government's cancer policy. The CEQ apparently did not have 
the resources to conduct the detailed review of current scientific knowledge 
required, while the economists were seemingly unable to convince the President of 
their allegations about the adverse inflationary impact of new environmental health 
regulations, even though inflation concerns did play a much greater role later in the 
Carter Administration's term. 
Unity on the question of a generic carcinogen policy was forged on two 
fronts. First, the IRLG was formed to attempt to unite the environmental agencies, 
with OSHA playing the leading role. Second, the Regulatory Council was formed to 
fend off the economists, and was led by Douglas Costle, administrator of the EPA. 
Anson Keller and others assembled a group of scientists from the National Cancer 
Institute (NCI), and, under orders from Eula Bingham, was instructed to strive for a 
consensus position from a wide range of government scientists as to what a 
proposed generic cancer policy would look like. Later, the effort was broadened to 
include non-government scientists. 
Forging unity among the government scientists was not a simple matter. FDA 
had been preparing to make more extensive use of quantitative risk assessment, 
while OSHA was intent on holding to the position that its statute prevented such risk 
assessment. EPA wanted a non-regulatory approach (i.e. not legally-enforceable), 
which could change with the growth in scientific knowledge. This ultimately 
became the "guideline" approach currently used by the agency. Since it was the 
largest of the agencies, EPA also felt that it should play a leading role. At one 
7 1 "What will Happen When the Regulators Regulate Themselves?" National 
Journal 11/4/78, p. 1769 
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7 3Interview with Eula Bingham, Ibid. 
point, it appeared that a unified position among the regulators would not be 
possible. A large, two-day meeting between members of the NCI and the IRLG 
finally resulted in a breakthrough, and a major paper was published in the Journal 
of the National Cancer Institute.7 2 Eula Bingham is listed as IRLG Principal. Other 
members included Anson Keller, Umberto Saffiotti (of NCI), David Rail of the 
National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, and representatives of FDA, 
EPA, CPSC, Office of Science and Technology, and the CEQ. This document formed 
the theoretical foundation for the OSHA cancer policy. One unresolved area 
concerned risk assessment, which EPA wanted to resolve by allowing public comment 
on the IRLG guidelines. OSHA's position was that this would prevent a policy from 
ever being finalized. EPA did conduct its own hearings on its version of the carcinogen 
policy, although OSHA did not testify at these proceedings. 
On the other hand, the Regulatory Council appears to have been formed mainly 
to forge a workable unity among the regulators to prevent the economists from 
developing a stronger role in environmental regulatory affairs. Douglas Costle of 
the EPA appeared to play the leading role here. 7 3 Thus, EPA and OSHA appeared 
to develop a well-defined political division of labor. 
Regulatory Reform and OSHA: The Accumulation of Political Capital 
The reform effort at OSHA repeatedly received praise by the President and 
even some economists. In remarks before the Regulatory Council, Eizenstat claimed 
that no policy meant more to the President than regulatory reform. While this may 
be an overstatement (the President surely had major interests in the Middle East 
^Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group, "Scientific Bases for Identification of 
Potential Carcinogens and Estimation of Risks," Journal of the National Cancer 
Institute, Vol. 63, No. 1, July 1979, p. 241-268 
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7 5 Dewars H: "OSHA will Quit Nitpicking, Go After Major Standards," 
Washington Post, May 20, 1977, p. A l 
7 6Dewars H: "Rx for a Troubled Agency," Washington Post, September 12, 
1977, p. A l 
and Latin America, not to mention inflation and energy policy), it is fair to 
conclude that regulatory reform did receive substantial attention. Efforts by OSHA 
to reduce the number of needless regulations were repeatedly singled out for praise. 
However, there was apparently some lack of communication between the agency and 
the White House staff regarding the political use of the reform effort. Eizenstat 
told the President in a memo that "OSHA's bold initiative to discard 1100 
'nitpicking' safety regulations...came as a surprise to the White House." He went on 
to state the need for some way to allow the Executive Office of the President to 
share credit for this action. 7 4 
On November 24, 1978, OSHA eliminated 928 minor safety regulations. Before 
this time, Bingham had made it clear that businesses were not to be cited on these 
unimportant standards. The Washington Post quoted Ray Marshall on May 20, 1977 
as saying OSHA will no longer enforce "...petty regulations like those dealing with 
coat hooks in bathrooms." He went on to say the OSHA changes have "the strong 
backing of President Carter, who said he wants to "enforce the law rigidly," but 
with a maximum amount of support from labor and industry. 7 5 "Thus far, Bingham 
appears to be a Carter favorite....Carter [said] 'Few things the government has been 
doing domestically have gotten as favorable a public response as Eula Bingham's 
efforts to transform OSHA.'" 7 6 Anthony Mazzochi, a union official instrumental in 
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the passage of the OSHA Act said, "It's a sad commentary on our society when a 
person acts like the law intended, and my God, she becomes a celebrity."77 
In an editorial, the Washington Post said, "OSHA seemed like a prime candidate 
for dismemberment...Bingham's moves, according to even OSHA's harshest critics, are 
all in the right direction...[If the reforms are unsuccessful]...getting the federal 
government out of the job safety field will have to be considered."78 
Clearly, the move to delete unnecessary regulations created enormous political 
capital for OSHA, which was invested in future efforts to regulate cotton dust, 
lead, acrylonitrile, and other chemical exposures. In addition, it set the stage for 
proposing sweeping, more complex standards such as the carcinogen policy, the 
hazard communication standard (right-to-know), and the medical records access 
rule. The repercussions of both the administrative instruction from Bingham and 
the actual elimination of such a large number of regulations on the books gave 
teeth to Carter's regulatory reform effort. 
Two influential groups approached this issue with differing and potentially 
conflicting objectives. The economic advisors were interested primarily in reducing 
the cost of regulation, while the regulators were attempting to make rules and 
standards more closely address the more serious problems of the day. This tension 
was understood by at least one White House staffer, and several regulators, as 
shown by internal White House memos: 
...despite his urging that agencies think twice before making new rules, Carter 
is far from opposed to issuing complex and expensive regulations requiring a 
great deal of paperwork when he thinks thev are necessary, (underlining 
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Papers, Carter Library 
8 0 Memo for the President from Stu Eizenstat and Si Lazarus, October 18, 1978, 
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appears in Kitty Berniek's papers in the Carter Library. Ms. Bernick was a 
White House staffer). 7 9 
There was also some question concerning both the legality and political 
consequences of economic intervention in environmental regulations, a controversy 
that rages on today. Most of the agencies had been granted authority from 
Congress with specific mandates and duties. The role of the Executive Office of the 
President, Office of Management and Budget, and the Council of Economic Advisors 
in such matters has never been well-defined. The political consequences were also 
important. A memo to the President from Eizenstat and Lazarus stated: 
...CEQ contends that Presidential or EOP review of regulatory decisions will 
offend environmental and labor constituencies. Others, including ourselves, 
believe that political damage would be even greater if it were perceived that the 
Administration had retreated from your earlier commitments to assure that 
regulations are cost-effective. 8 0 
The Economic Consequences of Regulation 
Essentially, the economists argued that environmental regulations imposed a 
severe burden on the economy, and that the best way to solve environmental 
problems was through the use of market forces. There is a voluminous literature on 
this topic, dating back to the 1950's. In the Carter Administration, Charles 
Schultze promoted this idea most thoroughly in his book The Public Use of Private 
Interest. The advantage of using market forces, according to this line of reasoning, 
can be summarized as follows: 
Under an incentive-oriented approach, effluent charges, injury-rate taxes, or 
improved workman's compensation, the administering agency does not itself 
have to keep abreast of every new development. But if specific regulations 
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are the only bar to prevent social damages, the regulatory agency must provide 
a regulation for every possible occasion and circumstance.8 1 
However, such market-oriented approaches are less certain and may be even 
less timely than the "muddling through" regulatory approach. Costs often do not 
become evident until many years into the future, and there is an implicit assumption 
that the effects are reversible (i.e., that the environment is self-cleansing). In fact, 
some businesses may prefer specific regulations. "A charge for polluting, instead of 
the current regulatory morass, is less susceptible to manipulation...Business may be 
reticent to abandon this."82 
There was considerable debate within the administration regarding the 
magnitude and nature of the costs imposed by environmental regulations. Juanita 
Kreps, Secretary of Commerce, cited a Brookings Institute study which said that 
environmental, safety and health regulations had retarded productivity growth by 
20-25%. 8 3 Chase Econometrics predicted that environmental regulation would 
account for an average 0.3 to 0.4 points of the annual increase in consumer prices 
in the 1970-1983 period. 8 4 
In addition, the economists generally favored performance standards instead of 
specification standards. Since there may be more than one way of reducing or 
eliminating hazards, and if all those ways are equally effective, they argued that 
industry should be allowed to choose the most cost-effective method. The 
8 1Schultze C: The Public Use of Private Interest. Brookings Institution, 
Washington DC, 1976, p. 9 
"National Journal 8/11/79, p. 1322 
8 3 Memo to the President from Juanita Kreps, May 26, 1978, Eizenstat Papers, 
Box 211, Government Regulations-Reform [O/A 62434][1], Jimmy Carter Presidential 
Library 
8 4 Cited in Green M: "The Faked Case Against Regulation," read into the 
Congressional Record of January 23, 1979 (House) 
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economists cited part of the OSHA Act, which says, "Whenever practicable, the 
standard promulgated shall be expressed in terms of objective criteria and of the 
performance desired."85 (emphasis added) 
The Regulator's Rebuttal to the Economists 
Essentially, the environmental regulators argued that the costs of controlling 
hazards, be they occupational exposure to toxic chemicals, safety hazards, or 
environmental contamination, are far less than the costs (financial and otherwise) of 
fatalities, health care, lost production, and lower quality of life suffered by those 
affected. They charged that these costs are often not borne by the individual firm, 
but are "externalized," i.e., passed on to society at large in the form of worker's 
compensation claims, health insurance, polluted environment, etc. By regulating a 
specific chemical, the costs are "internalized" for the individual firms. Thus, 
environmental regulations really impose no additional costs on society; in fact, they 
reduce costs, since regulations typically use preventive measures which are cheaper 
than medical and other after-the-fact treatments. 
In the early 1970's, for example, the chemical manufacturing industry 
announced that the proposed OSHA standard on vinyl chloride, a known human 
carcinogen, could eliminate 2 million jobs and cost between $65 and $95 billion. 
However, after the standard was adopted, the industry flourished, with some 
individuals arguing that the health and safety regulations provided an incentive to 
make the manufacturing process more efficient by reducing the amount of vinyl 
chloride monomer left in the final polyvinyl chloride product (the monomer is the 
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8 9Green, M, Ibid. 
9 0 The President's Public Pacers. (Carter, 1977) p. 967 
cancer-causing agent). No job losses have occurred and the cost for compliance 
has been about one-twentieth of the original estimate. 8 6 
The regulators also noted that in spite of general public complaints about 
excessive regulation, the Opinion Research Corporation conducted polls during the 
late seventies indicating that the public supported regulation to protect worker 
health and safety by a margin of 4 to 1, product safety by a margin of 3 to 1, and 
the environment by 2 to l . 8 7 Some economists have suggested that such polls often 
do not phrase the question in terms of opportunity costs, and that if they did, 
support for such regulation might be considerably reduced. 8 8 Nevertheless, it seems 
clear that public support for this type of government activity is substantial. 
The regulators also argued that increased regulation also tends to create jobs, 
not eliminate them. The EPA estimated that about 20,000 jobs had been lost in 
plants that could not meet various environmental standards, but that 600,000 jobs 
had been directly created by pollution control technology development and 
expenditures.8 9 
This theme was echoed in Carter's 1977 Environmental Message to Congress, 
when he said, "...pollution controls generate more jobs than they have cost."90 
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The Fight Inside the Administration 
How did the President and his advisors line up on this question? The 
following account describes the sides involved and the impact of the anti-
inflationary effort: 
The "fight" is a periodic one pitting the administration's regulators against 
such powers as chief economic advisor Charles Schultze, Treasury Secretary 
Michael Blumenthal, Commerce Secretary Juanita Kreps...and wage price watcher 
Barry Bosworth. The arena keeps shifting—from cotton dust standards to strip 
mining regulations, to carcinogen standards at OSHA-but the fundamental 
issue is the same: Should health and safety regulation be sacrificed to the 
anti-inflation campaign, based on the false specificity of existing cost-benefit 
analysis?...The choice is between the president as a cost-benefit econometrician 
or as a tribune for the victims of marketplace abuse."91 
A letter from a number of Representatives complained to the President that his 
"...economic team is continuing to try to make...health regulations the 
Administration's scapegoat in the anti-inflation battle...Recent examples 
[include]...the OSHA carcinogen standard."92 
This struggle essentially concerns the applicability of cost-benefit analysis to 
health and safety regulations. The philosophical and methodological issues are 
discussed in Chapter III. Here, the political struggle and OSHA's understanding of its 
obligations will be examined. The opening shot was fired when Carter decided to 
continue former President Gerald Ford's executive order requiring regulators to 
prepare an "Inflation Impact Statement" for any new proposed rules. 9 3 OSHA's 
position during the Carter years was that while it was necessary to analyze an 
industry's financial and technological capabilities to comply with a new rule (usually 
to determine time frames for compliance deadlines in various industries), its statute 
9 1 Green M, Ibid. 
9 2Letter to the President for House Representative Parren Mitchell, et al., 
February 12, 1979, White House Central File, Subject File Health 1-2 (Carcinogens) 
in Box HE-4, Jimmy Carter Library 
9 3See Executive Order 12044 
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US 490 (June 17, 1981); 
9 5Interview with Eula Bingham 
did not require the comparison of costs and benefits for the purposes of standard 
setting. Rather, its duty was to establish standards which protected employees and 
provided a workplace free of recognized health hazards, not whether the benefits of 
a particular proposal outweighed its costs. In both the asbestos and cotton dust 
cases, the courts ruled that an OSHA standard must assure, to the extent feasible, 
that no employee's health be impaired. In the asbestos case, an appeals court 
explicitly rejected the proposition that the law requires—or even permits—the 
Secretary of Labor to act on the basis of a cost-benefit comparison. 9 4 Bingham 
notes that: 
We fought and won, even with the Supreme Court, that we didn't have to do 
cost-benefit analysis according to that law [the OSHA statute]...But where 
metal came against metal was when we implemented standards that required a 
lot of retrofitting and new equipment. That's where the economists got 
heavily involved. The lead standard was literally held up. I didn't know it 
was really quite as bad as it was. I guess I should have been more frightened, 
but I [never was]. I knew it was the right thing to do. 9 5 
The lead standard is a very detailed health standard requiring extensive 
medical surveillance of exposed workers and a very low Permissible Exposure Limit, 
together with expensive engineering controls for specific industries. 
Bingham spoke before a steel workers convention, urging them to lobby the 
White House to "free the lead standard." She also said that she and Ray Marshall 
would fight the "palace guard" around the President to get the standard issued and 
that economists are "complacent about cancer in the workplace." Finally, she 
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attacked the economists directly when she said, "To say that safety and health 
regulations are inflationary is phony."96 
In a memo complaining about these remarks, Eizenstat said, I do not believe it 
would be useful for anyone from over here to say anything to Eula about this, 
at this time,...but we are trying to show that the administration is working to 
reduce the costs of regulation in a responsible way--and on a unified basis. 
But if this sort of thing does not stop, what little chance we have to succeed 
will disappear. 9 7 
In fact, OSHA had no staff of its own to assess economic impacts, and had to 
hire outside consultants, a practice that continues today. Eula Bingham said, "OSHA 
spent $3.5 million preparing economic impact statements last year, three and a half 
times as much as what was programmed for the education of workers. Now that's 
an appalling thing!"98 
Bingham's assessment of the relationship between economic and occupational 
health issues is instructive, especially since she claims that Carter was of like mind, 
once the technical issues had been explained to him (an issue that came to the fore 
during the struggle over the cotton dust standard). The Washington Post quoted 
her as follows: 
Workers have a right to expect they won't be killed on their jobs. If that 
means I have to pay 50 cents--or 2 dollars—more for my refrigerator, then I 
wouldn't want to hide it."99 
In another interview, Bingham displayed a willingness to sacrifice marginal industries 
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1 0 1 See Carter's 1979 Message to Congress 
which are unable to internalize their costs of employee safety and health, based on 
her concept of feasibility. 
Feasibility as defined in the OSHA Act and interpreted by the courts involves 
technical feasibility...and cost...You cannot put the whole industry out of 
business. But it is not unreasonable to kill off a couple of laggards...It was 
very hard to get numbers. If the technical feasibility was such that you could 
do it with no exposure, but you would put the whole industry out, then you 
couldn't do it. You would have to titer it back until you left the industry 
intact, but maybe one or two people fell by the wayside. They were probably 
having trouble surviving anyway. 1 0 0 
This is not radically different from Carter's stand in a message to Congress, 
when he said, "There are no economic tradeoffs to healthy water...Economic and 
environmental quality go hand in hand." 1 0 1 
Of course, economic and environmental quality can go hand in hand only if the 
cost of pollution or worker health and safety is borne by the firm, i.e., if the costs 
are internalized. If the costs have been shifted to society at large, this would 
indicate an inefficiency, since a greater amount of resources would have to be 
used. It costs more to treat workers for cancer than it does to prevent exposures 
to carcinogens in the workplace, if we look at social costs, not just costs to the 
individual firm. In other words, the most cost-effective way of controlling 
occupational disease and injury or environmental pollution is through an emphasis on 
prevention, not cure. Carter's commitment to cost-effective, necessary regulation 
seems clear in a briefing document: 
Question: Do you agree with Bob Strauss' comments about attacking 
environmental regulations because they are inflationary? 
Response: I am fully committed to the...Clean Air Act...and other 
environmental statutes. We intend to eliminate unnecessary 
regulations and to insure that other [necessary] 
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regulations are designed to achieve their goals in a cost-effective 
manner, as we have done with OSHA regulations."102 
The emphasis on cost-effectiveness was perceived to be a way of avoiding the 
controversy surrounding cost-benefit analysis. In other words, once the goal has 
been determined, all that remains is to find the cheapest way of meeting that goal. 
The White House staff's understanding of this issue is clarified in a memo from 
Kitty Bernick to Stu Eizenstat, which says in part: 
OSHA believes that its statute limits analysis to the technological and financial 
capacity of the industry and does not permit comparison or quantification of 
costs and benefits...as the basis for standard setting...Executive Order 12044 
and the Administration's regulatory reform bill require the procedural step of 
analyzing costs and benefits, and, more important, considering less costly 
alternatives which would achieve the statutory objective. This approach does not 
require a rigid quantification and weighing of costs and benefits. Rather, it is 
a cost-effectiveness approach. By requiring the agency to identify alternative 
means of achieving its goals...the regulator is more likely to achieve the same 
results at less cost...Our point is that cost-benefit analysis is a useful tool, 
but it is not the only factor the decisionmaker can consider. 1 0 3 
Cotton Dust: OSHA's First and Last Victory Over the Economists 
While the above explanation may sound like a neat compromise, what did it 
mean in practice? 1 0 4 The best example of the distinction may be the cotton dust 
regulation, which OSHA promulgated in June, 1978, under court order. Cotton dust 
exposure can cause byssinosis, also known as "brown lung," a particularly disabling 
lung disease suffered by textile workers. Bingham suggests that the President's 
domestic policy staff failed to serve him well in this instance, since they did not 
1 0 2 Memo for the President From Stu Eizenstat, May 10, 1978, Briefing 
Document for Meeting with Environmentalists, Eizenstat Box 203, Environment 
General Issues [O/A 6240] 
1 0 3 Memo from Kitty Bernick to, Stu Eizenstat, "Cost Benefit Analysis and 
OSHA," White House Central File, Box HE-7, File HE 4-2 1/1/79-1/20/81 
1 0 4 See Baram MS: "Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Inadequate Basis for Health, 
Safety and Environmental Decisionmaking," in Ecology Law Quarterly, Vol 8, 1980, p. 
473-531 for an excellent discussion of the distinctions between cost-benefit analysis 
and cost-effectiveness analysis. 
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educate him regarding some of the specific issues involved. However, given his 
technical background, the President was able to learn quickly, and while he tended 
not to "meddle," he was "involved," when necessary, in occupational health and 
safety matters. 1 0 6 
Both the economists and Eizenstat held that respirators would be as effective 
as engineering controls in reducing exposures to cotton dust. This debate about 
engineering controls vs. personal protective equipment (such as respirators) 
continues today. An OSHA staffer indicated that one of the key provisions, the "teeth" 
of the OSHA cancer policy, concerns the preference for engineering controls over 
respirators. 1 0 6 In this respect at least, the OSHA cancer policy remains in effect 
today. 1 0 7 For example, the recent O S H A formaldehyde standard calls for 
engineering controls to be used as the primary means of reducing hazards; 
respirators are to be used only as a last resort. However, in practice, OSHA rarely 
enforces engineering control provisions of standards. 
Respirators are devices worn by workers that may filter out some fraction of 
the cotton dust in the workplace air, if used properly. Engineering controls 
typically include such techniques as ventilation, process changes, and enclosures 
designed to prevent cotton dust from entering the workplace air at all. It is a basic 
principle in the practice of industrial hygiene that engineering controls should 
constitute the first line of defense, and that respirators can only be used when 
engineering controls are not technically feasible, or until engineering controls can 
be installed. Calling for use of respirators in place of feasible engineering 
1 0 5Interview with Eula Bingham, Ibid. 
1 0 6Interview with anonymous national OSHA Staffer, February 1, 1988 
1 0 7 This is true for standards-setting programs only. In enforcement, 
engineering standards are rarely enforced. 
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controls is like asking a doctor to prescribe a sulfa drug instead of a modern 
antibiotic, simply because it is cheaper. Of course, no one would consider imposing 
such a requirement, since the sulfa drugs are known to be less effective. Similarly, 
it is well-known that, in the real world, respirators are in practice less effective 
than well-designed engineering controls. 1 0 8 
Yet this is precisely what the President's economic advisors and his chief 
domestic policy advisor wanted. A recent book on economics persists in labelling 
this question as one of examining alternative costs among equally effective means of 
controlling worker's exposures. 1 0 9 Eula Bingham's review of the events leading up 
to the promulgation of the cotton dust standard is noteworthy in that it clarifies 
where Carter himself stood on these issues, and how his staff insulated him from 
the issues involved. Her account follows: 
[The White House staff] knew the economic issues, but they didn't know the 
scientific issues, the biology of it or the toxicology or the medical aspects. 
Of course, if they had, they'd have been on our side. Once the confrontation 
happened, and we won very big with Carter, my influence loomed very large 
and theirs was not as great. It was crazy and ...strange how it happened. 
They were more intimidated by Ray Marshall and myself because I guess they 
thought Carter agreed with us or liked us or something. 
It was early enough so that we had some room, in spite of the anti-regulatory 
moves in Congress and among the economists. 
OSHA had been sued by the unions and the brown lung association [a victims' 
interest group] about the cotton dust standard, and we were under a court 
order to have it out by the first of May, I think. By the first of May we had 
it all done, except it still had to go through some of the regulatory review. 
1 0 8"When it is not feasible to render the working environment completely safe, 
it may be necessary to exclude the worker from that environment by the use of 
personal protective equipment (this is normally considered to be secondary to 
engineering and administrative controls)...Personal protective devices have one 
serious drawback—they do nothing to reduce or eliminate the hazard. The 
supervisor must be constantly alert to make sure that required respiratory equipment 
is worn by those workers..." from Olishifski JB: Fundamentals of Industrial Hygiene 
(second edition), National Safety Council, 1979, p.38 
1 0 9 Rhoads, Steven E: The Economist's View of the World. Cambridge 
University Press, 1985, p. 18 
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We had decided to go with a standard that said the industry had a year to 
assess the problem and decide what they needed and that they had to put the 
controls in place as soon as possible, but not longer than seven years. They had 
to put in engineering controls and could not rely on respirators. 
Charlie Schultze was against it. He wanted everyone to have the same amount 
of time and to use respirators and no engineering controls. Eizenstat or 
someone prepared the briefing memo, and this was Charlie's big stand. The 
plaintiffs gave us until the end of May. So we were within a day of that, and 
Charlie Schultze called Ray Marshall up and said (and the word had already 
gone out on the street to the press) that Charlie was going to have a press 
conference at 9 o'clock, and he was announcing the new cotton dust standard. 
Well, you know, you can't do that, it's against the law.... He was announcing 
a cotton dust standard that was going to be essentially respirators, and 
everybody had the same length of time, seven years. We had said as soon as 
possible, but no longer than seven years, and engineering controls. They had 
made this briefing memo and the President had gone along with it. Ray 
Marshall got him on the phone and just read the riot act. He never cursed, 
but he said, "Damn it Charlie, don't have that press conference because I'm 
going to talk to the President." 
So he got through to the President, he said it's an emergency, I've got to talk 
with him. I was in the room and the President said to him, "Well, if the facts 
are like you say, those issues were never presented to me." And Ray said, 
"Well, I don't think your staff has served you very well, because this is the 
way it is." [The President] said, "We'll have to get together and talk about it, 
but I don't know, I've already given Charlie the go-ahead." Ray said, "I'll take 
care of Charlie," and the President says, we'll get you on the calendar this 
afternoon. So Ray got on the phone and told Charlie to absolutely not have 
the press conference, that there was no standard, and nobody was going to 
sign it, and hold up on everything. We were worried he would go out front, 
and then it would be very hard to call it back. So he didn't have it. 
Once [Marshall] got the appointment with the President, he said, well, 
figure out what you're going to say to the President to convince him. 
The first thing I did was call in my staff, my political appointees that 
had come with me, and we all cried. I said I don't think there's a 
chinaman's chance of changing the President's mind. But Ray told me we 
had to try. I recall Chuck Knapp, who is now going to be the President 
of University of Georgia, saying, "well I wouldn't give you much hope." 
I said I don't know whether I'll leave tomorrow or the first of July, but 
I won't stay, if he goes forward with that. I said I just can't stay, 
professionally. I called Irv Selikoff and called John Peters and several other 
people and told them, this is what I'm faced with, what would you do if 
you were me? And they said you can't professionally stand for putting 
respirators on people as the first line of defense and I said well, that's 
the way I feel about it, [too]. I got classical references where the 
hierarchy of controls are named very briefly, where it's very clear what 
the field of occupational medicine and industrial hygiene have considered 
to be the way you deal with these things over the years...that you use 
respirators as a last resort. 
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We got to the President's office and there was Stu Eizenstat, Charlie Schultze, 
the President, Ray Marshall, myself, and Fritz Mondale. Fritz Mondale came 
to help us out. Nobody else was there. The President said, "Well, tell me 
your side of the story," to Ray. Then Ray said a little bit, then they asked me 
to tell my side. Then Charlie proceeded to tell what he thought the standard 
should be, and Stu talked also. Charlie explained this stuff about the free 
market, and that you had to let everybody have the same amount of time, 
otherwise it was not fair. So the President sat and listened, and then he said, 
"Well, how does this sound, Eula? I think we ought to give them 18 months 
to do their survey and then everyone ought to have everything in place at the 
same time in five [instead of seven] years. And they should wear respirators 
until they can get everything in place, all the engineering controls, wouldn't 
you agree? How does that sound Eula?" 
I looked at Ray Marshall and he looked at me and I almost sobbed, and I 
thought, Oh I didn't hear him right. So I said, "Could you please repeat 
that?" So he repeated it and Charlie was sitting over there, just getting 
angrier and Stu was just furious. Mondale was smiling, and I thought, well, he 
couldn't have known this all along. I said, "Well it sounds good to me."And he 
said, "Well, it's settled." And Eizenstat says, "What do you mean it's settled? 
I think you ought to sleep on this." The President says, "Well, there's a 
court order on this, you don't want Ray or Eula to go to jail." [Eizenstat] 
said, "Well, I don't think we should do this now, you can't make that decision 
now." And [the President] turned to him and said, "What do you mean I can't 
make that decision now? I'm the President." 
You know what they wanted to do, they wanted to have another chance at 
him. He said, well, it's settled. He said to Charlie and Stu, "You meet with 
them and work out any of the details." Everyone left except the President, 
Ray Marshall and myself, and [the President] engaged us in a conversation 
about the Willow Island thing [where many workers died as a result of a tower 
collapse due to "green concrete."]. It was a gracious signal that said that he 
agreed with us. That was my reason for the "palace guard" comment [I made 
earlier]. I knew they [Schultze and Eizenstat] were kidding themselves. The 
President wasn't going to stop a lead standard!"110 
The President's Personal Experience as a Farmer 
The President's decision on cotton dust may have also been a result of his 
own personal experience in Plains, Georgia: 
I ran a peanut shelling plant...The job is to clean the dirt from the peanuts. 
In dry weather, clouds of impenetrable dust cover the people who are running 
the plant, including me and my brother and my employees...If you're growing seed 
peanuts, which is my main business, then you treat them with chemicals to 
prevent rot in the ground...that are poisonous. We used...a mercury-based 
treatment at that time, and all the labels say wear a respirator. I never could 
1 1 0Interview with Eula Bingham, May, 1987, Ibid. 
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get an employee to wear a respirator for more than a n n o u r o r two...They just 
wouldn't do it. And I never wore a respirator. I knew that I ought to, but 
you look kind of stupid funning around trying td buy peanuts from a bunch of 
farmers with a white gauze mask on your face or something else...I knew there 
was no way you were going to make all the employees in a cotton mill wear 
respirators, even if you offered them and gave them respirators...My experience 
[in these environmental matters] is limited, but in this case it was not. A lot 
of the cotton mills I had visited while I was campaigning had cotton fibers 
floating in the air . 1 1 1 
Clearly, the experiences of a decisionmaker matter as much as the advice he or she 
receives. 
The Effect on the Business Community 
That cotton dust was a setback for Schultze can be seen in his memo to the 
President of September 29, 1978, where he says, 
Cotton dust was seen as a "defeat" for [the Regulatory Analysis Review 
Program] and its advocates. The outcome confused participants in the 
Executive Office of the President and regulatory agencies about the degree of 
Presidential support for the Regulatory Analysis Program. The failure to 
identify costs of regulations is a tactical error. It feeds the business 
community...which wants to do away with environmental regulations. 1 1 2 
There may be some truth to this. The failure to make a formal finding of 
significant risk or conduct some form of cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analysis 
in the benzene case is now widely viewed as a tactical mistake. For example, 
Anson Keller and others now believe that the agency should have argued that even 
though the OSHA act does not require it, a risk assessment and rudimentary 
economic analysis must be completed to deflect opposition. 1 1 3 OSHA now routinely 
performs risk assessments for all new standards. 
1 1 1Interview With Jimmy Carter, Ibid. 
1 1 2 Memo from Charles Schultz to the President, September 29, 1978, Eizenstat 
Papers, Box 211, Government Regulations-Reform [O/A 6243][1] 
1 1 3Interview with Anson Keller, Ibid. 
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The fact that the Secretary of Labor, Ray Marshall, was also an economist 
may have played some role in countering the White House advisors' emphasis on 
costs to industry. In fact, Charles Schultze is quoted as saying that "the President 
is very impressed with Ray Marshall." 1 1 4 Another summation of Marshall also 
sheds some light on his relationship with the President: "He [Marshall] is very 
much in the mold of Carter: cool, self-confident, impatient with ideological musings 
that don't produce results."115 
Joseph Califano, Carter's Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, also 
weighed in against the narrow economic view: "It is myopic to argue that programs 
to protect workers are inflationary, if we do not count what these programs buy." 1 1 6 
"Counting what these programs buy" is precisely what makes a quantitative 
economic analysis of health standards problematic at best. For a single substance, 
where some reasonable estimates of workers exposed is available, where toxicological 
mechanisms are well understood, and where the economic benefits can be roughly 
approximated, calculating the benefits of a particular standard or regulation may not 
be completely beyond the realm of the imagination, However, when families of 
chemicals are regulated, and when the state of knowledge is in its infancy, as it is 
with carcinogenesis, then quantification may well be impossible. 
The question of the utility of economic analysis will be examined in greater 
detail in the following chapter. Historically, however, it should be clear that the 
beginning of the ascent of economists in environmental matters began during the 
Carter years. The cotton dust case was merely a temporary setback. The anti-
1 1 4 Dewars H: "The New Labor Secretary: Not Exactly an Outsider," 
Washington Post, February 20, 1977, p. Fl 
1 1 5 Dewars Ibid. 
1 1 6Richards B: "Study Sees 20% of Cancer Cases as Work-Related," Washington 
Post, September 12, 1978, p. A l 
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1 1 7Chemical Abstracts Services: "Registry Passes 4-Million Mark; Uses Grow," 
CAS Report, 1978: 7:2, cited in Calkins DR, et al.: "Identification, Characterization 
and Control of Potential Human Carcinogens: A Framework for Federal Decisionmaking," 
Journal of the National Cancer Institute, Vol. 64, No. 1, January, 1980, p. 169 
1 1 8"Occupational Diseases, 1977," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Labor 
of the Committee of Human Resources, US Senate, 91st Congress, June 28,29, 30, 
1977 p. 1 and p. 53 
regulatory bent of the Reagan Administration, combined with the Supreme Court 
decision on benzene, has effectively ensured the supremacy of economic and risk 
analysis during the eighties. 
The Public Debate: What Causes Cancer? 
The cancer issue was put squarely before the public in the late seventies. By 
then, it had become clear that regulating chemicals on a one-by-one basis would fail 
to meet the requirements of the OSHA Act. In 1978, the American Chemical 
Society estimated that 4 million chemicals were in existence, with about 6,000 new 
ones being identified each week. About 44,000 of these were thought to be in 
common use in the U S . 1 1 7 Some fraction of these chemicals are carcinogenic, and 
there was a vigorous national debate over whether these substances were 
responsible for a "cancer epidemic." 
In hearings before the Senate in 1977, it was reported that 21,000 chemicals in 
common use were known to be toxic, and that of these, 2,400 were suspected of 
causing cancer. At the time, OSHA regulated only 16 of the 2,400 as carcinogens 
(14 in the early carcinogens rule). About 300,000 workers were exposed to these 16 
alone. Nationally, it was reported that there were more than 100,000 deaths from 
occupational diseases (not all cancer), and another 390,000 new cases of 
occupational disease annually. This can be compared to the approximately 14,000 
annual deaths that were due to industrial accidents. 1 1 8 
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Estimates of the percentage of cancer caused by environmental factors varied 
widely. In 1977, the National Cancer Institute said that about 90% of all cancers 
were environmental in origin, 1 1 9 implying that, theoretically, at least, they were 
preventable. A report by the National Cancer Program estimated that 40% of all 
cancers were due to smoking, 10% were due to chemical carcinogens (of which half 
could be considered to be occupational cancers), while the causes of the remaining 
50% were still unknown. 1 2 0 In 1978, The Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW) reported that 20-40% of all cancers were attributable to 
occupational factors (not just "environmental" factors). Industry typically reported 
the figure at l -5%. 1 2 1 
In fact, the HEW study was done in response to an earlier study. Since 
industry's claim that only a very few cancers were occupational in origin, this 
would probably not constitute a "significant" risk. OSHA realized that it would not 
be able to regulate occupational carcinogens generically, unless it could be 
demonstrated scientifically that a greater percentage of cancers were due to 
occupation. A paper published in the National Cancer Institute journal looked at 
asbestos exposures and decided that this substance alone accounted for 10 % of all 
cancers. Total occupational factors causing cancers were pegged at 20-40%. 1 2 2 
Although there was never any consensus on this in the scientific community, the 
1 1 9Greenberg, DS and Randall, JE: "Waging the War on Cancer: How the 
American Cancer Society Focuses on the Search for Cures Rather than 
Environmental Causes," Washington Post, May 1, 1977, p. CI 
1 2 0 White House Central File, Box HE-4, File HE 1-2 4/18/79-1/20/81 
1 2 1Bernick Papers, Box 10, OSHA Carcinogens [3] 
1 2 2Bridbord, K, et al.: "Estimates of the Fraction of Cancer in the US Related 
to Occupational Factors, National Cancer Institute, National Institutes of 
Environmental Health Sciences, National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health, Bethesda, MD, 1978 
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HEW study blunted industry's contention significantly, and allowed the rulemaking 
activity to continue. 
On NBC's Meet the Press" of June 25, 1978 the issue also received media attention: 
Q: Dr. Selikoff [Director of the Environmental Sciences Laboratory, Mount 
Sinai School of Medicine], according to reports, cancer has become the 
primary health concern of the American people, and the fear of cancer 
has taken on epidemic proportions. How justified do you consider this 
fear? Is there an epidemic? 
A: Well, if you consider that twenty percent of all Americans now living are 
going to die of cancer unless we do something about it, I think that is a 
fairly justified fear. 
Q: Dr. Upton [Director of the National Cancer Institute], do you consider 
that an epidemic? 
A: I don't think the incidence is epidemic in the usual sense, although it is 
common...If we look at the overall incidence, there is some drift upward 
which cannot be attributed to cigarettes, but I wouldn't say it has become 
epidemic. 1 2 3 
In some ways, arguments over the exact percentage of cancers attributable to 
a specific cause miss the point, since many cancers are preventable, and are likely 
to have multiple causes. The generic carcinogen policy was only part of an effort 
by OSHA to bring this complex issue before the public. In 1979, OSHA sponsored a 
conference with the title: "Lost in the Workplace: Is There an Occupational 
Disease Epidemic?" The conference brochure described a "massive yet silent 
slaughter," language which prompted a sharp response by the American Industrial 
Health Council (AIHC). Its president wrote a letter to Ray Marshall, stating that: 
The AIHC wishes to express its grave concern over the language which the 
Department of Labor has used in describing this seminar...Its use of [such] 
languagc.is offensive in tonc.We challenge the suggestion that there is an 
epidemic in the workplace and we specifically challenge the 100,000 annual 
death rate [figure]. We ask that you [Ray Marshall] publicly disassociate 
yourself and your department from such unfortunate rhetoric. 1 2 4 
1 2 3"The Environment: How Cancerous?" NBC's Meet the Press, June 25, 1978, 
published in Annals New York Academy of Sciences, 1978, p. 799 
1 2 4Letter to F. Ray Marshall from W. C. Krumrei, American Industrial Health 
Council, September 4, 1979, Kitty Bernick Papers, Box 10, OSHA Carcinogens [2] 
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1 2 5Remarks by Eula Bingham on the OSHA Carcinogen Policy, Bernick Papers, 
Box 10, OSHA Carcinogens [3] 
1 2 6 NBC's Meet the Press, Ibid. 
1 2 7Bernick Papers, Bingham Remarks, Carter Library, Ibid. 
Why did OSHA choose to use such explicit language? Part of the reason may 
lie in the fact that the agency was seeking a fundamental change in the way we 
perceive chemicals in general. In her response to the letter, Bingham wrote: 
"Faced as we are with a constantly expanding body of scientific and medical 
knowledge that today finds chemicals to be hazardous that were earlier 
believed to be harmless, we have no reasonable alternatives but to view aU chemical 
exposures as potentially hazardous."1 2 5 
In short, OSHA was attempting to use knowledge that had previously not been 
used, i.e., to shift the burden of proof. This is also an issue that came to the fore 
during the "Meet the Press" interview cited earlier: 
Q: Dr. Selikoff, you pioneered in research that has identified asbestos as a 
potent cause of lung cancer. The health hazard of this substance has 
been known for at least fifty years. Why does this substance remain in 
large use in the American economy? 
A: (Selikoff) In considerable part because we haven't used the information 
that we have... 
A: (Dr. Kotin - Vice President of Johns-Manville Corporation, a leading 
asbestos manufacturer): ...a significant portion of the chemicals in the 
workplace that have been identified [as hazardous] were identified by 
industry-supported research in advance of the pressures by OSHA. 
A: (Mr. Mazzochi, Vice President, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union): 
Dr. Kotin's statement about what industry has done is pure nonsense. 
American industry has not divulged one single item about a cancer-causing 
substance to workers...I think the industry has the best of all worlds. 
Work is with guinea pigs. All we know about cancer is based upon what 
happens to workers. We don't use animal studies; the industry opposes that 
approach; and certainly the work they have done they refuse to divulge. 
Remember, industry to this date refuses to tell us what we work with, is 
it cancerous, how much of it is present...You absolutely walk into the 
most cancerous workplaces in America blindfolded, as workers. 1 2 6 
Bingham argued that there were essentially two choices: "Wait for a body 
count of dead or seriously ill workers, as we did with Kepone, beta-naphthylamine, 
benzidine, and coke oven emissions, or we can rely upon animal testing [and] other 
tests."1 2 7 
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The AIHC, with a membership of 120 companies and 60 trade organizations, 
was apparently formed in response to the OSHA proposed carcinogen policy. It was 
established in October, 1977 (the same month OSHA published its proposed 
carcinogen policy), to "assist the US OSHA in developing rational and practical policies 
for regulating potential carcinogens in the workplace."1 2 8 AIHCs "Report to the 
Membership, 1987" explains how the AIHC was founded: 
Because of this policy's far-reaching implications—legal, regulatory, scientific, 
and economic—a group of senior corporate executives from several industrial 
sectors saw the need to create a new group to address the issues raised by 
OSHA's cancer policy. These executives and their association colleagues 
established the A I H C . 1 2 9 
However, there was no discernible organizing strategy by labor, which seemed 
to confine itself to issuing public statements supporting the policy. 1 8 0 Perhaps this 
was due to labor's belief that OSHA would accurately present their views. Another 
possibility is that labor has traditionally been more concerned with enforcement, 
rather than standards-setting. Finally, organized labor has not retained scientific 
expertise in these complex areas (see Chapter V). 
The proposed cancer standard 1 3 1 became the subject of extensive hearings, and 
by the time the final policy was published in January 1980 , 1 3 2 the AIHC had spent 
over $1.3 million in legal fees and had hired an accounting firm to perform a cost-benefit 
1 2 8Handwritten notes in Bernick papers, author unknown, Box 10, OSHA 
Carcinogens [3] 
1 2 9 , 1 AIHC Report to the Membership, 1987 1977-1987: A Decade of Change," 
Washington DC, p. 3 
1 8 0Russell, Cristine: "Controversial OSHA Cancer Hearing Opens," Washington 
Star, May 17, 1978, p. 3 
1 3 1 4 2 FR 54148, October 4, 1977 
1 3 2 4 5 FR 5002, January 22, 1980 
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analysis. 1 3 3 The latter was an especially difficult proposition, since the policy did 
not even name specific chemicals to be regulated. 
The AIHC appears to have been "well-connected" at the White House. While 
the OSHA position and the AIHC positions on carcinogens were diametrically 
opposed on many issues, the rulemaking record is a model of public participation, 
with due consideration of widely varying viewpoints on nearly every conceivable 
facet of the proposed regulation. But, the AIHC complained to White House staffers 
regarding their "poor" relationship with OSHA, and apparently successfully won over 
the President's advisors on some points. One staffer wrote that OSHA's proposal 
was not "sensible," calling it a modified Delaney clause, 1 3 4 since it would essentially 
eliminate any workplace exposures to known human carcinogens. (The Delaney 
Amendment was passed by Congress, requiring the FDA to prohibit the addition of 
any carcinogen to the nation's food supply.) The comparison with the Delaney clause 
was a key part of industry's objection to the OSHA carcinogen standard, since 
industry charged that OSHA was seeking a "zero-risk" workplace that was 
impractical and not achievable. Another memo from White House Staffers Si Lazarus 
and Kitty Bernick indicated that they were "monitoring" OSHA's work and that 
"although the regulators generally object to AIHC, Katie and I have found them 
fairly easy to work with." 1 3 5 Another White House memo stated that, "the AIHC 
has been quite helpful and supportive on the Regulatory Reform Bill." 1 3 6 
1 3 3 Firms, OSHA Wrangle Over Carcinogen Rules," Washington Post, July 1, 
1978, p. A6 
1 3 4 Memo from Si Lazarus to Stu Eizenstat, August 11, 1979, White House 
Central File, Box HE 4-2, 1/20/77-1/20/81 
1 3 5 Memo from Peter Petkas to Si Lazarus re meeting with AIHC, Nov. 5, 1979, 
White House Central File (Commodities) Box CM-1 
1 3 6 Memo for Kathy Reid from Si Lazarus, October 23, 1979, Bernick Papers, 
Box 1, AIHC Folder 
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1 3 7 4 2 FR 54169 
1 3 8 Keller Interview, Ibid. 
The initial OSHA proposal was roundly condemned as being inflexible and not 
having a defensible prioritization scheme for which carcinogens to regulate first. 
The preamble to the proposal recognized that initially there would be a tremendous 
backlog of carcinogens to be regulated and classified. One of the options 
presented was particularly ridiculed: Proceed alphabetically through a list developed 
by N I O S H . 1 3 7 Anson Keller has stated that this was merely one of many proposals 
that was put in at the eleventh hour without thorough examination. 1 3 8 
Although the alphabetical approach certainly is wanting, it is nevertheless 
interesting to note that a disproportionate number of regulated substances begin 
with letters at the beginning of the alphabet. Consider the list of chemicals 









coke oven, emissions 
cotton dust 




methyl chloromethyl ether 
lead 
vinyl chloride 
It seems likely that any relationship between the substance's first letter and 
its regulatory fate is spurious. Nevertheless, it does underscore the potential 
dangers in the haphazard substance-specific regulatory technique. 
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The Public Debate: How OSHA Addressed Scientific Uncertainty 
As we have seen, the OSHA cancer policy was part of a broader government 
effort to establish broad guidelines on how cancer-causing substances should be 
controlled. The IRLG (consisting of the EPA, OSHA, FDA, and CPSC), together 
with the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) all worked to develop a 
unified policy that, while not immediately naming specific substances, would aid in 
classifying suspected substances. It is worthwhile to summarize the Preamble to the 
OSHA 1980 cancer policy at this point. The classification scheme was intended to 
be used to determine the degree of control necessary. In other words, the new 
policy was expected to shorten rulemaking dramatically, and avoid "reinventing the 
wheel" for each new substance. 
Specifically, the preamble cited the experience of the vinyl chloride regulation. 
Vinyl chloride was, at the time of its regulatory hearings, undisputably a human 
carcinogen. Yet there was extensive controversy over whether a "safe" level of 
exposure was possible, whether animal testing data using high doses could be 
extrapolated to humans exposed to lower doses, the appropriateness of specific 
requirements, etc. In spite of the 600 written comments, 200 written and oral 
submissions, numerous hearings, and a 4,000 page record, OSHA concluded that 
definitive answers to such questions had not been provided. But "...we cannot wait 
until indisputable answers to these questions are available because lives...are at 
stake." 1 3 9 Other substances had also taken considerable time to regulate: 
Asbestos 
14 carcinogens 
Coke oven emissions 
29 months 
40 months 
greater than 66 months 
greater than 67 months 
greater than 31 months 
Arsenic 
Benzene 
1 3 9 3 9 FR 35892, October 4, 1974 
Beryllium greater than 51 months 1 4 0 
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Thus, the policy's intent was to limit unnecessary, repetitive debate in the 
future. 
It is necessary to strike a balance between some limitation of scientific 
discussion, which is necessary to avoid regulatory paralysis, and the flexibility 
to consider exceptional cases and to accommodate new scientific advances. 1 4 1 
This statement shows how risk management decisions can drive risk assessment 
analysis. With the policy in place, the only points of contention would be how a 
particular substance had been classified, and whether the animal studies, or other 
tests, were of sufficient quality, which is the heart of what we now call risk 
assessment. 
The Need to Act 
During the testimony, officials from the National Cancer Institute reported that 
cancer rates had been increasing during the seventies at a 2% per annum rate, with 
about 25% of the people in the US expected to develop some form of cancer 
(excluding skin cancer) during their lifetime. 1 4 2 Yet the pattern of incidence is 
remarkably complex, and appears to include more than single factors, i.e. cancer 
usually progresses through a number of stages of development, with different factors 
acting at each stage. The Director of the National Institutes of Environmental 
Health Sciences testified that, 
It makes little sense to assert that "only" 1-5% of cancers are attributable 
to a single factor...All cancers are associated in one way or another with 
1 4 0 4 5 FR 5012, January 22, 1980 
1 4 1 4 5 FR 5014 
1 4 2 4 5 FR 5015-5016 
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occupational factors, just as they are probably all associated with 
dietary factors, genetic factors, and hormonal factors." 1 4 3 
Traditional toxicology was also described as being inadequate in dealing with 
carcinogens, because the effects of most other poisons are usually reversible, are 
comparatively rapid, and exhibit a dose-response function. None of these are true 
of carcinogens. When dealing with acutely toxic substances, early toxicological 
studies could "find a no-effect level in animals, divide by 100, and pray." 1 4 4 
However, tumors typically take anywhere from 5 - 4 0 years before becoming 
manifest. Many cancers appear to be caused by changes in a single cell, suggesting 
that the changes are not reversible, unlike most other toxic substances. Finally, no 
truly "safe" level of exposure has ever been demonstrated for any carcinogenic 
substance. Rather, a probability function relating the likelihood of cancer with the 
dose received is often described. However, there does not appear to be any dose at 
which cancer is not possible. The preamble stated that the long latency period 
makes it impossible to wait for the results of human epidemiological studies to 
estimate this probability function. 1 4 5 
The AIHC argued that if given sufficiently high doses of any substance, 
animals are likely to become seriously ill and more susceptible to cancer. 1 4 6 In 
other words, the AIHC held that all substances were likely to be carcinogenic. 
However, OSHA cited other experts who testified that in fact only a relatively few 
1 4 3Testimony of Dr. David Rail, Director National Institute of Environmental 
Health Sciences, 45 FR 5020 
1 4 4 A n anonymous British toxicologist, quoted by Umberto Saffiotti, 45 FR 5023 
1 4 5 4 5 FR 5023 
1 4 6 4 5 FR 5028 
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chemical substances have been found to produce cancer, even at relatively high 
doses. 1 4 7 
The National Cancer Institute, National Institute of Environmental Health 
Sciences, and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health all released 
reports stating that a substantial fraction of cancers in the US is occupationally 
related, and that this is not inconsistent with saying that they are also related to 
other factors as well. The AIHC argued that this involved "double or triple 
counting." OSHA replied that "AIHCs criticism...is not consistent with the 
scientific consensus on the multi-causal nature of carcinogenesis...and demonstrates 
a serious lack of understanding of the issue."148 The strength of this rebuke is an 
indication of just how far apart the AIHC and OSHA were on this issue. It is 
important that many scientists employed in the businessworld were generally 
supportive of the policy. In fact, some were included in internal OSHA strategy 
meetings. 1 4 9 If the preamble is an accurate presentation of the testimony, it would 
appear that the AIHC was isolated on these and other issues. 
Human Data vs. Animal Data 
There is little argument over the fact that the strongest evidence for 
establishing the cancer-causing ability of a substance is through human experience. 
If rates of cancer are known to be higher in an exposed population, and if all other 
confounding factors can be controlled (including socio-economic status, age, 
smoking history, reporting errors, selection and recall biases, water supply, diet, 
1 4 745 FR 5028 
1 4 845 FR 5033 
1 4 9Interview with Anson Keller, Ibid. Keller stated that the scientists from 
the businessworld did not play a much different role than the other government 
scientists with which OSHA consulted. 
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medical history, etc.), then it seems certain that the substance is in fact a 
carcinogen. 
However, due to its lack of sensitivity, epidemiology has been a weak tool in 
identifying non-carcinogens, and OSHA took the position that positive animal data 
should therefore supersede negative epidemiological data. Scientifically, it is always 
difficult to prove a negative (i.e., that something is noj. carcinogenic. In other 
words, if animal tests say the substance is a carcinogen, but we haven't seen 
increased cancer rates in exposed humans, should we regulate the substance as a 
carcinogen? Arsenic, asbestos, benzene, and vinyl chloride are all examples of 
substances that were the subjects of "false negative" epidemiological studies. In 
fact, one of the main reasons asbestos was finally identified as a cancer-causing 
substance was due to its ability to produce an extremely rare form of cancer, 
mesothelioma, which was more easily detected. 
Industry generally took the position that epidemiological studies should play an 
important role, and were useful in estimating the "upper bound" of risk posed to 
humans by a particular substance. OSHA modified its final rule so that such 
evidence could be considered, but still held that positive animal data was sufficient 
for regulatory purposes. 1 5 0 
One or Two Tests 
The quality of animal testing protocols was also debated. There was some 
concern voiced about the original proposal, which could have been interpreted to 
require regulation even if a poor-quality study showed carcinogenic potential. 
OSHA modified its proposal to require two tests for confirmation, although it noted 
that poor-quality tests were more likely to result in a negative finding. At this 
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1 5 1 4 5 FR 5105 
1 5 2 O S H A Instruction CPL 2-2.38A, May 16, 1986, Amended by CPL 2-2.38A CH-
1, July 18, 1986, published by Bureau of National Affairs, Occupational Health and 
Safety Reporter Reference File, p. 31:9515 
time, the EPA felt that professional judgement could be used, and that only one 
high quality positive animal study^ was sufficient. 1 5 1 
The reliance on animal testing was a significant departure from past practice, 
and finds expression in later OSHA regulations, such as the relatively new Hazard 
Communication Rule implemented in 1985. The rule requires employers to identify 
as carcinogenic those substances which have been found to cause cancer in animals. 
Conclusive evidence of cancer causation in humans is no longer required (although 
there is still much debate on the question). OSHA has indicated recently that 
containers of carcinogens which have inadequate data in humans, but sufficient 
evidence in animals (IARC Group 2B), do not need to be labeled as a carcinogen. 
The positive animal testing information does have to appear on a Material Safety 
Data Sheet, however. 1 5 2 
The Threshold Question 
Industry representatives generally argued that a Permissible Exposure Limit 
(PEL) greater than a lowest feasible limit should be set based on the fact that a 
practical threshold, or safe dose, could be calculated below which the likelihood of 
developing cancer was vanishingly small. This was dubbed the "you should live so 
long" theory during the rulemaking hearings. Essentially, this view held that a 
temporal relationship seen in animal studies could be applied to humans. The 
relationship shows that a decreasing dose results in a longer period of time before 
tumors become evident. If a dose could be identified that would cause tumors after 
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a time period greater than a human's lifetime, then that dose should be considered 
permissible. 
The problem with this view is that it does not consider the uncertainties 
present in animal testing: 
But the issue is not thresholds or no thresholds; it is one of adding a new 
carcinogen to a pool of present carcinogens. I would suggest, therefore, that 
there may well be thresholds with carcinogenic substances when given to a 
very clean animal in an environmentally controlled situation, that is, when 
there are few or no other carcinogens present: this is what the experimental 
oncologist tries to create in the standard laboratory animal test system—a 
clean animal of known and homogeneous genetic background and no known 
carcinogens living in sterile filtered air. The human population is different, 
however. The mouse doesn't smoke or breathe hydrocarbons or sulfur oxides 
from fossil fuels, doesn't drink, doesn't take medicine, doesn't eat bacon or 
smoked salmon, but man does. 1 5 3 
Because humans are exposed to a variety of substances, OSHA concluded that 
"the concept of thresholds [is] irrelevant and inapplicable to the determination of 
human hazards or risks."1 5 4 
Scientific Uncertainty and Prudence 
OSHA noted that animal tests had also been far from reliable in the past. The 
case of thalidomide was cited, where it was found that humans were 60 times more 
sensitive than mice, 100 times more sensitive than rats, 200 times more sensitive 
than dogs, and 700 times more sensitive than hamsters to this particular 
medication. In addition, no animal studies have ever conclusively shown inorganic 
arsenic to be carcinogenic, even though it is a known human carcinogen. 1 5 5 While 
OSHA considered the idea of specifying protocols for animal and other toxicity 
1 5 3Statement by David Rail, 45 FR 5137 
1 5 4 4 5 FR 5137 
1 5 5 4 5 FR 5137 
67 
1 5 6Statement by Dr. C. Harris, 45 FR 5182 
testing, it concluded that the state of knowledge was advancing too rapidly in this 
field for such protocols to be of use. 
How to proceed with regulation in the face of this uncertainty may have been 
the most difficult of all questions and remains controversial today. The AIHC was 
highly critical of OSHA's decision not to attempt to differentiate various 
carcinogens on the basis of "potency." The FDA stated that quantitative risk 
assessment was a necessary part of decisionmaking, and the EPA concurred. While 
some of this disagreement among agencies can be laid to different language in the 
relevant statutes, much of it is due to the unique nature of the occupational 
environment. The experience with beta-naphthylamine demonstrates the difference. 
Beta-naphthylamine for workers who have been exposed to that compound for 
over a five year period causes 100 percent bladder cancer. Now, you would 
never have predicted that from the animal tests. You would have predicted 
that it is a carcinogen, but you would not have predicted its potency. I wish 
we had test systems in which we could predict potency, but we do not." 1 5 6 
The essential point is that prudence is important in managing occupational 
risks, especially since exposures in occupational settings are usually orders of 
magnitude higher than they are in the environment. This is yet another example of 
how a risk management decision affected a risk assessment procedure. Attempting 
to quantify the risk involved for humans from animals is subject to uncertainties 
because of differences in: 
1. The number of animals tested (typically 100-1000); the human population 
in this country is between 200 million and 300 million 
2. Environmental differences - heat, light, radiation, etc. 
3. Absorption differences 
4. Distribution and storage differences 
5. Metabolic differences 
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6. Differences in excretion and reabsorption 
7. Receptor sites 
In short, attempting to put numbers on acceptable exposures to carcinogens in 
the workplace is likely to be especially problematic; setting PEL's above the lowest 
feasible limit would essentially be a return to the way regulation was conducted in 
the past: The only test for adequacy is a body count. 
Government or Independent Scientists 
OSHA decided to rely largely on government scientists in exercising 
professional judgement regarding proper assessment of toxicity testing and proper 
classification of individual substances. The AIHC wanted these advisory committees 
to be composed, at least in part, by "independent" scientists; the advisory 
committees were also to be autonomous. 1 5 7 Presumably, this would allow business a 
greater voice in the classification and regulation of specific substances. However, 
OSHA decided that this would constitute an illegal transfer of authority from OSHA 
to a non-governmental panel, that it would be inefficient and result in needless 
delays, that it would not ensure the protection of workers, that it would not be 
accountable, and that Congress rejected the concept of independent boards when it 
gave authority for standard setting to the Secretary of Labor. 1 5 8 Of course, 
Congress did allow initial use of consensus standards, which were developed by 
independent (private) organizations, but this was only a means to get OSHA on its 
feet. 
This issue has resurfaced today as OSHA attempts to update its Permissible 
Exposure Limits with 1988 Threshold Limit Values. TLVs are consensus standards 
1 5 7 4 5 FR 5203 
1 5 8 4 5 FR 5203 
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1 5 9"Study Charges Corporate Influence on TLVs, Calls for International Effort 
to Set Guidelines," BNA Occupational Safety and Health Reporter, October 28, 1987, 
p. 871 
set annually by the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, a 
professional group. Some have argued that the TLVs are established behind closed 
doors and are excessively influenced by business interests. 1 5 9 The role of the 
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health is also relevant here, and will 
be examined in greater detail later. 
Categorization 
The AIHC did support the general view that generic standards were the only 
feasible way to regulate chemicals, although it then proceeded to attack nearly 
every aspect of the policy. For example, it criticized the effort to categorize 
substances, the heart of the standard. To put it simply, Category I was reserved 
for those substances confirmed to be carcinogenic. Category II was reserved for 
those substances for which the evidence was "suggestive" and still inconclusive. 
The AIHC held that this would "freeze science," arguing that once a substance had 
been categorized, new evidence would be less likely to be generated. However, one 
scientist testified that: 
I believe most scientists will be happy to see the introduction of something 
like Category II, recognizing that some experiments give inconclusive results 
and allowing us to escape from the dilemma of having to assign all chemicals 
into "Yes" or "No" categories. 1 6 0 
The trend toward more categories has continued. The International Agency for 
Research on Cancer (IARC) now has no less than four categories in which to 
classify carcinogens: 
Category 1 - There is sufficient evidence to support a causal association 
between the exposure and cancer. 
1 6 0 4 5 FR 5206 
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1 6 1Interview with Anson Keller.Ibid. 
Category 2 - Includes exposures which are probably carcinogenic to humans. 
Category 2A - Usually reserved for exposures for which there is at least 
limited evidence of carcinogenicity to humans 
Category 2B - Cases where there are inadequate data in humans, but there is 
sufficient evidence in animals. 
Category 3 - Chemicals which cannot be classified as to their carcinogenicity 
in humans. 
The primary purpose of the Category II cited in the OSHA cancer policy was 
to draw attention to the lack of information and promote further research, quite 
the opposite from "freezing science." Anson Keller stated that the final version 
contained too much regulation for Category II substances, which in the original 
proposal would have been controlled through cheaper means, such as improved work 
practices, better material control, etc. 1 6 1 As Table 2.1 shows, the requirements for 
both categories were extensive. 
Two other categories (III and IV) were dropped in the final version of the 
regulation, since it was thought that they would be wasteful of resources. Category 
III was to include those substances for which evidence was inconclusive and 




Table 2.1 OSHA Carcinogen Categories 
Definition Requirements 
II 
Meets the definition 
of potential occupational 
carcinogen in: 
1. Humans 
2. A single mammalian species 
in a long-term bioassay 
which is in concordance with 
some other scientifically 
evaluated evidence 
3. A single mammalian species 
in a long-term bioassay 
where OSHA determines that 
supporting evidence is not 
necessary. 
Same as Category I, except 
the evidence is found to 
be "suggestive." 
Same as Category I, except 
the evidence does not have 
supporting evidence from 
other tests 
1. Notification of 
use. 
2. PEL set as low as 
as feasible, through 
engineering and work 
practice controls. 
If a substitute is 
available, no exposure 
is permitted (banned). 
3. Exposure monitoring 
4. Regulated areas 
5. Compliance plan 
6. Respirators 
7. Protective clothing, etc. 
8. Housekeeping 
9. Waste Disposal 
10. Wash Facilities 
11. Medical surveillance 
12. Employee training 
13. Signs & Labels 
14. Recordkeeping 
1. Same 
2. PEL set on a 
case-by-case basis, 
to be met mainly 
through engineering 
and work practice 
controls 
3. Same 
4. No regulated area 





10. No wash facilities 
11. Same 
12. Same 
13. No signs or labels 
14. Same 
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A Potential Occupational Carcinogen is defined in the policy as: 
any substance or combination of substances, which causes an increased 
incidence of benign and/or malignant neoplasms, or a substantial decrease 
in the latency period between exposure and onset of neoplasms in humans 
or in one or more experimental mammalian species as the result of any 
oral, respiratory or dermal exposure, or any other exposure which results 
in the induction of tumors at a site other than the site of administration. 
This definition also includes any substance which is metabolized into one 
or more potential occupational carcinogens by mammals. 1 6 2 
In a recent interview, John Pendergrass stated that this definition does not agree 
with other commonly used definitions, and that this was one of the main reasons 
the policy continues to have low priority. However, he could not state what the 
principal differences are . 1 6 3 
Priori t izat ion: How Indust ry U s e d 
"Good Science" As A Cover for Delay 
At the urging of economists, the AIHC, and others, OSHA agreed that it was 
important to prioritize which substances would be classified first. In the preamble 
to the 1980 standard, OSHA stated that priority-setting should not slow the 
important process of reducing human exposure to potential carcinogens. Most 
priority setting systems were thought to be far too elaborate, leading to "paralysis 
by analysis."1 6 4 
OSHA initially chose to publish a list of candidate substances, with final 
regulations based on "model standards," to be implemented no more than a year 
later. The original proposal provided for establishment of an Emergency Temporary 
Standard, but this "automatic trigger" was dropped in the final standard to ease 
criticisms of lack of flexibility. However, even this was not the prioritization 
1 6 2 4 5 FR 5283 
1 6 3Interview with John Pendergrass, American Industrial Hygiene Conference, 
San Fransisco, California, May 1988 
1 6 4 4 5 FR 5210, January 22, 1980 
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scheme industry had in mind. The AIHC regarded the candidate lists as a sort of 
blacklist and de facto ban, even though OSHA pointed out that the candidate list 
was not a final judgement, and that no model standard would have been applied 
without the opportunity for public comment. By calling for prioritization, but then 
objecting to actual publication of the priority list, industry's hidden agenda of delay 
became more evident. 
While there were press reports that OSHA intended to name over 100 chemicals 
that would fall under immediate model standard regulation, 1 6 5 the priority list for 
both categories was not expected to name more than ten. The full candidate list 
was expected to include 187-488 substances, while the shorter priority list (of about 
10 substances) was to be published every six months. 1 6 6 One such candidate list of 
106 substances did appear late in 1980 , 1 6 7 but it was never acted upon, and the 
model standards were never tested. A storm of controversy erupted as businesses 
argued that their products had, in effect, been banned without public hearings, even 
though the Priority List was for Potential carcinogens. As far as industry was 
concerned, mere appearance of a chemical on any list in the Federal Register 
amounted to regulation. There are also reports that a great deal of OSHA staff 
time was involved in compiling the list. 1 6 8 Apparently, no official Priority List was 
ever published, and the model standards were never applied. 
Economic Analysis 
1 6 5 Dewars H: "OSHA Details Plan to Control Worker Exposure to 
Carcinogens," Washington Post, October 4, 1980, p. A7 
1 6 6 4 5 FR 5205 
1 6 7 4 5 FR 53672, August 12, 1980 
1 6 8lnterview with Anonymous National OSHA Staffer, Ibid. 
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The original proposed regulation called for the determination of the lowest 
feasible occupational exposure limit, while the final version added the words, 
"including technological and economic considerations."169 This is in keeping with 
OSHA's distinction between assessing economic feasibility and cost-benefit analysis 
described earlier. Economic feasibility means an assessment of the impact of a 
proposed standard on various industries. Here, the decision to regulate has already 
been made. However, under cost-benefit analysis, the decision to regulate is not 
based on health effects, but on whether the estimated benefits outweigh the 
estimated costs. 
Generally, both the government economists in Schultze's Regulatory Analysis 
Review Group and OSHA agreed that carcinogens should be regulated due to their 
"externality-generating nature," since "externalities result in an inefficient allocation 
of society's resources because market prices fail to reflect the social cost of 
production."1 7 0 However, AIHC economists and others from the American Petroleum 
Institute argued that OSHA was attempting to create a "risk-free" society, which is 
both impossible and wasteful. Instead, the economists argued, the costs and 
benefits of each regulation should be determined to quantify the "reasonably 
necessary" level of risk. Exposure levels for Category I substances would therefore 
not be set at the lowest feasible level, but some level where the risk was low 
enough to be acceptable to society at large. 1 7 1 To this day, NIOSH has held to the 
doctrine of lowest feasible exposure, although they have recently completed a 
quantitative risk assessment. The economists also wanted the engineering control 
1 6 9 4 5 FR 5235 
1 7 0 4 5 FR 5235 
1 7 1 4 5 FR 5237 
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specifications removed from the model standards in favor of more 
performance-oriented provisions (such as respirators). 
AIHC believes that the record strongly supports the conclusion that OSHA 
should undertake a cost/benefit analysis as part of the regulatory process to 
determine the level of control. This may not necessitate an elaborate 
cost/benefit analysis but it does mean that OSHA will have sufficiently 
identified the societal costs and benefits so that it can more reasonably 
determine an acceptable level of risk--the reasonably necessary level-in 
setting particular standards. 1 7 2 
In attempting to define what such a level would look like, Dr. Nicholas Ashford of 
MIT testified about a concept he called "minimization of regret." Basically, this 
means that society prefers actions which prevent major disasters, even if regulations 
would in retrospect be stricter than absolutely necessary. 1 7 3 Of course, this 
represents an unacceptable inefficiency to most economists. If Ashford is correct, 
then there are occasions when society prefers inefficiency over accepting risks. 
The Regulatory Analysis Review Group (RARG), which was headed by Charles 
Schultze, apparently never agreed to the generic approach, insofar as economic 
analysis goes. In their testimony, they recommended the weighing of costs and 
benefits of different regulatory approaches for each specific substance, 1 7 4 which is 
certainly not a generic approach, and certainly not a prescription for speeding up 
rulemaking. In any case, none of the principals involved in the 1980 formulation of 
the policy recalls any further substantial interference from the economists, possibly 
due to the general nature of the policy, 1 7 5 and a decision by the economists to 
fight against individual standards, waiting for implementation of the cancer policy 
to decide how to respond. 
1 7 2 4 5 FR 5246 
1 7 3 4 5 FR 5246 
1 7 4 4 5 FR 5237 
1 7 5Interviews with Eula Bingham and Anson Keller, Ibid. 
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1 7 6Statement by N. Ashford, 45 FR 5249 
1 7 7 4 5 FR 5239 
The seeming neutrality of cost-benefit analysis was also criticized during the 
hearings with regard to equity considerations. In occupational health and safety 
matters, the benefits are likely to accrue to one group (industrialists, and perhaps 
consumers in the form of lower prices—although consumers may also have some 
exposure) while the costs are borne by another group (workers). 
Maximizing social welfare should not necessarily be equated with optimizing 
social welfare. Equity and economic efficiency are sometimes conflicting goals. 
As a decision tool, cost-benefit analysis can be useful in identifying the nature 
of the trade-offs; as a decision rule, it is useless. Regulation of toxic 
substances is an expression of social policy, not economic policy, and the 
social decision does not end with internalizing the social costs of producing 
and using chemicals, followed by equating costs and benefits at the margin. 1 7 6 
R A R G did criticize the Snell Report, which was funded by the AIHC to 
estimate the total costs of the carcinogen policy. "There are a number of major 
methodological problems with the...Snell Report which makes it impossible to place 
great confidence in its results." The methodological problems involved the use of 
scaling factors and a very small group of 7 substances and 8 pesticides to arrive at 
total cost figures of $9 billion - $88 billion in capital costs and $6 billion - $36 
billion in annual costs caused by generic regulation of all carcinogens. More 
fundamentally however, the Snell Report did not calculate the costs involved in the 
non-regulation of industrial carcinogens, such as premature death, family suffering, 
medical costs, government transfer payments, etc. 1 7 7 Many of these types of costs 
are intangible, or at least extremely difficult to quantify. In practice, economists 
simply choose to ignore them, as the author of the Snell Report did. 
OSHA concluded that the lowest feasible limit of exposure should be set for 
carcinogens, not levels set based on acceptable risk, by means of cost-effectiveness 
analysis or cost benefit analysis. The analytical techniques were too crude, 
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efficiency criteria alone were not appropriate because equity considerations were 
ignored, and finally, the OSHA Act required the lowest feasible level since no safe 
level of exposure can be determined. 1 7 8 The Supreme Court's decision on the 
benzene standard would change this. 
Favorable Review By The White House 
How was the cancer policy handled at the White House? A White House memo 
dated August 11, 19*79 indicates that the OSHA carcinogen policy was one of the 
"big five" regulations singled out by "Stu, Charlie, Fred, and Mclntyre," primarily 
due to its potentially large price tag. The Administration handed it over to the 
Regulatory Council, regarding it as an interagency affair, although they noted that 
the document "needs work." 1 7 9 On October 1, 1979, Si Lazarus noted that the 
Regulatory Council cancer policy "leaves much room to the agencies with respect to 
many of the interesting issues about how tight to turn the screw. We will have to 
see what EPA and OSHA do with that room." 1 8 0 By January 15, 1980, however, 
another White House memo supported the final OSHA regulation, calling it "light 
years ahead of the original proposal."181 
Even Eizenstat and Schultze gave a favorable review. They wrote to the 
President that the OSHA and DOL staffs 
...could not have been more cooperative in working with other interested 
agencies and with our staffs in shaping the final regulation...although neither 
industry nor labor is likely to be completely satisfied with the final result. 
1 7 8 4 5 FR 5239 
1 7 9 White House Central File, Subject File, Health 4-2, Box HE-7 Memo for Stu 
Eizenstat from Si Lazarus, August 11, 1979 
1 8 0 Memo from Si Lazarus to Stu Eizenstat, October 1, 1979, White House 
Central File, Box HE-7, File Health 4-2 
1 8 1 Memo for Eizenstat from Ron Lewis, January 15, 1980, White House Central 
File, Box HE-7 File Health 4-2 
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We believe the process worked well here; it emphasized extended discussion 
and peer criticism, rather than confrontation."1 8 2 
However, the AIHC later joined in an industry-wide suit challenging OSHA over the 
"lack of scientific validity," contending "that the OSHA regulation is of 
unprecedented sweep and generality."1 8 3 AIHC listed 5 objections to the final rule 
in a meeting with White House staffers: 
1. The OSHA scientific advisory panel would be composed of government 
scientists, not independent experts 
2. The use of risk assessment would be limited to prioritizing, not in 
establishing control levels 
3. No threshold dose for carcinogens was allowed 
4. There was no distinction between strong and weak carcinogens (potency) 
5. The model standards dictated engineering controls instead of performance 
standards. 1 8 4 
Apparently, White House staffers finally turned a deaf ear to the AIHC, in 
spite of their earlier close working relationship. Industry then turned to the 
courts, where the American Petroleum Institute asked the US Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals to review the regulation, even before it had been announced. 
The Reagan Administration: Withdrawal 
Before the OSHA cancer policy could be fully implemented, a new 
administration with a radically different perspective toward regulation took office. 
Initially, the Reagan administration planned to withdraw the regulation in piecemeal 
1 8 2 Memo to the President from Eizenstat, Kahn, and Schultze, January 15, 
1980, White House Central File, Box HE-4, File HE 1-2 4/18/79 - 1/20/81 
1 8 3 American Petroleum Institute, et al. v. OSHA, et al. nos. 80-3018 et al. 
(Fifth Circuit) 
1 8 4Bernick Papers Box 10, OSHA Carcinogens [3] 
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fashion. 1 8 5 No priority list was ever published after the first candidate list was 
published on August 14, 1980. An administrative stay of these listing requirements 
was published on January 4, 198 3 . 1 8 6 Apparently, there were also plans to remove 
the entire standard, but this effort was never accomplished. 
Thorne Auchter, who headed OSHA during the early years of the Reagan 
administration, characterized the regulatory stance of the previous Carter 
Administration as being extremely pro-regulatory. Carter's concept of producing 
regulations only when needed and removing unimportant rules was replaced by a 
concept of producing regulation only when the evidence of need was absolutely 
indisputable. Auchter recognized that such evidence was not available for most 
carcinogens, and initiated action on only one during his tenure—an Emergency 
Temporary Standard for asbestos. 1 8 7 In an interview he stated that there are "only 
two 100% proven carcinogens—asbestos and cigarette smoke." 1 8 8 In short, the level 
of proof required by this administration was much higher. 
The Benzene Decision: Throwing Water on the Dying Embers 
Some of this reticence was due, at least in part, to the Supreme Court ruling 
on benzene, 1 8 9 which was handed down at the end of the Carter Administration. A 
badly-divided court ruled that the agency must make a factual finding that a 
1 8 5 "OSHA Planning Cancer Policy Withdrawal; Complete Rewrite Favored Over 
Amendment," BNA Occupational Health and Safety Reporter, Vol 12, No. 27, Dec. 2, 
1982, p. 539 
1 8 6 4 8 FR 241, January 4, 1983 
1 8 7 T h e ETS was issued on Nov. 4, 1983 (48 FR 51086), which was vacated by 
the Fifth Circuit Court on March 7, 1984 (Asbestos Information Association v. 
OSHA, 727 F. 2d 415) 
1 8 8Interview with Thorne Auchter, February 3, 1988 
1 8 9International Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 
448 US 607 (Supreme Court, July 2, 1980 
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1 9 0 I U D v. API, 448 US 607 (1980) 
significant risk is present and will be eliminated or significantly reduced by 
regulation. 
Four of the justices argued that OSHA did not present sufficient evidence to 
show that reducing benzene exposures from 10 ppm to 1 ppm was necessary, and 
that the current PEL of 10 ppm placed employees at "significant risk." Four other 
justices protested this view, writing that, 
...the plurality [the other four justices] ignores the plain meaning of the OSHA 
Act of 1970...The unfortunate consequence is that the Federal Government's 
efforts to protect American workers from cancer...may be substantially 
impaired...According to the plurality, a standard is not "reasonably necessary or 
appropriate" unless the Secretary is able to show that it is "at least more 
likely than not" that the risk he seeks to regulate is a "significant one." 
Nothing in the statute's language or legislative history, however, indicates that 
the "reasonably necessary and appropriate" language [in the OSHA Act] should 
be given this meaning. 1 9 0 
The deciding vote belonged to Justice Rehnquist, who argued that, due to its 
vagueness, the OSHA Act was an invalid delegation of authority by Congress. 
There are numerous contradictions in this ruling. For example, while it said 
OSHA should not have relied on assumptions and theories to show risk at 10 ppm, 
the plurality also said OSHA was "free to use conservative assumptions in 
interpreting the data with respect to carcinogenicity." The plurality also mentioned 
the OSHA cancer policy in a footnote. It claimed that OSHA might go too far in 
regulating American businesses, and that a decision in favor of OSHA would impose 
enormous costs that might produce little, if any, discernible benefit. The footnote 
says, "OSHA's cancer policy indicates that this possibility is not merely 
hypothetical." Even though the vote was so close, the decision is of tremendous 
significance, since it was the first time the Court had ruled on risk assessment. 
Since the ruling, all environmental regulations now develop some sort of 
quantitative risk assessment as part of the record. 
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In January, 1981, OSHA deleted the provisions which required the PEL to be 
set automatically at the lowest feasible level for Category I potential carcinogens, 
and also those provisions which limited the type of evidence that could be 
considered. In their place, OSHA proposed to set the exposure limit at the lowest 
feasible limit which is necessary to eliminate significant risk. 1 9 1 This represented 
the Carter administration's last-ditch effort to make the cancer policy conform to 
the benzene decision. However, the Reagan administration launched a full-scale 
review of the cancer policy amendments, and published an advance notice of 
proposed rulemaking to overhaul the policy. 1 9 2 
The effect of the benzene ruling on the OSHA cancer policy was severe, 
especially in the hands of individuals predisposed against regulation. Rather than 
attempt to incorporate risk assessment into the cancer policy, Auchter allowed the 
policy to remain dormant. His perception of regulation in general is that much of 
it was driven by litigation, the very thing that the policy was intended to prevent. 
He believes that the courts began to issue rulings on the substance of a given 
agency action. A more proper role for the court would be to rule only on issues of 
due process, he believes. 1 9 3 Of course, if he had chosen to implement the cancer 
policy, the courts may have had more of a procedural foundation on which to 
review cases. The absence of a generic cancer policy explaining how the agency 
had reached a decision to regulate specific substances may have allowed the court 
to dabble further in the area of scientific expertise. The substantial scientific 
record amassed in support of the policy may have also made it more difficult for 
the Justices to rule on matters of scientific knowledge. Of course, if the court felt 
1 9 1 4 6 FR 4889, January 19, 1981 
1 9 2 4 7 FR 187, January 5, 1982 
1 9 3Interview with Thorne Auchter, Ibid. 
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that the cancer policy was simply unreasonable, it may have prompted further 
action in the Congress. It is worth emphasizing that the vote was extremely close, 
and the ruling fairly muddied. 
This orientation towards reacting to court rulings has had a detrimental effect 
on staffing the agency. Auchter indicates that he had considerable difficulty 
attracting senior health officials to join the agency, with many considering it a 
"no-win" proposition from a career standpoint, because of the numerous enemies 
made in the course of working at the agency. In fact, Auchter believes one may 
have more influence from outside the agency than from inside the agency. 1 9 4 Eula 
Bingham has charged that the agency is now in "shambles," not so much due to the 
litigious environment as to other factors: 
The people who are really concerned...who really did the job in the face of 
adversity, if they possibly could leave have gonc.There's no spirit at OSHA. 
There's no self-esteem. There's no commitment to standards and enforcement, 
[although] I do believe there are a few dedicated people [ left] . 1 9 5 
The number of OSHA inspectors declined from 1,328 in 1980 to 1,044 in 1987. 
Perhaps more importantly, the type of inspection shifted from an emphasis on 
comprehensive physical inspections of worksites to inspections of records only. In 
1986, 4,619 records inspections were conducted. Reflecting this change, the agency 
has recently levied very large fines against Chrysler Corporation and IBP, Inc. (a 
meatpacking firm) of $1.57 million and $2.59 million, respectively. 1 9 6 In both cases, 
the fines were for failure to maintain written records of injuries and illnesses 
sustained by employees. These records must be accurate if the agency is to target 
1 9 4Interview with Thorne Auchter, Ibid. 
1 9 5Speech by Eula Bingham before Worker's Education Local 189, Cincinnati, 
Ohio, November 21, 1987 
1 9 6Glaberman, W: "Is OSHA Falling Down on the Job?" New York Times, 
August 2, 1987, p. Fl 
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its inspections successfully at only the most hazardous industries, as the Reagan 
Administration intended. Of course, there is an incentive for business to under-
report injuries and illnesses to avoid an inspection, so OSHA has recently retreated 
from the targeting system. Now, at least 10% of all inspections are conducted in 
general industry, not only in the high hazard area. 
What has been the effect of slower standards setting and the orientation 
toward records-type inspections? It is quite difficult to show how increased judicial 
review and reluctance to set standards has affected statistical measures of safety 
and health. Occupational injury and illness rates increased slightly in 1984, and 
have remained higher than in 1982 and 1983 (see Table 2.2), although there are a 
number of other possible confounding explanations. These include changes in 
employers' understanding of reporting requirements, improved workers' compensation 
benefits (which may mean workers are more likely to make claims), business cycles, 
and a shift in employment from hazardous industry to less hazardous service and 
white collar jobs . 1 9 7 In spite of these caveats, one can not rule out the hypothesis 
that relaxed enforcement and standards-setting agendas have contributed to the 
interruption in the decline of injury and illness rates. The increase in 1984 was 
the biggest in the agency's history. 1 9 8 Overall, however, the rates have declined 
dramatically from the rate in 1973 (11.0/100 workers), and remain below the levels 
seen during the Carter administration, providing at least suggestive evidence that an 
activist OSHA has in fact made a difference. 1 9 9 
1 9 7Mendeloff, J: "The Hazards of Rating Workplace Safety," Wall Street 
Journal, February 11, 1988, p. 30 
1 9 8Glaberman, "Is OSHA Falling Down on the Job?" Ibid. 
1 9 9 "NIOSH Director Praises OSH Act, Cites 'Clear Evidence' of Law's Impact," 
Occupational Safety and Health Reporter, Bureau of National Affairs, September 23, 
1987, p. 747 "Millar [NIOSH Director] cited worker fatality figures as evidence of 
the law's impact. He said that over 14,000 workers were killed in 1968...by 
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Table 2.2 Occupational Injuries and Illness 



















Source: Bureau of National Affairs and Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Carcinogen Policies at Other Agencies During the Reagan Years: Increasing the 
Level of Acceptable Risk 
While the carcinogen policy languished at OSHA, other agencies proceeded to 
make changes to their carcinogen guideline policies. Much of the work involved 
attempts to increase the levels of acceptable risk for specific substances. For 
example, in 1982, the EPA proposed to increase the previously-accepted doctrine of 
tolerating a statistical risk of 1 cancer case per million people. In the case of 
ethylene bisdithiocarbamate fungicides, EPA said the risk of contracting cancer from 
food residues would be between 5 in 10,000 to 5 in 100,000. The occupational risk 
of contracting cancer would be much higher, between 1 in 100 and 9 in 100,000. 
Nevertheless, the agency granted a 2-year extension for continued use of about 27 
million pounds per year. 2 0 0 
Even more controversial was the attempt by EPA's John Todhunter, an 
assistant administrator for the Office of Pesticides and Toxic Substances, to divide 
1984...statistics showed that 6,496 workers died in workplaces..." 
2 0 0"EPA's High Risk Carcinogen Policy," Science, Vol. 28, December 3 1982 p. 
975-978 
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2 0 1Frederica Perrera, quoted in National Journal, Ibid. 
2 0 2 Ellen Silbergeld, quoted in Wines M: "Scandals at EPA May Have Done in 
Reagan's Move to Ease Cancer Controls, National Journal p. 1269 
suspected carcinogens into "genotoxic" and "epigenetic" categories. The theory 
stipulates that genotoxic carcinogens directly affect a cell's DNA, resulting in the 
"one-hit" that can lead to tumor formation (recent theories have stipulated that at 
least 2 "hits" are required in the DNA molecule to produce a tumor). Epigenetic 
carcinogens produce tumors through other mechanisms, for which the body may have 
defenses. The effect of the proposed classification scheme would have been to 
permit greater exposure to the epigenetic compounds, since a safe level of exposure 
was at least theoretically possible. However, a number of other scientists protested 
that the ability to distinguish between the two types was poor, and could not be 
used as the basis for policy. A leading cancer researcher stated, 
Their theories have been shot down as far as scientific support, yet we're 
seeing them implemented in individual decisions...If what they're trying to do is 
to lower the burden of regulation to meet economic goals, then they should 
open it to the public and see if the public is willing to take the additional 
risks. 2 0 1 
The final blow to this classification scheme was the experience with dioxin 
(2,3,7,8-tetra-chlorodibenzo-p-dioxin), a "classic epigenetic carcinogen."2 0 2 This 
substance is such a potent carcinogen in animal tests that it fueled public fears, 
leading to the evacuation of a small town in Minnesota. 
Politically, these moves were dealt a severe blow when the top administrator 
of EPA, Anne Burford and an assistant, Rita Lavelle, were accused of mismanaging 
the agency's program to clean up hazardous waste sites. Both officials resigned and 
one was sent to jail. Congress initiated oversight hearings, and the House Energy 
and Commerce Committee stated that "In the past two years, the Reagan 
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administration has shown itself to be soft on cancer."2 0 3 Norton Nelson, chairman 
of the board of counselors to the National Toxicology Program, said that the 
Reagan Administration was "covertly" abandoning long-accepted scientific bases for 
cancer regulation. 2 0 4 
Recently, this issue has been revived in slightly different format. New models 
of carcinogenesis theorize three stages: initiation, promotion, and progression. If a 
substance can be identified as a promoter, then theoretically, it may have a 
threshold (safe) dose, since it must be present in fairly high concentrations to allow 
an initiator to progress to tumor formation. However, reliable analytical techniques 
to identify the different types of carcinogens are still wanting. 
The trend toward lowering estimates of risk levels associated with exposures to 
carcinogens continues today. For example, the EPA has recently estimated that the 
risk of skin cancer from arsenic is one-tenth of the 1984 estimate. Dioxin is now 
thought to pose one-sixteenth of the risk estimated in 1985. Risk estimates for 
methylene chloride were reduced by nearly 90 percent. 2 0 5 Dioxin, asbestos, and 
cigarette smoke are thought to be promoters, and some scientists believe that safe 
threshold doses can be identified through more sophisticated use of animal testing 
results. Others however, including Barry Commoner and Marvin Schneiderman 
(former associate director of the National Cancer Institute) have stated that the 
reassessment is not based on current scientific understanding. Commoner has called 
it "ludicrously bad science," while Schneiderman maintains that the new information 
2 0 3 Wines M: "Scandals at EPA May Have Done In Reagan's Moves to Ease 
Cancer Controls," National Journal, June 6, 1983, p. 1264 
2 0 4 Wines, M: "Scandals at EPA May Have Done in Reagan's Moves to Ease 
Cancer Controls," Ibid. 
2 0 5Shabecoff, Philip, "EPA Reassess the Cancer Risks of Many Chemicals," 
New York Times, January 4, 1988, p. 1 
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has not in fact been worked into risk assessment models used by EPA. 2 0 6 There 
have also been reports showing that dioxin alone has been capable of causing 
tumors (i.e., that it acts as an initiator as well as a promoter).207 Of course, since 
conservative assumptions have been used in the past, it is possible that as we 
learn more, we will find that the risks are not as bad as originally thought. While 
this seems reasonable, the actual practice has been to lower acceptable exposure 
limits like TLVs and PELs when new evidence is presented, not raise them. Thus, 
in spite of conservative assumptions, new research more often than not shows that 
chemical exposures are riskier than we thought. 
The issue of quantitative risk assessment will be examined in the next chapter. 
It is worth noting the economic effects of the new risk reassessments, however. 
Syntex Inc., which currently has about $15 billion in lawsuits resulting from the 
Times Beach dioxin episode, indicates that it could save $11 million in cleanup costs 
if the new risk assessment were used. Dow Chemical, Monsanto, and Hercules, Inc. 
would also save substantial sums of money due to lower cleanup costs.208 
Cancer risks were also the subject of a recent court ruling on use of 
carcinogenic food dyes. The FDA argued that the risks posed by these substances 
was as low as one in 19 billion, and that the risk was "so trivial as to be 
effectively no risk." The court stated that the concern over carcinogens in 
Congress and the public "...resulted in a close focus on substances increasing cancer 
threats and a willingness to take extreme steps to lessen even small risks." The 
206Hays, Laurie, "Proposals from Federal Agencies to Ease Dioxin Standards 
Renew Debate on Risk," Wall Street Journal, January 27, 1988 
207Bernard Weinstein quote in Wall St. Journal, Ibid, quoted as saying dioxin 
alone has been shown to produce tumors in some experiments 
208Hays, Laurie: "Proposals From Federal Agencies to Ease Dioxin Standards 
Renew Debate on Risk," Ibid. 
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2 0 9Associated Press, "Appeals Court Rejects FDA decision to allow cosmetic 
dyes tied to cancer." Atlanta Journal Constitution, October 24, 1987 
2 1 0Interview with Anonymous OSHA Staffer, Ibid. 
2 1 1 B N A Special Report, "Hazard Communication, Recordkeeping, Z-Table Project 
Head OSHA Agenda in Shadow of Election-Year Malaise," Occupational Health and 
Safety Reporter, January 6, 1988, p. 1240-1252 
court said it was up to Congress to determine if this was an example of an 
undesirable consequence of the Delaney Clause. 2 0 9 Clearly, this is a far cry from 
the Benzene Decision, where the court focused on reasonableness and significant 
risk. 
The OSHA cancer policy was scheduled for an update in January, 1988. An 
OSHA staffer has indicated that no real progress is expected until October 2 1 0 , and 
many other observers feel that the election year will produce bureaucratic 
inertia. 2 1 1 However, the AIHC is pursuing the matter, and hopes to provide the 
push to have OSHA revise the policy before a new administration takes office. 
Conclusion: The Continuing Struggle 
Between Regulators and Economists 
In this chapter, several conclusions can be drawn from the historical 
experience of the OSHA cancer policy: 
1. Lawyers and scientists developed an uneasy but productive relationship to 
formulate the carcinogen policy. Lawyers realized that continuous 
relitigation over certain cancer principles was not productive. Scientists 
realized that there would continue to be large gaps in our understanding 
of cancer for the forseeable future. Together, these two groups achieved 
a broad consensus on how uncertain scientific knowledge can be used to 
make cancer regulatory policy. 
2. The relationship between economists and regulators has not achieved this 
type of consensus, and has been marked by bitter struggle. This struggle 
has pitted those who wish to minimize the costs borne by industry 
against those who wish to maximize public health. As arbiter, the courts 
have often sent conflicting signals as to what is "reasonable." In spite of 
the cotton dust episode, economists have largely emerged victorious. 
Sweeping generic regulation of carcinogens has given way to 
incrementalism (i.e. substance-specific regulation). 
3. An important tactical element in winning acceptance for the cancer policy 
involved disarming the business community by removing unimportant 
safety rules. Since there are unlikely to be many more of these left on 
the books, such a scenario may not be easily repeated in the future. 
4. The model of a strict separation of risk management and risk assessment 
appears to break down. In practice, the two appear to mix extensively, 
but without an established process. It is worth noting that the testimony 
given during typical rulemaking does not encourage discussion and debate 
among the participants (i.e., there is no negotiating process). Risk-averse 
or risk-tolerant management assumptions have affected risk management 
principles (e.g. benign vs. malignant tumors, genotoxic vs. epigenetic 
carcinogens, etc.). 
5. Individual personalities matter. President Carter's practical experience 
with respirators appeared to have swayed a close decision. Eula Bingham 
was willing to take risks and proceed in the face of uncertain scientific 
information. However, Thorne Auchter practiced more caution and 
demanded a higher level of certainty, perhaps even higher than the courts 
would have demanded, before taking action. 
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6. Organized labor was conspicuously absent from the struggle over the 
cancer policy, while business was extremely well-organized. The AIHC 
played a highly visible role, and appeared to be well-connected with 
White House staff members. Organized labor submitted testimony, but did 
not attempt to publicize the issue, as they did with the right-to-know 
standard. Nevertheless, the AIHC appears to have been isolated during 
much of the rulemaking proceedings, perhaps due to Bingham's close ties 
to organized labor and the supportive testimony of other scientists from 
the private sector. 
91 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES 
The creation of a comprehensive carcinogen public policy has been stymied in 
large part by the difficulties associated with allocating resources between two social 
activities: 
1. Promoting further economic development on the one hand, and 
2. Controlling exposures to hazardous substances (caused in part by that 
economic development) on the other. The previous chapter showed that attempts 
to "rationally" allocate those resources has historically been performed using 
quantitative techniques such as cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, and 
risk-benefit analysis. Although the use of some version of these techniques will 
clearly need to be included in any new version of the OSHA carcinogen policy (due 
to previous court rulings), the assumptions, and indeed, the relevance of such 
analysis needs further investigation if a future OSHA carcinogen policy is to be 
politically viable. 
The sparring between such governmental agencies as the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) and those involved in safety, health and environmental regulation 
has been the subject of congressional hearings. 2 1 2 OMB is widely regarded as 
having enormous power over decisions made by regulatory and scientific agencies, 
2 1 2 See Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Intergovernmental 
Relations Hearings, Jan. 28, 1986 on OMB impact on regulations governing asbestos 
and grain dust. Also see Sun S: "Food Dyes Fuel Debate Over Delaney," Science, 
Vol. 229, Aug. 23, 1985, p. 739-741, which says, in part, "...Members of 
Congress...say...FDA has succumbed to pressure from OMB...The one exception to 
Delaney is the approval of saccharin, and that was the result of Congressional 
Mandate. 
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When Morals and Economics Clash 
The Limits of Economic Analysis 
The application of economic and risk assessment analytical techniques to 
carcinogen policy yields a host of important philosophical and ethical issues, and 
may explain why mixed signals have been sent by both Congress and the courts. Do 
these techniques aid the decisionmaker in thinking rationally about regulatory 
2 1 3 Walsh J and Culliton B: "Office of Management and Budget: Skeptical 
View of Scientific Advice," Science, Vol. 183, No. 4123, Feb. 1, 1974, p. 392 
2 1 4 Quoted in Occupational Hazards, October 1975, p. 49, cited in Regulating 
Safety: An Economic and Political Analysis of Occupational Health and Safety 
Policy, by John Mendeloff, MIT Press, 2nd Printing, March, 1980, p. 69 
2 1 5 Kneese, Allen and Schultze, Charles, Pollution. Prices and Public Policy. 
Washington DC, Brookings Institution, 1975, p. 22 
and is the source of considerable anxiety and fear among regulators, a role shared 
by its historical predecessors.2 1 3 
Economists often charge that health and safety regulators don't adequately 
consider the social costs of controlling hazards, implying that society may be 
unwilling to pay for additional protective measures if the nature of the lost 
opportunities were truly understood. The regulators counter that OMB lacks the 
necessary technical expertise, and that the effect of OMB interference is to 
increase the level of risk and cheapen the value of life. 
For example, former Congressman David Obey has stated, "I believe that when 
you're dealing in questions related to human life, economic costs are irrelevant."214 
Contrast this with George Schultze's view: 
Environmental goals therefore are not the simple consequence of decisions 
about how clean we want the air and water to be....[They] confront us...with a 
set of hard choices between environmental quality and other aspects of living 
standards, in which the more we want of one, the less we can have of the 
other." 2 1 5 
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alternatives, or do they obscure important, but intangible, considerations from 
entering the equation at all? 
In environmental, health, and safety regulation, there may be occasions when a 
decision can be judged to be morally right, even though its benefits do not 
outweigh the costs. As an analogy, consider the case of crime deterrence. If we 
assume that increased convictions will lead to a reduction in crime, and if the 
police arrest an innocent person for the purposes of making an example, then the 
question of whether the benefits outweigh the costs is clearly an inadequate test. 
In this case, assume that the benefits of reduced crime are much larger than the 
costs of the person's lost earnings and other contributions to society while 
incarcerated. If so, then a cost benefit analysis may conclude that imprisonment is 
desirable, even though the individual is innocent. Of course, most of us would 
object that an innocent person should never knowingly be convicted. This means 
that some things are outside the realm of economics. Human rights are an example. 
Freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, trial by jury, etc. involve the idea that 
people can expect to be treated in certain ways, regardless of the efficiencies 
involved. In the previous chapter, a former OSHA administrator compared the right 
to a safe and healthy workplace, which is guaranteed by the OSHA Act, to other 
rights. The value of human life, fresh air, and the right not to be exposed to 
carcinogens without prior consent while working might also be included in this 
category. 2 1 6 , 2 1 7 
2 1 6 Some of this material is based on Kelman S: "Cost-Benefit Analysis: An 
Ethical Critique," Regulation, AEI Journal of Government and Society, January/ 
February 1981, p. 33-40 
2 1 7 For an excellent discussion of the centuries-old debate about what should 
and should not be placed on the market, see Gunnemann, JP: "Justice With 
Strangers: The Ethics of Exchange," Mimeo from Emory University, Atlanta, GA 
(Forthcoming in Prism, a theological journal of the United Church of Christ) 
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Pricelessness 
The concept of pricelessness is anathema to cost benefit analysis, since market 
prices (and sometimes shadow prices) are often used to compare the value of costs 
and benefits. The method may work best when such prices exist and correlate well 
with value. Yet clearly there are occasions when prices of any kind are a poor 
reflection of the value placed on certain things. For example, respect that is 
purchased at a high market price (e.g. a corporate executive who hires well-paid 
yes-men), is likely to have a low value. The common wisdom is that one must earn 
respect, not buy it; the very act of paying for it devalues it. Similarly, the value 
of sex consummating love is clearly higher than the sex purchased from a 
prostitute. Yet cost benefit analysis tends to use market prices when they are 
available. 2 1 8 
All this should not lead to the conclusion held by some critics 2 1 9 that 
quantification of certain things is impossible and should not even be attempted. In 
fact, many economists would agree that policy decisions based only on a strict 
comparison of costs and benefits would be poor ones. 2 2 0 Some mixture of ethics 
and quantification of risks is used by all of us everyday in choosing various courses 
of action. Life can never be completely without risk, and the process of weighing 
relative risks is omnipresent. The essential point here is that prices, which 
establish what is or is not feasible, can not provide a correct quantification of the 
2 1 8 Kelman, Ibid. 
2 1 9 Hare RM: "Contrasting Methods of Environmental Planning," in Goodpaster 
KE, et al. Ethics and the Problems of the 21st Century. University of Notre Dame 
Press, Notre Dame, 1979, p. 64-68, cited in Shrader-Frechette, Science Policy. 
Ethics, and Economic Methodology. D. Reidel, Boston, 1985, p. 153 
2 2 0Interview with Charles Schultze, February 24, 1988 
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2 2 1 Kelman, Ibid. 
2 2 2 Baram, MS: "Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Inadequate Basis for Health, 
Safety, and Environmental Regulatory Decisions," Ecology Law Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 
409, p. 485 
value society places on clean air, a safe workplace, Human life, or viability of 
future generations. 
Public and Individual Decisionmakinq--Are the Criteria the Same? 
There is also an important difference between public and private decision­
making, one that is often ignored by the individualistic microeconomic tradition on 
which cost benefit analysis is based. To put it simply, our social decisions often 
are perceived to provide an occasion to display a "respect" for life that is not 
practiced on an individual level. Privately, we take risks and give life a finite 
value. There is no reason to believe that these individual risk levels can be 
summed simply for the purposes of public policy analysis. 2 2 1 This distinction is 
important in understanding the limitations of cost benefit policy analysis in setting 
social policy. A simple summation of individual preferences denies any sense of a 
collective social vision of what we want for our neighbors, our children, and even 
strangers. 
Of course, environmental policymaking agencies have in fact monetized human 
life. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission uses a figure of $1000 per whole body 
rem, the Environmental Protection Agency in its environmental radiation standards 
uses $500,000 for each life saved, and the Consumer Production Safety Commission 
has used figures ranging from $200,000 to $2,000,000 per l i fe . 2 2 2 One writer has 
found a range of $200,000 to $7 million per life used in various regulatory 
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2 2 5 Ibid . Shrader-Frechette, p. 33-34, 54-57 
endeavors. 2 2 3 The truth of the matter is that, in practice, initiation of a cost 
benefit analysis using such widely-varying figures means that a particular policy has 
already been approved on grounds other than cost-benefit. One bureaucrat stated 
that he can remember "...no instance where risk benefit analysis resulted in the 
conclusion that the agency action should be stopped."2 2 4 
Utilitarianism. Positivism and Cost-Benefit Analysis: 
Poor Substitutes for Moral Analysis 
Cost-benefit analysis is rooted in the philosophy of utilitarianism, which was 
abandoned by most modern philosophers around the turn of the century. 2 2 5 This 
system of thought can be characterized briefly as maximizing the "greatest 
happiness for the greatest good." Any action which achieves this is desirable; in 
short, the ends justify the means. Since cost benefit analysis assumes that society 
wants to maximize utility through the most efficient allocation of resources, the 
link between the method and the philosophy is evident. 
In its purest (most vulgar?) form, science has strived to eliminate values from 
an understanding of how the laws of the universe work. The positivist desire to 
know things with certainty, coupled with the truly remarkable predictive powers 
science has afforded us, has led many to suppose that science is devoid of values. 
Clearly, "good" scientists aim to produce work that is unbiased; but this does not 
mean that science itself does not have values—another case of the fallacy of the 
assumption that individual characteristics are automatically reflected on a larger 
2 2 3 Greer W: "Value of One Life?" New York Times, June 26, 1985, p. A l , 
cited in Noble C: Liberalism at Work: The Rise and Fall of OSHA. Temple 
University Press, Philadelphia, 1986, p. 112 
2 2 4 Baram, Ibid., based on interviews with NRC, ERDA, and FEA staffs in 
Washington DC (Fall 1978) 
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2 2 6 K u h n TS: The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1962, 1979 
scale. Scientists receive training that color (and lend meaning to) the "facts" 
they analyze. 2 2 6 Ultimately, it is impossible for science, scientists, or for that 
matter, any of us, to be free of values. We need them to interpret the world 
around us. Even the desire to produce unbiased scientific work is a value. If we 
can agree that values are present in science, and that science is not only a means 
of uncovering physical laws, then some examples of the things that science values 
might be problem-solving capacity, simplicity, predictive power, and the concept of 
"acceptable practice" (the scientific method). 
Like science, cost-benefit analysis may also don blinders when it comes to 
recognition of internal, arbitrary values. For example, cost-benefit analysis implies 
that values enter only after the calculations of discounted costs or benefits, 
internal rate of return, etc. and that the values are supplied by the decisionmaker, 
not the analyst. In truth, value judgments enter every stage of the analysis. For 
example, the decision to regard something as a cost or a benefit depends on one's 
values. An economist might tend to automatically regard cheap energy as a benefit, 
while an environmentalist might see the use of cheaper, but non-renewable, energy 
resources as a cost. The assessment of unknown scenarios (such as the weight 
given to plant sabotage in the cost benefit analysis of nuclear power plants), how 
to assess low probability but catastrophic events (like exposure to mutagens), what 
discount rate, if any, to use over the long run, whether to compare average or 
marginal costs, and how to correct market prices for imperfections (e.g. 
"externalities") are all examples of value-laden decisions that might be made in the 
course of a cost benefit analysis. Similar types of assumptions are made in a 
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quantitative risk assessment. These assumptions show the difficulty in erecting 
rigid walls between risk management and risk assessment. 
These somewhat abstract arguments are useful only if it can be seen that the 
use of cost-benefit analysis does not preclude struggling with what is right and 
wrong. In other words, there is ultimately no substitute for a dialogue involving 
differing value systems in the process of arriving at social decisions. In the 
environmental arena, it seems likely that an approach where the costs and benefits 
of different regulatory options are compared to each other using a number of 
different ethical criteria would be most helpful to the decisionmaker, since all the 
options would be examined and different choices could not be hidden under the 
mantle of "reason." In short, efficiency is a means to an end, not an end in its 
own right. 
How should ethics and philosophy be incorporated into scientific pursuits and 
policy analysis in particular? While a thorough examination of this question lies 
beyond the scope of this thesis, it is worthwhile to briefly explore some alternatives 
to the ideal of neutrality. Commonly, it is thought that the only way to be 
objective is to be neutral, to consider all possibilities as being equally plausible. 
Some proposed alternatives to this ideal include: 
1. Explicit delineation of methodological, ethical, factual, and theoretical 
assumptions using applied philosophy as one of the disciplines to be 
incorporated into a policy research team; 
2. Use of broader social valuation schemes (other than prices) 
3. Use of adversarial proceedings to address disagreements among experts 
(the science court); 
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4. Evaluation of alternative philosophical systems, including egalitarianism, 
classical liberalism, libertarianism, as well as utilitarianism. 2 2 7 
While it is difficult to see how these alternatives might be incorporated 
operationally, the notion of neutrality is particularly seductive. It was Dante who 
wrote "The hottest places in hell are reserved for those who in times of great 
moral crisis maintain their neutrality." Another writer says "...perhaps the 
biggest problem is not how to make (cost benefit analysis) completely neutral, but 
how to protect ourselves from those who want us to believe (it) can be." 2 2 8 
Risk Assessment as a Surrogate for Economic Analysis 
How has risk assessment been used for the purposes of economic analysis? An 
OMB economist recently published a cost-effectiveness evaluation of 44 different 
safety and health regulations, showing that "many more lives [could be] saved for 
the same investment or the same number of lives saved for a much smaller 
investment" if resources were reallocated towards reducing safety hazards and away 
from health regulations. For example, the cost per life saved from an OSHA 
standard involving servicing wheel rims was only $500. In contrast, the 
formaldehyde standard was found to cost $72 billion per life saved. 2 2 9 Others have 
suggested that the use of conservative assumptions in areas where scientific 
knowledge is uncertain distorts regulation, allowing some possibly low-level risks to 
be more stringently regulated, while more severe risks are tolerated. 2 3 0 Table 3.1 
2 2 7Shrader-Frechette, Ibid. 
2 2 8Shrader-Frechette, Ibid. 
2 2 9John F. Morall III: "A Review of the Record," Ibid. 
2 3 0 Nichols AL and Zeckhauser RJ: "The Perils of Prudence," Regulation, 
November/December, 1986, p. 13-24 
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shows how only a few of many possible conservative assumptions tends to multiply 
the estimated cancer risk. 
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Table 3.1 Cancer Risk From Various Assumptions 
Factor Range of Possible Reduction 
In Estimated Cancer Risk 
Weight vs. Surface Area 2-12 
Maximum likelihood vs. 
upper 95% confidence limit 2-3 
Malignant tumors vs. malignant 
plus benign tumors 1-2 
Average animal sensitivity vs. 
most sensitive animal 2-5 
Pharmacodynamics vs. effective dose 1-6 
Risks at shorter than equilibrium 
buildup time 2-5 
Total 15- 10800 
Source: Anderson E: "Risk Analysis in Environmental Health With Emphasis on 
Carcinogenesis/ Harvard School of Public Health, 18-20 September, 1984 
(Speech), cited in Barnard RC: "Scientific Risk Assessment and the 
Regulation of Human Cancer Risks: Background and New Directions," 
American Industrial Hygiene Journal, 48(9), 1987, p. 798-803 
The courts and environmental agencies have taken differing positions over the 
years regarding the applicability of cost benefit analysis to environmental policy. 
The courts have generally interpreted Section 102(2)(C) of the National 
Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) to mean that a cost-benefit analysis is 
required. 2 3 1 On the other hand, the primary purpose of OSHA is "to assure as far 
as possible, safe and healthy working conditions."2 3 2 Feasibility is mentioned in the 
Act, although it is not clear whether this refers to technical or financial feasibility, 
or both. 
The Supreme Court later said that OSHA must set a standard if a "significant 
2 3 1 Luke JR: "Environmental Impact Assessments for Water Resources," George 
Washington Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 5, August 1977, p. 1107 
2 3 2 O S H A Act, Public Law 91-596, Dec. 29, 1970, Section 2(b) 
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risk of material health impairment" is found. 2 3 3 In Chapter II, we saw that in its 
Benzene decision, the Supreme Court ruled that any new standard must be preceded 
by a determination that exposures to chemicals at the existing Permissible Exposure 
Limit pose a significant risk. But the court stopped short of demanding a cost 
benefit analysis. In fact, in its cotton dust ruling, the Court specifically rejected 
the use of cost benefit analysis in setting OSHA standards. Importantly, however, 
it did reaffirm the need for a risk assessment. As a matter of policy, all 
environmental government agencies now perform a quantitative risk assessment and 
some form of cost benefit or economic impact analysis during preliminary rulemaking 
activity. The latter can be an exhaustive market simulation model 2 3 4 or a simple 
listing of costs and benefits, which is the current practice at O S H A . 2 3 5 
The Food and Drug Administration has also not used cost benefit analysis for 
carcinogens, since the Delaney Clause specifically prohibits any addition of 
carcinogens to foods, cosmetics, or drugs. However, some attempts have been made 
to weigh benefits and costs by classifying some carcinogenic substances as either 
extremely weak or present in such low concentrations that they pose a de minimus 
risk. Essentially, the idea is that if the risk level is extremely low, then it is a 
trivial matter with which the courts should not be concerned. 2 3 6 Congress voted to 
2 3 3Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 US 607, 
Appendix A (1980). See also Mintz, Benjamin, OSHA: History. Law and Policy. 
Bureau of National Affairs, Washington DC, 1984, p. 267-332 (Benzene and Cotton 
Dust) 
2 3 4 See Call, HJ and Massouda NF: "The Methodology and Model Description 
for the Economic Analysis of the Chlorinated Solvents," Mimeo from the Office of 
Pesticides and Toxic Substances, Economics and Technology Division, Regulatory Impacts 
Branch, Environmental Protection Agency, July, 1986. 
2 3 5Interview with Larry Baslow of OSHA's Regulatory Analysis Office, March 
2, 1987 
2 3 6 Lecos, C: "Cancer, the Law, and Methylene Chloride," FDA Consumer, 
March 1983, p. 15-17 
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2 3 7 Thorne Auchter stressed this point repeatedly during an interview for this 
thesis. 
override the Delaney clause when it permitted the use of saccharin, even though the 
substance was found to cause cancer in animals. Here, the Court appeared to be 
extremely prudent, allowing the risk to be passed on to society at large only after 
specific Congressional action. Thus, the courts are likely to require Congressional 
action in deciding which risks are unimportant. Ultimately, Congress may need to 
consider at length how agencies are to treat risk in general, and not just for 
specific substances. 2 3 7 Of course, such action can carry with it important political 
liabilities or assets. A similar debate is continuing over certain food dyes. On one 
side, the dye industry argues that the risk posed by these substances is so small as 
to be essentially meaningless. On the other hand, some consumer groups have 
argued that since dyes do not really have any intrinsic value (other than to those 
employed by the dye industry) or social benefit, there is no reason to take the risk, 
no matter how small. These groups often cite the use of a certain yellow dye used 
in breakfast cereal. The company involved agreed to remove the dye, and although 
the appearance of the product was altered, there was no measurable decrease in 
sales. 
So far we have focused on difficulties associated with estimates of costs. 
However, the use of dyes invokes the question of examination of benefits. 
Economists generally believe that market mechanisms will most efficiently weed out 
useless items, since there will be no consumer demand. Regulatory agencies have 
so far refrained from conducting hearings on the relative benefits of new chemicals, 
instead focusing on costs associated with workplace and environmental 
contamination. However, Barry Commoner has posed an interesting question: Why 
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not require businesses to justify a new product, not solely on projected earnings or 
other market measures, but on the basis of social uti l ity? 2 3 8 
Some risk assessors have begun to ask benefit-related questions in seeking to 
understand why there is such a large gap between the public's perception of risk 
and expert's perception of risk. 
If we are more risk averse, are we also more "benefits averse" (i.e. less 
sensitive to benefits as we become more averse to risks? Do we simply 
become less interested in new benefits as we become richer? If our perception 
of risks and benefits has not changed, then how were we able to build an 
industrial society unless we as a people were more concerned with benefits 
than with risks? 2 3 9 
Others have begun to ask even more fundamental questions regarding the 
relevance of quantification of probability levels and magnitudes of loss. By focusing 
only on risks and probabilities, risk analysts have implicitly excluded formal 
consideration of other factors, such as the benefits gained, voluntariness, equity 
concerns, public will, etc. They may protest that this is not thleir job, that 
consideration of these other factors belongs to the decisionmaker. 
Compartmentalizing the process in this manner has two effects. 
First, it allows the risk analyst to seize the high ground by providing the 
"rational" part of the analysis. This is similar to the economists' efforts to 
"rationally" arrive at the most efficient allocation of resources. In both cases, a 
layman (or a decisionmaker) might well ask, "How can one argue against this?" If 
the calculated risk is low (or the costs outweigh the benefits), a decision to 
proceed with tightened regulation automatically becomes "irrational." In short, the 
weighing of ethics and other intangibles becomes short-circuited and the public is 
denied a significant role in the decisionmaking process. 
2 3 8 Barry Commoner, Ibid. 
2 3 9Sagan LA: "Beyond Risk Assessment," Risk Analysis, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1987, p. 
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2 4 0 T h e most recent example of this is the controversy surrounding Proposition 
65 in California. 
The second effect is an insulation of the expert. The economist or risk 
assessor need not (indeed, dare not) take positions on the various value judgments 
necessary to complete a decision. This may explain why so few experts have 
become public spokesmen. In effect, they abdicate their democratic responsibilities 
as citizens, choosing not to worry about how their analyses will be used (even 
though its use has already been ordained by their earlier monopolization of 
rationality). In both cases, the chances for democratic input by the citizenry is 
reduced. 
This does not mean that economic and risk analyses should be excluded from 
consideration. Rather, it suggests that the quantitative analysis be mixed with 
consideration of various intangibles at each step. By making a series of policy 
decisions on various technical issues, the OSHA cancer policy can best be 
understood as an attempt to break down the walls between risk management and 
risk assessment. This may explain some of the controversy surrounding the policy. 
Quantitative risk analysis has, in fact, become a separate discipline, with its 
own journals and norms. While it holds promise, its effect thus far has been to 
strengthen the economists' hold on environmental regulation. Of course, the public 
has not been entirely removed from the loop (and ultimately never can be), but 
when it does act, it is increasingly criticized for making an irrational decision. 2 4 0 
The Elements of Risk Assessment 
Traditional treatment of the risks posed by environmental hazards have 
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traditionally been divided into two categories: Risk Assessment and Risk 
Management. 2 4 1 The first category typically involves the following steps: 
1. Evaluation and estimation of exposure and its consequent health effects 
2. Hazard identification 
3. Exposure assessment, including types, magnitudes, time, duration, number 
of people exposed, etc. before and after regulation. 
4. Dose-response function assessment 
5. Risk characterization, with an estimation of the probable incidence rate 
of the disease(s), and the remaining areas of uncertainty. 
In order to minimize the role of values and depict the process of risk 
assessment as more scientific than risk management, numerous inference guidelines 
have been developed to explicitly state "...the predetermined choice among the 
options that arise in inferring human risk from data that are not fully adequate or 
not drawn directly from human experience."242 The impact of these assumptions is 
large for carcinogens when compared to traditional toxicology. 
Traditional toxicology asserts that "the dose makes the poison." 2 4 3 In other 
words, there is a certain threshold dose to which most people can be exposed 
without suffering long term irreversible health effects. This has been found to 
work quite well for many hazardous substances, such as acids, narcotics, etc. 
However, in the case of carcinogens, no one has yet demonstrated what a safe 
dose is. Instead, a risk function is used to assess the number of excess cancer 
2 4 1"Risk Assessment and Risk Management of Toxic Substances," Report of the 
DHHS Committee to Coordinate Environmental and Related Programs, April 1985. 
See also Risk Assessment in the Federal Government. National Research Council, 
National Academy Press, Washington DC, 1983, p.3 
2 4 2 Risk Assessment in the Federal Government. Ibid. p. 51 
2 4 3Paracelsus (1493-1541 A.D.), cited in Williams, Ibid. p. 9 
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cases that might be expected at each dose level. In examining uncertainty, it is 
important to note that there is no consensus in the scientific community 
concerning the mathematical model to be used in defining the carcinogenic 
dose-response function, probably due to the complexity of various biological factors, 
which include: 
1. Dose of the toxic agent at the sensitive tissue 
2. The nature of the sensitive tissue itself 
3. The nature of the tissue's response 
4. Rates and sites of biotransformation (metabolism) 
5. Toxicity of various metabolites 
6. Cumulative nature of the material (persistence in the body) 
7. Pharmacokinetic distribution 
8. Effect of biological variables such as sex, age, species, strain of test 
animal, etc. 
9. Method of administering dose. 2 4 4 
All of our animal testing data and epidemiological evidence result from 
situations where high doses have occurred among small populations, and then 
extrapolated into the low dose region to assess the occupational or environmental 
risk to the nation posed by particular substances. A great deal of controversy 
continues regarding the most appropriate mathematical model to use for this 
extrapolation. There are essentially five of them: 
1. The linear model assumes that the expected number of chemical-cell 
interactions is directly related to the dose. This model does not consider 
the body's ability to repair, detoxify, or metabolize carcinogenic 
substances. 
2. The multi-stage model assumes that the toxic response is characterized by 
a series of biological events, with each event linearly related to dose. 
3. The probit model is based on a typical dose response function. 
4. The logit model approaches zero more slowly that the probit model. 
5. The Weibull model is a quadratic application of the one-hit theory. 2 4 5 
2 4 4 5 0 FR 50412-50499, December 10, 1985 
2 4 5 5 0 FR 50412-50499, Dec. 10, 1985 
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The first two models assume there is no threshold, while the last three assume 
that there is. Most risk assessment work on hazardous chemicals is now done based 
on the linear or multi-stage model. The World Health Organization has stated that: 
Use of the linear non-threshold model is recommended for extrapolation 
of risks from relatively high dose levels, where cancer response can be 
measured, to relatively low dose levels, which are of concern in 
environmental protection where such risks are too small to be 
measured. 2 4 6 
Once such an extrapolation has been performed, we need to decide what dose 
(if any) can be judged to be acceptable. The courts have generally given broad 
leeway to the regulatory agencies. The Supreme Court has stated that "we 
recognize that (OSHA's) determination that a particular risk is significant will be 
based on policy considerations....A reasonable person might well consider a risk of 
one in a thousand significant, while one in a billion [to be] insignificant."2 4 7 To 
put these numbers in perspective, Table 3.2 shows risks of death in various 
industries 
Source: "Accident Facts," National Safety Council, 1983 Edition, John F. Morrall 
HI, 
"A Review of the Record," Regulation, November/December, 1986 p.27 
Most quantitative risk assessment work currently assumes that a risk of one in 
a million is insignificant (or socially acceptable). For smaller populations the 
2 4 6 World Health Organization recommendation, cited in 50 FR 50412, Ibid. 
2 4 7 A F L - C I O Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, 44 
US 655, cited in 50 FR 50412, Ibid. 










2 4 8 Milvey P: "A General Guideline for Management of Risk from Carcinogens," 
EPA, in Risk Analysis, vol. 6 No. 1, 1986, p. 70 
2 4 9Interviews with Thorne Auchter and Patrick Tyson, Ibid. 
2 5 0 Litai , D, et al.: "The Public Perception of Risk," in Covello VT, et al.: 
The Analysis of Actual vs. Perceived Risk. Plenum Press, New York, 1983, p. 351-372 
acceptable risk must be higher, since the criterion of one in a million would mean 
that occupational exposures would have to be drastically reduced, possibly leading to 
the elimination of a number of industries. 2 4 8 In fact, most Permissible Exposure 
Limits are set, not at the level at which risks become insignificant, but at the level 
which is financially achievable for the industry. 2 4 9 In part, this explains why the 
standards set by OSHA have generally allowed for permissible exposures that are 
orders of magnitude higher than those set by the EPA or the FDA. The concept of 
relative risk involves weighing different risks. For example, the carcinogenic risk 
of certain chemotherapeutic drugs is usually considered to be less significant than 
the risk posed by untreated cancer. Thus, the rational person would choose 
treatment. However, there are wide differences in individual perceptions of quality 
of life under treatment that could skew this conclusion (i.e., some may choose not 
to undergo treatment). These are more examples of the difficulty in extrapolating 
from individual decisions to social policy. Of course, this is not solely a 
question of technical feasibility. The question of who takes the risks and who gets 
the benefits is crucial, especially in the occupational setting, where workers 
historically have had little control over the quality of their workplace environments. 
Similarly, we are much less tolerant of risks forced on us than we are of risks 
taken voluntarily. 2 5 0 Thus, responsibility for deciding acceptability of risks belongs 
to all of us. No single institution or discipline can effectively perform a truly 
complete risk benefit analysis on its own. 
110 
Uncertainty and the Irrelevance of Risk Quantification 
In fact, it has recently been argued that quantification of risk levels are 
largely irrelevant, especially when there is substantial uncertainty and when the 
risks posed by individual carcinogenic substances are quite low. Instead, two risk 
assessors have argued that "the critical question facing societal risk managers is not 
'How safe is safe enough?,' but 'How fair is safe enough?'" 2 5 1 These authors go on 
to show that most people and many policymakers are not concerned with 
incomprehensible differences in probability levels. Instead, they are concerned with 
fair process (in which collective consent is acceptable to those who must bear the 
consequences), with liability-sharing principles, with the magnitude of the adverse 
consequence, and with institutional credibility; in short, with questions of trust and 
equity. 2 5 2 
Risk Management: Is It Truly Different From Risk Assessment? 
Risk management is generally viewed as a more inexact process where values 
play a larger role in determining the best way of controlling the risk, which can be 
anything from public education to interdiction. The process is defined as "the 
integration of risk assessment results with engineering data, social, economic, and 
political concerns and then weighing the alternatives."253 
Is it really possible to neatly separate risk assessment from risk management? 
After the EPA scandal under Burford, William Ruckelshaus, the new administrator, 
attempted to shore up public confidence in the agency by preaching a strict 
separation of the two. 
2 5 1 Rayner S and Cantor R: "How Fair is Safe Enough? The Cultural 
Approach to Societal Technology Choice," Risk Analysis, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1987, p. 3-9 
2 5 2 Raynor and Cantor, Ibid. 
2 5 3 Raynor and Cantor, Ibid. 
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Risk assessment at EPA must be based only on scientific evidence and 
scientific consensus. Nothing will erode public confidence faster than the 
suspicion that policy considerations have been allowed to influence the 
assessment of risk." 2 5 4 
Contrast this with a more candid statement, also by Ruckelshaus. 
Risk assessment is...the attempt to quantify the degree of hazard that might 
result from human activities...Essentiallv. it is a kind of pretense: to avoid 
paralysis of protective action that would result from definitive data, we assume 
that we have greater knowledge than the scientists actually possess and make 
decisions based on those assumptions."(emphasis added) 2 5 5 
One researcher has suggested that political considerations dictated the first 
statement, 2 5 6 while a former OSHA administrator reported that he thought 
Ruckelshaus had withdrawn the statements entirely. 2 5 7 
The Consequences of the Breakdown of the Risk Assessment/Risk 
Management Typology Breakdown 
One other difficulty has emerged with this typology. When a vacuum is 
created in the risk management phase, the public debate increasingly takes place 
inside scientific agencies and professional groupings. For example, the National 
Toxicology Program publishes an annual report listing all known or suspected 
carcinogens. It has been suggested that these lists are in many respects similar to 
the 1980 Candidate List which aroused so much controversy in the business 
community. The NTP list, as well as a similar list published by the International 
Agency for Research on Cancer, are referenced by the OSHA Hazard Communication 
Standard. If a substance appears on the list, it becomes regulated automatically. 
2 5 4Ruckelshaus, quoted in Rushefsky, ME: Making Cancer Policy. State 
University of New York, Albany, NY, 1986, p. 133 
2 5 5 William Ruckelshaus, quoted in Rushefsky, Ibid. p. 173 
2 5 6Rushefsky, p. 150, Ibid. 
2 5 7Interview with Morton Corn, Ibid. 
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In response to industry pressure, a statement will be added to the introduction of 
the annual NTP report, stating that the report is only a "hazard identification" 
document, not a risk assessment.2 5 8 This suggests a further attempt to 
compartmentalize the decisionmaking process. Are we to have hazard identification, 
quantitative risk assessment, and risk management? Can we expect this to lead to 
even further paralysis? 
Similar difficulties have surfaced with an OSHA proposal to update its 
Permissible Exposure Limits with 1987-88 Threshold Limit Values. The latter are set 
annually by the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, a 
professional society. The new TLVs may also include a statement indicating that 
they are not intended to be used for regulatory purposes. Some interest groups 
have argued that the TLVs are set behind closed doors, and are dominated by 
industry. They say that Congress specifically decided against using such private 
groups to set standards when it formed the National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health, which is responsible for recommending new exposure limits to 
OSHA. OSHA has usually not responded to NIOSH's recommendations, possibly due 
to the absence of risk assessments. The NIOSH recommendations are also 
considered by many to be unrealistically low. Since NIOSH is housed in the Centers 
for Disease Control, it sees its mission as much more than simply making 
recommendations to OSHA-i t sees itself as setting the state-of-the-art in 
occupational health practice in the country. 2 5 9 Nevertheless, NIOSH has recently 
completed its first risk assessment (for radon) and will be sending the 
recommended exposure limit to the Mine Safety and Health Administration. Unlike 
2 5 8Personal Communication from Dorothy Canter, Assistant to the Director, 
NTP, date 
2 5 9Interview with anonymous NIOSH staffer, February 10, 1988 
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OSHA, MSHA is required to formally respond to the NIOSH recommendation in 60 
days. If this process works well, it has important lessons for OSHA-NIOSH 
relationships. 
However the responsibility for risk assessment or risk management is 
delegated, it should be clear that in practice the two often overlap and that 
democratic decisionmaking is enhanced when they do. Whether the mechanism is 
negotiated rulemaking, consensus rulemaking, or public town meetings, the gulf 
between expert and citizen is reduced. The National Research Council, among 
others, has suggested that the overlap area be termed "risk assessment policy" to 
"differentiate the [inference guidelines] from the broader social and economic policy 
issues that are inherent in risk management decisions. At least some of the 
controversy surrounding regulatory actions has resulted from a blurring of the 
distinction between risk assessment policy and risk management policy." 2 6 0 
Can Democracy Work? 
Of course, none of these data deal with the important concepts of equity, 
voluntariness, control, delay, or catastrophic potential-all aspects of risk that 
matter to people. The implication is that risk experts can "tell people what [is] 
best for them." 2 6 1 Increasingly, the public is playing a larger role in risk 
management decisions that have a direct impact on their lives. Risk and economic 
analysis can either be viewed as an objective, quantifiable part of any technology or 
industry, in which case it is likely to form the only basis for policy decision (how 
can a reasonable person suggest that we spend $17 billion to save a fraction of a 
life?) or it can be viewed as a way of providing people with useful information to 
2 6 0 Risk Assessment in the Federal Government. Ibid., p. 3 
2 6 1 Ottway H: "Experts, Risk Communication, and Democracy," Risk Analysis, 
Vol. 7, No. 2, 1987, p. 126 
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be used in political and social discourse. 2 6 2 Finding ways to empower individuals to 
participate in public decisionmaking in an informed manner lies at the heart of a 
vibrant, technologically-based democracy. Highly technical risk assessments may 
retard this process in favor of a system thought by experts to be more rational. 
That the more democratic process can work was shown by an EPA experiment. 
Residents in Tacoma, Washington were asked to decide whether a copper smelter, 
which released large quantities of arsenic (a known carcinogen) into the 
atmosphere, should be required to install costly pollution control devices which 
could cause the plant to be shut down, or to permit higher emissions to keep the 
plant open. In short, the citizens were asked to define what an acceptable risk 
would be. While the final decision rested with EPA and the courts, all sides 
involved in the ensuing public debate concluded that the process a positive one. 
William Ruckelshaus said, "...in all I would call it a qualified success. Those who 
participated came away with a better understanding of the anatomy of environmental 
decisions, and local groups were able to come up with technological options that 
might have increased protection while allowing the plant to remain open." 2 6 3 
Conclusion 
This chapter shows that consideration of philosophical systems, ethics, political 
concerns, and scientific evidence enters at each step in both risk assessment and 
risk management. Therefore, any weighing of alternatives must also include how 
those alternatives look under different assumptions and value systems. While it is 
clear that we all take risks, it should also be clear by now that in some cases 
(exposure to carcinogens perhaps being one of them), the public may choose to 
2 6 2 Ottway, Ibid. p. 128 
2 6 3 Kalikow BN: "Environmental Risk: Power to the People," Technology 
Review, October 1984, p. 55-61 
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make efforts to control the risk, even if the costs diitweigh the benefits involved, 
and even if the calculated risks are thought to be slight. Firefighters and 
lifeguards, for example, must respond to all distress calls, even the inefficient false 
alarms. 
How far to control those risks, especially in the face of great uncertainty, 
cannot be decided by any single bureaucracy, social institution, or stakeholder. An 
informed, involved, and empowered population is the best guarantee of workable, 




A COMPARISON OF GENERIC AND 
SUBSTANCE-SPECIFIC REGULATION OF 
METHYLENE CHLORIDE 
In this chapter, the OSHA carcinogen policy (in its original 1980 formulation, 
but with elements of quantitative risk assessment added) will be applied to 
methylene chloride (dichloromethane, or DCM). DCM is currently under 
consideration at OSHA for specific regulation as a carcinogen. While some of this 
material is speculative, it should help to clarify the advantages and disadvantages of 
the generic and substance-specific approaches to regulation of occupational 
carcinogens. Special emphasis will also be given to the use of quantitative risk 
assessments using pharmacokinetic models. Final rulemaking hearings have not yet 
been scheduled, but will probably be highly contentious. DCM enjoys very wide 
usage, and the economic impact of any proposed regulation will be quite large. In 
addition, questions of the degree of scientific uncertainty will surface once again, 
since new technological advances have permitted the use of information regarding 
how the substance is metabolized. These latter issues are yet another example of 
how carcinogen regulation remains "on the frontiers of science." 
The role of non-regulatory groups is also important in this case. While the 
current OSHA Permissible Exposure Limit is 500 ppm (as an 8-hour time-weighted 
average), 2 6 4 the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists has 
2 6 4 T h e standard also includes a ceiling limit of 1000 ppm, and a maximum peak 
of exposure limit of 2000 ppm for 5 minutes every 2 hours 
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2 6 5 A N S I Standard Z37.23-1969 
2 6 6"Criteria for a Recommended Standard-Occupational Exposure to Methylene 
Chloride," NIOSH, DHEW Publication No. 76-138, 1976 
2 6 7 Burek J, et al.: "Methylene Chloride: A Two-Year Inhalation Toxicity and 
Oncogenicity Study in Rats and Hamsters," Toxicology Research Laboratory, Health 
and Environmental Sciences, USA, Dow Chemical USA, Midland, Michigan. For a 
review of this study, see "Quantitative Risk Assessment for Occupational Exposures 
to Methylene Chloride," KS Crump and Company, Inc. October, 1986. 
issued a Notice of Intended Change for its 1987-88 Threshold Limit Value. The new 
TLV is to be 50 ppm, 10 times lower than the PEL. The current TLV is 100 ppm. 
The Substance-Specific Method 
History of Regulation 
The current OSHA PEL was derived from a standard developed by the 
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) , 2 6 5 which was intended to protect 
workers from neurological injury from anesthetic-type effects and also from irritant 
properties. Thus, the OSHA PEL, adopted in 1971, was not intended to protect 
against cancer. This remained unchanged, even when NIOSH recommended that the 
limit be reduced to 75 ppm in March 1976 , 2 6 6 and when the TLV was lowered to 
100 ppm in 1975. 
In 1980, an animal study showed statistically significant increased rates of 
salivary gland sarcomas and increases in benign mammary gland tumors in male and 
female rats exposed to DCM, respectively. 2 6 7 Statistically significant increased 
rates of benign tumors were also found in female hamsters, but no increases in 
tumors of any kind were found in male hamsters. Several other studies appeared in 
the following years, but it was not until March of 1985, when the National 
Toxicology Program reported animal studies showing statistically significant increases 
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of mammary gland fibroadenomas and malignant neoplasms in the lung and liver, 2 6 8 
that the regulatory effort began to appear. EPA, CPSC, and FDA initiated risk 
assessment proceedings to determine if further regulation was needed. 2 6 9 In May, 
1985, EPA classified methylene chloride as a "probable human carcinogen," instead of 
the former "possible" designation. 2 7 0 CPSC proposed a labelling rule and status 
update for various household products, 2 7 1 and the FDA proposed a ban on the use 
of DCM in hairsprays. 2 7 2 
Characteristically, it required action by an outside group to force OSHA to 
address the issue. On July 19, 1985, the United Automobile Workers (UAW) 
petitioned OSHA to publish a hazard alert, issue an emergency temporary standard, 
and produce a new permanent standard. In response, OSHA refused to grant an 
Emergency Temporary Standard, but did issue a "Guideline for Controlling Exposure 
to Methylene Chloride." 2 7 3 The document did not establish a legally-enforceable 
PEL, but did provide a series of recommendations to employers in various industries. 
It also published an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Nov. 24, 1986 to 
begin the process of developing a permanent standard. 2 7 4 
2 6 8"Toxicology and Carcinogenesis Studies of Dichloromethane," National 
Toxicology Program, NIH85-2562, 1985 
2 6 9 See 51 FR 42258, Nov. 24, 1986 for a brief review of this history 
2 7 0 4 9 F R 46294, November 26, 1984 
2 7 1 5 1 FR 29778-29809, August 27, 1986 
2 7 2 5 0 FR 51551-51559, December 15, 1985 
2 7 3 O S H A Instruction PUB 8-1.2, March 10, 1986, Office of Science and 
Technology Assessment 
2 7 4 5 1 FR 42257, November 24, 1986, Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
for Occupational Exposure to Methylene Chloride 
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In April, 1986, NIOSH issued a Current Intelligence Bulletin reviewing the 
results of the NTP study, recommending that exposures be controlled to the lowest 
feasible level, instead of its former recommendation of 75 ppm. 2 7 5 
Currently, the OSHA PEL remains at 500 ppm. Many observe that it is 
unlikely a final standard will be issued until some time after the elections in 
November. A final Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is scheduled to be released in 
March, 1988, but has not yet appeared. 2 7 6 
Extent of Exposure 
DCM is used in a variety of industries, including aerosols, paint removers, 
foam blowing, degreasing, electronic, pharmaceutical, and in triacetate fiber and 
polycarbonate resin production. Annual production is estimated at 265,000 tons, 
with over 1 million workers potentially exposed. Twenty-six thousand of these 
workers are thought to be exposed to levels approaching 500 ppm. 2 7 7 It is widely 
used partially because of its relatively low level of flammability. 
Quantitative Risk Assessment 
It is useful to examine some of the assumptions made in a recent quantitative 
risk assessment performed for OSHA by an outside contractor. In order to convert 
the test animal dose to humans, a choice must be made. Should the findings from 
small rodents be scaled on the basis of weight or surface area? OSHA has typically 
used weight (with doses expressed in milligrams of agent/kilogram of body 
2 7 5 N I O S H Current Intelligence Bulletin No. 46, "Methylene Chloride," April 18, 
1987 
2 7 6"Hazard Communication, Recordkeeping, Z-Table Project Head 1988 OSHA 
Agenda in Shadow of Election-Year Malaise," Bureau of National Affairs Special 
Report, January 6, 1988, p. 1240-1252 
2 7 7 5 1 FR 42259-42260, November 24, 1986, Advance Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking for Occupational Exposure to Methylene Chloride 
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2 7 8 Crump KS, "Quantitative Risk Assessment for Occupational Exposures to 
Methylene Chloride," Ibid. p. 25 
weight/day), while EPA has tended to use surface area (with doses expressed in 
milligrams/square meter/day). If OSHA were to use the surface area method, then 
the estimated lifetime risk estimate would be roughly 13 times larger using data 
from mice and 5 to 6 times larger using data from rats. 2 7 8 To calculate the dose 
using the weight method: 
Dose (mg/kg/day/) = 
dose (ppm) x 1.2 x Molecular Weight of chemical 
Molecular Weight of air 
x No. of hours of exposure per day/24 
x breathing rate x days of exposure per week/7 
body weight 
The formula assumes that 1.2 is the density of air, that the average test rat 
breathes 0.26 m 3 per day, that 0.4038 kg is the average weight of the rat, that the 
rat absorbs all of the chemical that is inhaled into the body, and that there is a 
linear relationship between concentration and dose received. There are other 
standard values for other test animals, although there are likely to be substantial 
differences among individual animals within a species. A similar formula is used to 
extrapolate this dose to an occupational dose for humans. Here, it is assumed that 
the worker weighs 70 kg, inhales 10 cubic meters of air per 8 hour shift, works 250 
8-hour days/year and has a 74-year life span. Other assumptions are required in 
extrapolating the dose from the relatively high test doses to lower ones where 
humans are likely to be exposed. However, the doses used in the animal testing for 
methylene chloride are not that much higher than the PEL. 
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OSHA typically uses a computer program, G L O B A L 8 3 2 7 9 , to generate Maximum 
Likelihood Estimates (MLE) of risk-related dose. The model employs the multi-stage 
theory of cancer, and assumes linearity at low doses. The MLE is a standard 
statistical concept defined as a method of determining the value of a parameter that 
maximizes the likelihood of the observed data. 2 8 0 Ninety-five percent confidence 
limits are then calculated to provide an upper-bound risk estimate. This is a 
conservative assumption that usually increases the risk estimate by a factor of 2 or 
3. Some economists have proposed the use of the expected value, which is "the 
weighted average of the risk estimates, with the weight for each alternative equal 
to the subjective probability that it is correct."2 8 1 These authors do not suggest 
how "subjective probability" might be quantified. The expected value approach is a 
sort of compromise between the MLE and the 90% upper confidence limit. In its 
recent formaldehyde rule, OSHA reported both MLE's and upper confidence limits in 
justifying a lower PEL. 2 8 2 
In a recent DCM quantitative risk assessment performed for OSHA, the extra 
risk of one in a thousand corresponds to an MLE range of 2.97 to 175 mg/kg/day in 
test animals. Using the formula given above, the MLE's of risk range from 0.35 to 
58 per 1000 workers, assuming 45 years of exposure to the current PEL of 500 
ppm. The 95% confidence limits vary from 8.03 to 248 per 1000 workers. Even at 
the old NIOSH-recommended standard of 75 ppm, the MLEs are between 6.5 x 10"3 
2 7 9 Howe, R: "GLOBAL83: A computer program to extrapolate quantal animal 
toxicity data to low doses," Prepared for the Office of Carcinogen Standards, 
OSHA, Contract 41USC252C3 
2 8 0Bhattacharya GK and Johnson RA: Statistical Concepts and Methods. Wiley 
& Sons, New York, 1977, p. 162 
2 8 1 Nichols AL and Zeckhauser, RJ: "The Perils of Prudence," Regulation, 
November/December, 1986, p.21 
2 8 2 5 2 FR 46220, December 4, 1987 
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and 9.0 per 1000 workers, with upper confidence liinits between 1.21 and 41.9 per 
1000 workers. 2 8 3 This is several orders of magnitude higher than the socially-
acceptable risk level of one in a million identified in earlier chapters, even using 
the MLEs. In this case, the debate over whether to use MLE's, expected values, or 
upper confidence limits would appear to be moot, since they are all well above 1 in 
a million. These estimates were derived from animal studies that, for once, were 
not substantially greater than occupational exposure levels. Animals were tested at 
concentrations of 0, 1000, 2000, and 4000 ppm in the NTP study. 
The risk assessment also examined epidemiological studies. Friedlander found 
decreased levels of malignant neoplasms among workers exposed to D C M Forty-one 
malignancies were found among a group of exposed workers, while 58 were expected. 
Thirteen lung cancers were found while 21 were expected, and 14 digestive system 
neoplasms were detected whereas 17 were expected. In short, exposed workers had 
lower rates of cancer at these sites than did the control group. However, 8 
pancreatic cancers were found, while only 3.2 were expected. Personal air sampling 
data are available for this group of workers. Generally, exposures were far below 
the PEL, ranging from an average of 20 ppm to 140 ppm, depending on job 
category. 2 8 4 
Even though the total malignancies were lower than expected (except for 
pancreatic cancer), the risk assessment concluded that: 
the epidemiological data can not rule out the possibility that methylene 
chloride is a human carcinogen. This point is illustrated by the 
[statistical] power of the studies...it is highly likely that any true 
2 8 3 Crump, Ibid. p. 20 
2 8 4Friedlander, B, et al. "1964 Methylene Chloride Cohort Mortality Study. 
Update through 1984." Unpublished report for Eastman Kodak Company, Rochester, 
NY, cited in Crump, Ibid. 
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carcinogenic effect that is manifested in the liver or pancreas, for 
example, has been missed. 2 8 5 
The power to detect an increased relative risk of 2.5 is only 0.26. The study 
concludes that the epidemiological evidence is therefore consistent with the animal 
evidence, in the sense that it does not contradict the calculated risk levels from 
animal studies. Because of the small population involved, the epidemiological studies 
are not useful in either supporting or denying they hypothesis that DCM is a human 
carcinogen. 
Generic Regulation of Methylene Chloride 
With this information as background, how would the generic OSHA carcinogen 
policy have affected the regulation of methylene chloride? First, it seems likely 
that the first animal study reported in 1980, together with earlier studies showing 
mutagenic activity in bacter ia , 2 8 6 , 2 8 7 , 2 8 8 would have provided sufficient evidence to 
place methylene chloride on a Priority or Candidate List. DCM did not appear on 
the initial Candidate list published in August, 1980 , 2 8 9 but would appear to meet the 
definition of a "potential occupational carcinogen" in the 1980 cancer policy, which 
is defined as "...any substancc.which causes an increased incidence of benign 
2 8 5 This material is based on Crump, Ibid. 
2 8 6 Kirwin CJ and Thomas WC: "In vitro microbiological mutagenicity studies 
of hydrocarbon propellants," Journal of the Society of Cosmetic Chemistry, Vol. 31, 
p. 367-370, 1980 
2 8 7Jongen, WMF, et al.: "Mutagenic Effect of Diehloromethane on Salmonella 
tvphimurium. Mut Res, Vol. 56, p. 245-248, 1978 
2 8 8 Simmon VF, et al.: "Mutagenic activity of chemicals identified in drinking 
water," in: Scott D, et al., eds, Progress in Genetic Toxicology. Elsevier, 
Amsterdam, p. 249-258, 1977 
2 8 9 4 5 FR 53672, August 10, 1980 
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and/or malignant neoplasms...in...one or more experimental mammalian species..."290 
Importantly, placement of DCM on the list would not have been "subject to judicial 
review or be the basis for any legal action...[since] inclusion...does not reflect a 
final scientific determination..."291 
Next, OSHA would have determined whether DCM should be classified as a 
Category I or Category II carcinogen. Since there was evidence in both animals 
and short-term bacterial mutagenicity tests, it seems likely that it would have been 
designated as a Category I carcinogen. Section 1990.112 (a) of the OSHA 
carcinogen policy states that "A substance shall be identified, classified and 
regulated as a Category I Potential Carcinogen if, upon scientific evaluation, the 
Secretary determines that the substance meets the definition of a potential 
occupational carcinogen in...a single mammalian species in a long-term bioassay 
where the results are in concordance with some other scientifically evaluated 
evidence..."292 In this case, the mutagenicity testing would have fulfilled the 
concordance requirement. NIOSH also supported the classification of DCM as a 
Category I carcinogen in its Current Intelligence Bulletin No. 46: "These dataware 
sufficient to classify methylene chloride as an OSHA Category I potential 
carcinogen...." NIOSH goes on to state that supporting epidemiological studies are 
not required by the carcinogen policy and that exposures should be reduced to the 
lowest feasible l imit. 2 9 3 
Where would DCM have been placed in terms of agency priority? This would 
have been a function of a number of factors, including severity of exposure, number 
2 9 0 4 5 FR 5283, January 22, 1980 
2 9 1 4 5 FR 5285, section 1990.131 
2 9 2 4 5 FR 5284, January 22, 1980 




Cancer Effective Dose 
The Cancer Effective Dose can be defined as: 
Test Exposure in mg/m 3 x (inhalation m 3 /day) 
CED = 
body weight of test animal(mg) 
These authors have calculated the EPI for a number of industrial chemicals, 
including DCM. Their results are shown in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Exposure Potency Indices for Selected Chemicals 
Chemical EPI (%) 
1,3-Butadiene 36 
Formaldehyde (old PEL - 3ppm) 28 
Tetrachloroethylene 7.8 
Trichloroethylene 3.2 
Propylene Oxide 2.2 
1,2 Dibromomethane 1.5 
Ethylene Oxide 0.8 
1,2-Dibromo-3-chloropropane 0.2 
Dichloromethane (methylene chloride) 2.8 
Source: Adapted from Hooper K and Gold LS: "Ranking the Carcinogenic Hazards 
of Occupational Exposures: Exposure-Potency Index Values for Nine 
Volatile Industrial Chemicals," in Sorsa S and Norppa H, eds: Monitoring 
of Occupational Genotoxicants. Liss, New York, 1986, p. 223 
2 9 4 Hooper K and Gold LS: "Ranking the Carcinogenic Hazards of Occupational 
Exposures: Exposure-Potency Index Values for Nine Volatile Industrial Chemicals," 
in Sorsa S and Norppa H, eds: Monitoring of Occupational Genotoxicants. Liss, New 
York, 1986, p. 223 
of workers exposed, and technological and economic feasibility. Hooper and Gold 
have introduced the concept of an Exposure Potency Index (EPI) to aid in this 
process. 2 9 4 Briefly, the EPI is the percentage of the dose in humans which caused 
cancer in test animals. It can be calculated by dividing the PEL by the dose 
required to induce tumors in animals. Thus: 
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Workers Rate 
1,3-Butadiene 36 60,000 21,600 
Formaldehyde 28 516,000 144,000 
Tetrachloroethylene 7.8 577,100 45,000 
Trichloroethylene 3.2 518,000 16,600 
Propylene Oxide 2.2 39,400 867 
1,2-Dibromomethane 1.5 6,300 95 
Ethylene Oxide 0.8 96,000 768 
DBCP 0.2 350 0.07 
DCM 2.8 850,000 23,800 
Source: Hooper and Gold Ibid, and NIOSH. Part-time and full-
time workers have been combined. 
The new OSHA formaldehyde rule has reduced the PEL from 3 ppm to 1 ppm 
(8-hour time-weighted average), so the EPI Severity Rate would be about one-third 
the value shown in Table 4.2, using current values. Of course, this type of analysis 
ignores economic feasibility considerations, and the carcinogen policy warns against 
the establishment of a "rigid formula...to assign predetermined weight to each 
factor." But it should be clear that at least among this group of carcinogens, DCM 
is one of the more important carcinogens to be regulated. 
Assuming that DCM would have been placed on the Priority List, and that 
OSHA would have initiated a study concerning the economic and/or technological 
This means that at the current PEL, workers receive 2.8% of the dose required 
to cause cancer in 50% of the test animals for methylene chloride. If these data 
are multiplied by the number of workers exposed, then a rational priority-setting 
scheme can be approximated by calculating an EPI Severity Rate, defined as the 
product of the EPI (in percent) times the number of workers exposed. These 
results are shown in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 EPI-Severity Index for Some Volatile Chemicals 
Chemical EPI(%) No. of Exposed EPI Severity 
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Priority List Development 180 days 
ANPR 30 days 
Comment Period 30 days 
NPR Comment Period 60 days 
Rulemaking Hearings 100 days 
Post Hearing Comment Period 90 days 
Final Standard 120 days 
Total 610 days 
Thus, from the time animal and/or human data first became available, less than 
2 years would have been required to establish a final rule, based on the model 
standards contained in the policy. If substitutes were available for certain 
processes, then the alternate technology would have been developed more rapidly, 
since DCM would have been banned ("no" exposure would have been permitted). 
For example, paint stripping can be performed using DCM, bead blasting, or lasers. 
Even though the capability exists, lasers and bead blasting have not been 
implemented on a wide scale, although some observers believe these applications will 
now be accelerated under the threat of tightened regulation. Even if substitutes 
were not available, the PEL would have been dramatically reduced to a level as low 
as feasible. 
If the animal data that first appeared in 1980 were of sufficient quality, then 
a final rule would have been on the books by the end of 1982. Even if such a 
ruling could not have been made until the appearance of the NTP studies in 1985, 
feasibility of reducing exposures, the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(ANPR) would have been issued in 30 days. The ANPR would have had a comment 
period of no more than 30 days. At this point, a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(NPR), followed by a comment period of a maximum of 60 days, would have been 
published in the Federal Register. The carcinogen policy stated that the hearings 
would begin no later than 100 days after the ANPR, so the total rulemaking period 
would have been: 
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the rule would have been in place by 1987. Presently, OSHA has not yet issued the 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, and hearings have not even been scheduled. 
Using the results of the quantitative risk assessment MLE's described above, 
we can calculate how many cancers might have been avoided had a generic policy 
been in place and enforced. Recall that the MLE's varied between 0.38 - 58 per 
1000 workers and that the 95% confidence limits varied between 8.03 - 248 per 
1000 workers. If we assume that the risk declines in a linear fashion for those 
with lower exposures, and that exposures below the PEL are evenly distributed for 
all 1 million workers potentially exposed, then we can calculate average 95% 
confidence limits for the entire range of exposures: 
Risk/1000 Workers 
Exposure(ppm) 95% confidence (lower) (upper) 
500 8.03 248 
400 6.42 198 
300 4.82 149 
200 3.21 99 
100 1.61 50 
1 0.016 0.5 
Average 4.02 124 
Thus, the 95% average confidence limits for exposures between 1 ppm and 500 ppm 
are 4.02/1000 workers and 124/1000 workers. Since this does not include workers 
with exposures greater than 500 ppm, the true risk may be underestimated. On the 
other hand, it is likely that many more workers have exposures below 100 ppm, 
and that the exposure distribution is not linear. An OSHA contractor estimated 
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that the average 8 hour time-weighted average exposure was 22.4 ppm for 
industry. 2 9 6 Thus, the assumption presented above may overestimate the true risk. 
If we then assume that it takes five more years to issue a final DCM rule 
under the current "muddling through" substance-specific method of regulation, and 
that a rule could have been issued as early as 1983, then there would a delay of 
roughly 10 years that could have been avoided had a generic carcinogen policy 
been in place. Since the confidence limits are lifetime risk estimates, we can 
estimate the number of cancers that may have been avoided during those 10 years, 
assuming an average lifespan of 74 years, and a total exposed worker population of 
1 million: 
4.04/1000 x 10 x 1,000,000 
^_546 
74 
124/1000 x 10 x 1,000,000 
^_17,000 
74 
Thus, between 546 and 17,000 cancers caused by exposure to this single substance 
could have been avoided had a generic cancer policy been in force, using 
conservative assumptions (i.e., 95% confidence limits). If less conservative 
assumptions (e.g., MLE's) had been used, the figure would have been reduced to 
between 181 and 5,700 cancers. If the average exposure (22.4 ppm) had been used, 
the number of cancers prevented would be between 49 and 1,500. 
Pharmacokinetics 
DCM has been the focus of extensive research examining how it is metabolized 
in the body. Would the carcinogen policy have permitted a reexamination of its 
final standard on the basis of this new evidence? This is an important question, 
2 9 5 Pedco Environmental Report, cited in 51 FR 42257, Nov. 24, 1986 (Advance 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Occupational Exposure to Methylene Chloride) 
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2 9 6 See Reitz RH and Andersen ME: "Physiologically-Based Pharmacokinetics 
and the Risk Assessment Process for Methylene Chloride," Dow Chemical Company 
and US Air Force, AFAMRL/THB, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, July 15, 1985 
and EPA: "Update to the Health Assessment Document and Addendum for 
Dichloromethane: Pharmacokinetics, Mechanism of Action and Epidemiology" (Draft), 
EPA/600/8-87/030A, Washington, July, 1987. See Crump, Ibid, for a review 
since some critics argued that the policy would be inflexible, and would "freeze 
science." 
For many years it was thought that DCM was converted into carbon monoxide, 
explaining its acute toxicity (central nervous system depression). This 
biotransformation occurs through a metabolic mechanism known as the P-450 mixed 
function oxidase (MFO) pathway, which takes place primarily in the liver, and, to a 
lesser extent, in the lung. However, formic acid was detected in the urine of 
workers exposed to DCM, suggesting that another pathway exists. Working through 
glutathione-S-transferase (GST), an enzyme found in a different part of the liver, 
and also to a lesser extent in the lung, the possibility that DCM could be also 
metabolized to carbon dioxide, with formaldehyde and formic acid as intermediates, 
was stipulated. 2 9 6 
The two pathways may work at different rates for different exposure levels. 
Some researchers have stated that this explains why there is a carcinogenic effect 
in mice at low dose levels, while there is no cancer in rats or other species. (Mice 
have a higher rate of GST metabolism.) The MFO pathway can be saturated, while 
the GST pathway cannot (i.e. it operates through first order kinetics). Both 
pathways are thought to produce substances capable of interacting with 
macromolecules like DNA, resulting in carcinogenesis. The reason that mice had 
higher rates of cancer than did rats or hamsters in the NTP study is because the 
GST pathway is capable of producing more of the toxic intermediate than the MFO 
pathway at high doses (in theory). Mice have markedly higher rates of GST 
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2 9 7European Chemical Industry Ecology and Toxicology Centre: "ECETOC 
Statement No. 4 - June 1987: Current Results from European Chemical Industry-
Sponsored Research into Species Differences in the Toxicology of Methylene 
Chloride," OSHA Docket Document 10-36 
2 9 8 Crump, Ibid. p. 83 
metabolism, followed by rats, hamsters, and humans (based on in vitro testing of 
tissue samples), respectively. Since mice are already predisposed to liver cancer, 
then the tests dramatically overestimate the cancer rates actually experienced by 
humans, according to this theory. 2 9 7 In addition, this may mean that dose-response 
curves cannot be considered to be linear, since there are different rate constants 
for the two pathways. 
However, there are important assumptions here. The mechanistic models do 
not rule out the possibility that DCM itself, not its metabolites, causes cancer. The 
concentrations of MFO intermediates also does not explain the tumor incidence in 
the mouse lung and liver and the observed difference in mice and hamsters. 
Finally, the sensitivity of the pharmacokinetic model has not been evaluated for 
various parameters, such as individual animal differences, and the uncertainty in 
the model has not been quantified. Nevertheless, most observers seem to feel that 
the use of pharmacokinetic data is a major advance in the practice of risk 
assessment, 2 9 8 since a plausible mechanism for tumor formation can be proposed and 
perhaps one day fully validated. 
The relevant question here is whether this advance in science should mean 
that the regulation should be delayed until some of these questions can be resolved, 
or if such certainty is not required to take protective action. The cancer policy is 
quite clear on the issue of metabolic differences: 
Arguments that differences in metabolic profiles can be used to demonstrate 
that a chemical found positive in an experimental study in a mammalian system 
would pose no potential carcinogenic risk to exposed workers will be 
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considered by the Secretary only if the evidence presented for the specific 
substance...meets the following criteria: 
i. A complete metabolic profile, including identities of trace metabolites, is 
presented for the experimental animal species. 
ii. A complete metabolic profile, including identities of trace metabolites, is 
available for a human population group representative of those who are 
occupationally exposed. 
iii. Documented evidence is provided for ascribing the carcinogenic activity of 
the substance in test animal species to metabolites produced only in that 
species and not in humans; and 
iv. Documented evidence is provided to show that other metabolites produced 
also in humans have been adequately tested...2 9 9 
Since both metabolic pathways have been detected in humans, it would appear 
that section iii would rule out the use of this data, at least for now. In fact, the 
EPA has arrived at the same conclusion: 
In view of the uncertainties involved, the changes in DCM's carcinogenic 
potency that result from different uses of the available pharmacokinetic 
information are not, in practical terms, very distinct. Discussion of the issues 
has been worthwhile because of their theoretical importance rather than their 
practical significance in the present case. 3 0 0 
Thus, instead of "freezing science," the policy would facilitate the generation 
of additional useful scientific information to meet the requirements of the cancer 
policy. Paragraph iii above would have helped to ensure that the research was 
structured to provide the greatest degree of certainty possible. Instead of requiring 
a standard of scientific certainty that DCM causes cancer, the policy requires some 
level of scientific certainty that DCM does not cause cancer, especially when there 
is evidence to the contrary. This basic concept of presumptive rebuttal is crucial, 
and we shall examine it further in the final chapter. 
2 9 9 4 5 FR 5287, section 1990.144(c), OSHA Cancer Policy 
3 0 0 E P A : "Update to the Health Assessment Document and Addendum for 
Dichloromethane (Methylene Chloride): Pharmacokinetics, Mechanism of Action, and 
Epidemiology," EPA/600/8-87/030A Review Draft, Washington, July 1987, p. I l l 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Major Findings 
1. A generic cancer policy at OSHA is considered to be a necessity by all the 
major players involved, with the exception of economists, who prefer to 
analyze the impacts of each chemical regulated. 
2. Economists, risk analysts, and industrialists all have a stake in making that 
policy conform to the guideline type of carcinogen policy. Conversely, workers 
have an interest in making the policy a legally-enforceable one. While 
scientists may not have a stake professionally, they would probably be more at 
ease with the guideline approach, since this would limit the extent of outside 
influence on their research. 
3. Risk assessment and risk management cannot be neatly separated into 
compartments, one scientific, the other value-laden. In practice, the two mix. 
The product is a policy shaped by uncertain scientific knowledge and the social 
values of the dominant political forces. Democracy is enhanced when risk 
management issues are mixed openly with risk assessment issues. 
4. Economists, with support from risk assessors, have gained hegemony in the 
field of cancer risk regulation by focusing on limited resources and calling for 
"hard choices" and "rational decisions." This means that society will continue 
to struggle with ethical dilemmas. Unless issues like equity, public 
participation, and fairness are raised openly, the nation is likely to become 
more undemocratic, relying on experts and serving dominant industry interests. 
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5. The presumptive-rebuttal approach, currently limited to screening programs, 
should be extended to standards-setting programs like OSHA. The OSHA 
cancer policy is one way to do that. 
6. Organized labor has been conspicuously absent from the effort to develop and 
implement a generic cancer policy. The policy is at once complex and diffuse. 
This may help explain why it has received such low priority in this decade. 
7. The cancer policy should be seen as an attempt to provide usable information 
to the public, and to allow the public to have action taken on uncertain 
scientific information through formal principles. An informed public is 
essential to a vibrant democracy. If we truly value public participation in 
decision-making, we must have a generic cancer policy. The record shows that 
the approach is feasible, but we have not yet mustered the will to implement 
it. 
The Necessity of a Generic Cancer Policy 
Is a generic cancer policy needed at OSHA? All the major decisionmakers 
interviewed for this study indicated that there is little alternative in the face of 
the large number of chemicals in use. The current pace of rulemaking activity is 
too slow to allow the agency to fulfill its mandate. In short, there appears to be 
strong support for a "comprehensive rational" cancer policy and general discontent 
with the "muddling through" approach, even though the latter more closely defines 
the historical experience. This discontent is evident across the political spectrum, 
from the activist outlook personified by Eula Bingham, to the more cautious anti-
regulatory stance of Thorne Auchter and some economists. 
The more difficult questions concern whether such a policy is feasible. There 
are substantial disagreements over the policy's proposed scope and content. 
Economists argue that since different chemicals occupy different positions in the 
economy, the economic impact of regulating chemical substances must be assessed 
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3 0 2Rushefsky, Ibid. p. 90 
individually. Similarly, risk assessors are reluctant to adopt simplistic models to 
speed up the risk assessment process, since risk estimates may become even less 
accurate or plausible than they are now. Risk assessment is seen as a new 
discipline which requires extensive flexibility not amenable to standardization. 3 0 1 
The increase in toxicological understanding may also militate against a generic 
approach. For dichloromethane, we saw that the increased use of pharmacokinetic 
data may require a more specific understanding of metabolic pathways. Scientists 
may tend to support the "guideline" approach specified recently by the EPA and 
OSTP, which may enable policy to keep pace better with current knowledge. At the 
same time, it may have less impact on commercial dissemination of carcinogens, 
since the guidelines are not legally-enforceable standards, and do not have the 
rulemaking deadlines contained in the 1980 OSHA policy. At least one policy 
analyst also views the 1980 OSHA policy as "extreme" and rigid. 3 0 2 Thus, scientists 
(trained to accept only near-certain evidence as meaningful), economists (trained to 
accept utilitarianism), and at least some policy analysts (trained to present a 
balanced perspective) all have some stake in the guideline approach. If true, it 
would not be surprising to see a new OSHA cancer policy closely resemble the 
current EPA and OSTP guidelines. 
In Chapter II, we saw how some risk estimates have declined in this decade. 
Whether this is due to risk-tolerant assumptions of the Reagan administration, or 
the product of new scientific knowledge is difficult to determine. It seems likely 
3 0 1 Hattis D: "What's Wrong with Quantitative Risk Assessment?" Paper 
presented at the Conference on Moral Issues and Public Policy Issues in the Use of 
the Method of Quantitative Risk Assessment, Georgia State University, September 
26-27, 1985. Author is with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for 
Policy Alternatives. 
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that both processes proceed at once—that the "scientific" risk assessment process 
mixes with the "political" risk management process. 
There is troubling evidence that certain assumptions may not have been 
conservative enough. Recent reports of loss of stratospheric ozone, together with 
the well-known "greenhouse" effect suggest that the environment may not be self-
cleansing, as the economists have assumed. And although there are numerous 
alternative explanations as to why the cancer incidence rate is climbing, there 
should continue to be concern about whether we are indeed acting quickly enough. 
Under this second scenario, the gap between a scientific approach (i.e., one 
requiring nearly-absolute proof) and a prudent one is pressing. 
Are we being sufficiently prudent? Short of the appearance of catastrophe 
(i.e., an indisputable cancer epidemic or obvious mutations), there is likely to be a 
lack of consensus on this among the scientific community for the forseeable future. 
Policy actions will thus continue to be formed by a mixture of the prevailing 
political climate and current scientific knowledge. Thus, "...science and policy mix: 
the scientist is a policy entrepreneur, science poses problems, politics uses science 
to justify policy actions or policy changes, scientific research receives public 
funding, and regulatory science comes into being." 3 0 3 An increasingly 
knowledgeable electorate is likely to demand a larger role in decisionmaking in this 
area. 
The choice of assumptions rests in large measure on how risks and benefits 
are perceived. This is not simply a balancing of cost and benefits, or ranking of 
priorities, but an important social decision that indicates a consensus on the nature 
of our limitations. Economists have argued forcefully that our resources, which 
include both material goods as well as time and energy, are limited, and that 
3 0 3Rushefsky, Ibid. 
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society needs to rationally choose the mix of goods and services that maximize 
human welfare. They state that greater attention needs to be given to opportunity 
costs and "hard choices." Risk assessors have attempted to help make those choices 
through various ranking schemes indicating relative risk, implicitly placing bounds 
on what a rational decision should look like, and perhaps inadvertently preventing 
other, more intangible but important considerations from entering the picture. 
Once we accept the assumption that our resources are in fact limited, then we 
face a number of insoluble ethical dilemmas. For example, recent developments in 
epidemiology and advances in exposure assessments have resulted in clearer 
identification of specific populations at increased risk. The ethical responsibility to 
inform those at risk is embodied in a current bill before Congress 3 0 4 and in the 
large number of right-to-know regulations that have swept the country. What 
seems like a very low-level risk which should be accepted by rational individuals 
may well become unacceptable once individuals are identified. With a worldview of 
limited resources, then, some workers will face increased risk so that the rest of 
society will benefit from the products of their labor. 
Under the assumption that resources are limited, we are left with ethical 
choices that are impossible to make, and ultimately lead to paralysis. Do we allow 
some estimated number of workers to contract cancer to provide goods to the rest 
of us? One writer has suggested that America is in the grip of an "epidemic of 
nosophobia, literally defined as a morbid fear of illness,"3 0 5 and that such fear is 
an irrational failure to appreciate the benefits of chemicals in the modern world. 
Yet if it is true that increased affluence brings with it a lower appreciation for 
3 0 4"High Risk Occupational Disease Notification and Prevention Act," HR 162 
in the House and S 79 in the Senate, sponsored by Gaydos and Metzembaum, respectively. 
3 0 5 Whelan EM: "America is in the grip of a new epidemic: the morbid fear 
of illness," Atlanta Journal Constitution, October 23, 1987, p. A-23 
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additional benefits at the margin, then such a fear may not be irrational at all. It 
simply means that society may not wish to continue to achieve further growth, 
which economists usually take to mean increased goods and services. It suggests 
that society wishes to move in new directions, w i t h important consequences for how 
we define needs and wants, and how we choose to perform work. Such a 
transition would be a wrenching experience for a market-based, growth-oriented 
economy; there is admittedly little evidence of such a trend. Slow-growth advocates 
remain small in number and without authority. 
Does it make sense to say that some resources are unlimited? Before the 
question is dismissed out of hand, it is important to understand that even 
economists recognize the presence o f "intangibles." Creativity, love, visions o f the 
future-all of these are resources (not merely concepts) that few of us would wish 
to limit. If we make choices based solely only on what our tangible capabilities 
are, then we may lose important abilities to choose directions and make decisions 
which are morally sound. In short, we simply aim for what is achievable and 
economically profitable, not what is perceived as being worthwhile or right or just. 
Some elements of goals are always beyond reach, and i f we simply allocate 
resources to the mix of activities which is most likely to increase economic wealth, 
we lose direction, and fail to determine whether additional growth is in our best 
interest. 
Consider again a quote from C. V. Cox, a representative of the Chemical 
Manufacturer's Association: "As we all know, U t o p i a s do not exist, and energies 
spent trying to reach an unrealistic goal are spent in vain...We should strive to 
reduce risks to a level that reaches toward zero, but any attempt to actually t r y to 
reach absolute zero w i l l mean misspent resources."306 In essence, he has denied 
3 0 6 C o x , CV: "Risk is Normal to Life Itself," Ibid. 
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the power of vision as a guide to social action. It does not require a significant 
leap to recognize that a generic cancer policy such as OSHA's could be 
characterized as a Utopian policy that is simply not possible. This is why the AIHC 
compared the policy to the "unrealistic" Delaney clause. But the essential point of 
both Delaney and the OSHA cancer policy is to provide a direction for action, and 
a plan for how to get there. What does this concept of certain unlimited resources 
mean for the development of generic regulation of carcinogens? Essentially, it 
provides a way out of some of the ethical dilemmas described earlier. It means 
that efforts to identify, classify and regulate carcinogens in the workplace are 
worthwhile activities that should be supported, even if it is true that the relative 
risks are slight when compared to other risks. It suggests that the danger of 
regulating a non-carcinogen as a carcinogen is less important than the failure to 
regulate. Most importantly, it suggests that the embryonic environmental ethic, 
which requires not continued growth, but a continuous desire for improvements in 
health and safety, cannot be dismissed as an irrational aberration of modern society 
fomented by the media. Work then becomes not only a means to produce, but a 
way of improving the human condition through means other than supply of 
commodities. A fundamentally new definition of needs and wants is indicated. 
If the slow-growth ethic eventually comes to dominate the high-growth ethic 
in modern society, then the presumption-rebuttal approach codified in the OSHA 
cancer policy would become more acceptable than it is presently. Of course, 
business interests have a large stake in continued growth, and a presumption-
rebuttal approach is obviously a direct threat. This new approach is finding 
increased expression, however. The OSHA Hazard Communication Standard has 
elements of the presumption rebuttal approach. Employers are required to report 
evidence of carcinogenicity of products on Material Safety Data Sheets. They can 
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3 0 7 "Law Proposed by Initiative Petition first to be Submitted to the General 
Assembly [of Ohio] to enact sections 3710.99...to inform and protect workers exposed 
to toxic substances in the workplace," October 16, 1980. Section 4123.681 says in 
part,"Where an employec.sustains an occupational disease...from exposure to toxic 
substances known to produce such disease, there shall be a rebuttable presumption 
that such occupational diseasc.is a result of the employment." 
also rebut such findings by citing other negative studies, but the standard contains 
language indicating that a single well-conducted animal study showing 
carcinogenicity is sufficient cause to provide warning. Thus, the standard 
incorporates prudence as the dominant feature. Presumptive rebuttal was also 
included in a proposed state law in Ohio, although it was never adopted as law. 3 0 7 
The Toxic Substances Control Act, if enforced to the letter, would require extensive 
testing of all new chemicals. In short, new chemicals would need to be proven 
safe. In practice, the burden of proof currently rests with those trying to prove 
the presence of a hazard. Increased affluence may mean that we can now afford to 
shift those assumptions. The OSHA cancer policy should be seen as an attempt to 
extend presumption-rebuttal from screening programs (such as the Toxic Substances 
Control Administration) to standards-setting programs like OSHA. The initial effort 
suffered a set-back, but the need is still present. 
The results of the interviews conducted for this thesis also indicate the need 
for several new institutional arrangements. The absence of a working relationship 
between OSHA and NIOSH has harmed both agencies. OSHA has generally not 
responded to NIOSH recommendations for new standards, resulting in extensive 
litigation and agenda-setting by outsiders. In turn, NIOSH has increasingly seen its 
standard-recommending function as secondary to defining the current state-of-the-
art in occupational medicine and epidemiology. While this is important, the overall 
result has been lower budgets for NIOSH, and a sense that NIOSH is largely 
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irrelevant to the standards-setting process. The present $60 million dollar budget 
for NIOSH is smaller than individual grants offered by other scientific agencies. 
A more effective NIOSH would give OSHA some measure of insulation from 
litigation. Upon receiving petitions, OSHA could argue convincingly that it is 
following recommendations from NIOSH, which had been decided upon for a number 
of publicly-stated reasons. This is not to suggest that petitioners be prevented 
from due process; it merely means that OSHA could exercise a greater measure of 
control over its own agenda. A more effective OSHA would respond formally to 
NIOSH recommendations within a specified time period, forcing NIOSH to make 
recommendations that are more likely to be acted upon. In fact, such an 
experiment is now underway. NIOSH has recently completed its first risk 
assessment (regarding exposure to radon). A proposed standard and the risk 
assessment were delivered to the Mine Safety and Health Agency (MSHA), which is 
now formally required to respond to the NIOSH recommendation in 60 days. If 
successful, this exercise has important lessons for NIQSH-OSHA relationships. 
Better communication could also lessen OSHA's dependency on expertise from 
outside consultants. The prospect for increased citizen participation is also 
enhanced, since reliance on "consensus" standards (such as TLVs, which are more 
likely to be set without public participation) is reduced. 
An active OSHA carcinogen policy also has important implications for the 
National Toxicology Program. Current business-led efforts to downgrade the NTP's 
work as "hazard identification documents" (as opposed to "risk assessments") may 
ultimately impede the important work of the scientific agency. Public debate over 
proposed classification of carcinogens rightfully belongs in the rulemaking arena, 
not in a scientific arena, where involvement of citizens is more likely to be 
restricted due to the technical nature of the issues. The citing of the NTP list and 
142 
IARC lists in other regulations transfers the debate from a political arena to one 
which is more technical, and hence less accessible. Such accessibility is important 
to the democratic process. Of course, the scientific programs like NTP will never 
be the idealized "pure" scientific agency, completely aloof from the political winds. 
The relationship between OMB and OSHA needs to be better defined. 
Carcinogen risk assessment guidelines by the two agencies differ extensively. 
Congress should address at length how society wishes to address uncertain health 
risks, and which risks society regards as acceptable (perhaps by some combination 
of magnitude, fairness, formal consideration of benefits gained from taking the 
risk, equity, compensation, voluntariness, and perhaps probability). Similarly, 
Congress needs to consider possible limitations on the scope of judicial review of 
agency standards. If those standards are the result of democratic rulemaking 
processes which are in accordance with the requirements of the Administrative 
Procedures Act, there may be little useful role for further judicial review. The 
cynical use of judicial review as a delaying tactic has to be restrained if we are to 
make progress. While it is clear the courts are best equipped to rule on matters of 
process, it is far from evident that judges possess the abilities to rule on matters 
of substance. The costs involved in delay are substantial in terms of lives lost, as 
the DCM ease study illustrated. The OSHA cancer policy provides for substantial 
public input, and has never been accused of violating the APA. While this has most 
probably been due to the failure to fully implement the policy, Congress may wish 
to limit the courts' ability to hear cases which counter the agency's actual findings. 
On one other point, all decisionmakers interviewed for this study agreed: 
Carcinogen regulation is an enormously complicated process, fraught with difficulties 
and uncertainties. Yet the case study of DCM showed the clear and present need 
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3 0 8Interview with Franklin Mirer, United Automobile Workers Director of 
Health and Safety, American Industrial Hygiene Conference, San Fransisco, 
California, May 16, 1988 
for such a policy. Expedited rulemaking on this single substance alone would 
probably save lives; this alone should be sufficient to make it worth doing. 
This story of the OSHA cancer policy would riot be complete if we did not 
consider the role of another important actor. Organized labor has, for the most 
part, been conspicuously absent from the development of the policy. Their efforts 
have been limited to offering testimony during the hearings. 8 0 8 Instead, unions 
have chosen to wage a series of court battles over specific substances, such as 
formaldehyde, benzene, and ethylene oxide. One possible explanation for this is 
that unions have only recently begun to employ limited numbers of health and 
safety professionals, and may have lacked the expertise to participate significantly 
in the debate. Table 5.1 shows the number of such professionals employed by 
organized labor. 
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Table 5.1 Union Health and Safety 
Staff in 14 Selected High Hazard Unions 
Catecorv 1976 1983 
Doctors 5 3 
Industrial Hygienists 8 15 
Lawyers 5 8 
Engineers 5 4 
Epidemiologists 1 2 
Public Health Professionals 5 3 
Economists 4 2 
Occupational Safety 
& Health Specialists 0 4 
Occupational Safety 
& Health Coordinators 0 16 
Nurses 0 1 
Legislative Representatives 0 1 
Educators 0 1 
Others 0 10 
Chemists 2 0 
Total 35 70 
Full-time 20 44 
Source: 1983 Survey of Fourteen Unions Occupational Safety and Health Programs. 
Public Citizen Health Research Group, Washington, DC, 1984, cited in 
Noble C: Liberalism at Work, the Rise and Fall of OSHA. Temple 
University Press, Philadelphia, 1986, p.131 
Other possible explanations include an emphasis on obtaining adequate enforcement 
of existing standards, and a tendency to respond to individual grievances from union 
locals, which would be more likely to concern individual substances. 
At a minimum, organized labor should re-examine its substance-specific legal 
strategy, especially if it expects to provide the leadership and vision it displayed 
when the OSHA Act was originally formulated. Labor's current efforts to transform 
the "right-to-know" into the "right-to-act" would be invigorated by the presumption 
rebuttal generic approach. 
Because the cancer policy is diffuse in nature, there have not been identifiable 
advocacy groups pushing hard for its implementation. Organized labor or public 
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3 0 9 See Jasanoff S: Risk Management and Political Culture. Russell Sage 
Foundation, New York, 1986 for an excellent comparative study on cancer policies in 
different industrialized nations. Also see Kelman S: Regulating American. 
Regulating Sweden: A Comparative Study of Occupational Health and Safety 
Policy. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1981 for an account of the importance of involving 
workers in decisionmaking. 
interest groups have yet to demonstrate the strength to effectively counter the 
AIHC on this question. The result has been a willingness to let the policy languish 
and to continue to muddle through. Congress has shown little desire to struggle 
with the complexity of risk analysis and cancer policy. Instead, it has chosen to 
criticize OSHA for failing to develop a more expedited rulemaking process, without 
offering the guidance or the authority to actually do so. The political prospects for 
the policy are therefore not encouraging. 
The OSHA cancer policy is fundamentally a story about how newly-emerging 
information is used. Our society has been variously described as a "post-industrial" 
society, a "technologically-based" society, or a society entering the "information 
age." The question of applying such information is not specific to the occupational 
health and safety or environmental fields. Yet, the idea of specifying assumptions 
for areas where scientific uncertainty is prevalent, of providing classification 
schemes to make information comprehensible, and of providing expedited, simplified 
protective measures, raises the question of how our wealth of information will be 
used in the modern era. Will it be provided to those who need it? Will citizens 
and workers be educated to be able to act on it? After all, an educated populace 
is central to democracy. Or will information serve the needs of a relatively small 
elite, centered in the business and scientific communities? Several other advanced 
industrialized countries have chosen the latter course, 3 0 9 with reduced input by 
their peoples. The answer will determine in large measure whether our society can 
realize its full democratic potential. 
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We have been lucky with the "muddling through" approach so far. No clear 
cancer epidemic has emerged, and no substance has been conclusively shown to be 
mutagenic in subsequent generations. Of course, no one can predict whether our 
luck will hold. Our complex technological society demands that we graduate to a 
better planning process. The fact that a generic cancer policy at OSHA was 
formulated at all should show that we are capable of meeting the challenge. 
